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ABSTRACT
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This thesis proposes a revisionist reading o f contemporary poetry by examining the 
case of one of the most forgotten American writers of the twentieth century: Laura 
(Riding) Jackson (1901-1991). The goal is to demonstrate that Riding not only had a 
definite and unique poetics, but that hers stands as one o f the most extreme and 
paradoxical stances in Anglo-American modernism, to the point o f abandoning the 
writing o f poetry in 1938. Drawing on the concept o f “canon formation” as well as the 
Foucaultian concepts o f “discourse” and “author-fiinction,” I investigate the 
construction of the modem Anglo-American poetic canon, recovering the context and 
the circumstances o f Riding’s “disappearance.”  While I cover the “discourses” on poetry 
circulating in the first half o f the twentieth century—Pound’s (“imagism”), Eliot’s
(“dissociation of sensibility,”  “impersonality,”  and “tradition”), and the New Critics’ 
(“organic unity,”  “ambiguity”)— I^ offer a critical overview o f alternative modernisms 
being articulated at the time. My intention is to demonstrate that Riding’s poems are 
telling expressions of a writer to whom “the mind thinking becomes the active force of 
the poem,” to use Charles Bernstein’s apt formulation. Among my findings is that the 
reasons for Riding’s non-canonization are many and complex: tlie hegemony of New
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Criticism, her voluntary exile from the literary scene (where reputations are made or 
thwarted), her refusal to be anthologized and to be explained in critical terms other dian 
her own. All tiiese factors, together with the “difficulty” o f her poetry, contributed to 
make of Riding “the greatest lost poet o f American poetry,”  as wrote Kennedi Rexroth. 
Helped by the insights o f two important critics o f American poetry, Charles Bernstein 
and Marjorie Perloff, I defend that Riding’s “poetry of mind”—where what is at stake is 
that which we think to be our reality—represents a radical shift in modernist poetics 
from an image-centered to a language-centered poetry. Focusing on the conscious 
experience and die durational time o f thought present in her poems, I conclude that 
Ridings mindscapes have the precise goal o f identifying a universal fact: as human and 
thinking beings, we are in a permanent condition called language.
Número de páginas: 228 
Número de palavras: 73.658
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RESUMO
Esta tese propõe uma leitura revisionista da poesia contemporânea através do exame
do caso de um dos mais esquecidos escritores norte-americanos do século XX : Laura
(Riding) Jackson (1901-1991). O objetivo é demonstrar que Riding não apenas possuía 
uma poética definida e singular, mas que ela permanece uma das instâncias mais extremas e
paradoxais do modernismo anglo-americano, a ponto de Riding abandonar a escrita da
poesia em 1938. Recorrendo a conceitos de “ formação do cânone” bem como às noções
de “ discurso” e “ função do autor”, em Foucault, investigo a construção do cânone da
poesia moderna anglo-americana, recuperando o contexto e as circunstâncias da ocultação
de Riding. Enquanto cubro os “discursos” poéticos em circulação na primeira metade do
século X X — o “imagismo” de Pound, a “dissociação da sensibilidade” , “ impersonalidade”
e “ tradição” de Eliot, a “unidade orgância” e “ ambigüidade” da Nova Crítica— ofeçeço um
panorama crítico de modernismos alternativos sendo articulados à época. Minha intenção é
demonstrar que os poemas de Riding são expressões vigorosas de um escritor para quem
“a mente pensando se toma a força ativa do poema” , para usar a apta formulação de
Charles Bernstein. Entre minhas descobertas sobre as várias e complexas razões que
levaram à não-canonização de Riding estão a hegemonia da Nova Crítica, o exílio
voluntário de Riding da cena literária (onde são feitas ou desfeitas as reputações), sua
recusa em ser antologiada, bem como em ser explicada em termos críticos que não os dela.
Todos esses fatores, mais a “dificuldade” de sua poesia, contribuíram para fazer de Riding
“ a maior poeta esquecida da poesia norte-americana”, como escreveu Kenneth Rexroth.
Ajudado pelos insights de dois importantes críticos de poesia norte-americana. Charles
Bernstein e Marjorie Perioff, defendo que a “poesia da mente” de Riding— onde o que está
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em jogo é que o que pensamos ser a nossa realidade— ^representa uma mudança radical no 
paradigma da poética modernista: de uma poesia centrada na imagem para uma poesia 
centrada na linguagem. Focalizando a experiência consciente e o tempo duracional do 
pensamento presente em seus poemas, concluo que as “pensagens” de Riding têm o 
objetivo preciso de constatar um fato universal: enquanto seres humanos e pensantes, 
estamos numa condição permanente chamada linguagem.
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INTRODUCTION: TOPICS FOR A READING OF LAURA RIDING  
A Foucaultian Viewpoint
It is not enou^, however, to repeat the empty affinnation that the author has disappeared. For 
the same reason, it is not enougji to keep repeating (after Nietzsche) that God and man have 
died a common death. Instead, we must locate the space left empty by the author’s 
disappearance, follow the distribution of gaps and breaches, and watch for the openings that this 
disappearance uncovers.
(Foucault Reader 121) i
What is a poem? A poem is nothing. By persistence the poem can be made into something; but 
then it is something, not a poem.[...] Whenever this vacuum, the poem, occurs, there is agitation 
on all sides to destroy it, to convert it into something. The conversion of nothing into something 
is the task of criticism.
(Anarchism 18)^
The main objective o f  this study is to account for the relative disappearance o f  Laura 
Riding from institutional and canonical versions o f  Anglo-American poetry as well as from the 
received history o f modem Anglo-American literary criticism. Secondly, to fill this gap in 
literary history through a recovery o f  Riding’s radical and polemic poetry and poetics, in order 
to assert her importance as one o f  the pioneers o f  modernist poetry and criticism.
CH A PTER  1
Michel Foucault in the essay “What is an Author.’
In this introduction I want to foreground the importance o f  seeing the development o f  
modernist American poetry and criticism in Riding’s time, as well as the process o f  canon- 
formation, from a Foucaultian viewpoint: this means to stress the notion that “ criticism is no 
longer going to be practiced in the search for formal stmctures with universal value, but rather 
as a historical investigation into the events that led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects o f  what we are doing, thinking, saying” {Foucault Reader This entails 
also, in terms o f  the present research, that in order to explain the reasons for Riding’s erasure 
from the official literary history o f  American poetry, or the common reduction o f  her work as
a foomote to modernism, it is necessary to account for the powerful discourses that were
being constmcted in the literary, academic, and institutional realm o f  her time, as well as her
critical position regarding such discourses and time.
Discourses, for Michel Foucault, are ideological and institutional practices that attain
hegemonic power during a specific historical period. Discursive practices “are characterized by
the delimitation o f a field o f  objects, the definition o f  a legitimate perspective for the agent o f  
knowledge, and the fixing o f  norms for the elaboration o f  concepts and theories” {Language
199). Therefore, my methodology in this study implies focusing on discourses on poetry that
became dominant in Anglo-American modernism. The specific discursive formation 
emphasized in tliis contextualization o f  Laura Riding’s appearance and disappearance from the
canon o f  Anglo-American poetry is the criticism o f T. S. Eliot and the beliefs, values,
principles, and mles generated by the New Criticism. Discourse, again, as understood by
Foucault, refers neither to the logic o f  the chain o f  reason, as in logic, nor to the sequence o f
phrases o f  the linguists. It takes on a more ample and problematic signification. Contemporary
medical discourses, for instance, are constituted by different formations such as qualitative
2 Laura Riding in “What is a Poem.”
descriptions etc (“What is an Author” 82). Contemporary literary discourses, such as the ones 
produced by Eliot and the New Critics, are also constituted by formations and concepts such 
as irony, ambiguity, objective correlative, dissociation o f  sensibility, unity, aesthetic autonomy, 
organic form, tension, and intentional fallacy, as well as practices such as close reading.
Like other institutions, literature (and specifically poetry) is assumed in this study not just 
as the art o f  language, pure and simple, but as unavoidably linked to certain forms o f  
discourses that attain hegemonic position at certain historical periods. Through history, poetry 
has taken on many roles, from the shamanic and religious, to nationalist, political and even 
racist and sexist ones. In the nineteenth century, as in Romanticism and later in Aestheticism, 
poetry began to be defended as being an autonomous discourse, a structure o f  knowledge in 
itself distinct and superior from science, philosophy, politics, or history. Its universalistic 
claims, as we will see, turned out to displace the importance o f gender, race, class, and politics 
from the literary debate. However, we can not forget, as Terry Eagleton reminds us, that 
“Literature, in the meaning o f  the word we have inherited, is an ideology. It has the most 
intimate relations to questions o f  social power” (Literary Theoiy 22).
In the specific case o f  modem Anglo-American poetry, critics and poets such as I. A. 
Richards, William Empson, T. S. Eliot, John Crowe Ransom, Cleanth Brooks, and the New 
Critics were deeply influenced by Matthew Arnold’s assumption that poetry should function as 
a substitute for religion and morality. As shown by Eagleton, in the case o f  the advent o f  
English studies in the beginning o f  the twentieth century, literature was systematically used to 
reinforce aesthetical values and class ideologies (Ibid. 17). What is important to bear in mind is 
that literature not only produces artistic effects and responses, “masterpieces” and “ failures,” 
but also epistemes: the operation o f  certain ways o f thinking, writing, and evaluating; stmctures 
o f  power/knowledge which hold regulating visions on the nature o f  history, reality, and
literature as being the sole truth, thus imposing standards o f behavior and judgement.
Therefore, in order to contextualize the complex phenomenon called modernism, more 
important than tracing the influences o f  an author upon another is the investigation o f the
concepts, approaches, and theories underlying said phenomenon. And, as ihe New Criticism
became the hegemonic discursive formation during Riding’s career as a poet-critic and
afterwards, I find unavoidable the need to deal with such a power-knowledge and the
discourse on poetry it helped to foster. On the other hand. Riding’s renouncing o f  poetry has
been more discussed than her poems themselves, and not sufficiently from the viewpoint
articulated in her poems. As she puts it, at 85, “To be critic in relation to poetry at the point o f
renouncing it, obeying your consciousness, makes o f  you, in quarters where poets haVe
hierarchic power, someone to keep as quiet as possible”  (“What, if Not, Poems” 15).
As su^ested  by Foucault’s quotation in the first epigraph to this chap^t |ind in my
argumentative line, the concern in this study on modernist poetics is not only tracing the
signifying aspects o f  language in specific poems (meanings unfolded by a,4i>se reading, for
instance), but also with recognizing poetry’s particularities as a form o^xés(^ùrse. This implies 
focusing on the relationship between poetic language and its uses vis-à-vis “the institutional
rules that make possible particular significations and, consequently, make possible particular
forms o f  knowledge” (Con Davis 262).
The New Criticism created a body o f  knowledge that dominated American literary
studies by setting up the rules as to how poetry should be read and written within and outside
the academy, with notions, such as aesthetic unity, balance, organic form, irony, paradox, and
metaphorical complexity, functioning as a set o f  laws for poetic discourse, or a discursive
formation. In this process, as Philip Goldstein observes, the New Critics and, specifically,
Brooks’s approach “enabled literary criticism to become a distinct discipline with an equally
distinct subject matter— t^he canon” (40). The main instrument o f  this powerful discourse, 
which would dominate Anglo-American universities for more than forty years, was the 
pedagogical method o f  close reading. Ironically, Laura Riding was in great part marginalized by 
critics who were most privileged by the method she helped to foster. Moreover, she was taken 
outside the canon o f  modernist poetry she helped to create and criticize.
The Problem of the Canon
The word canon has several meanings according to the dictionary. It means “a list o f  the 
books o f  the Holy Scriptures officially accepted by a church as genuine,” “a standard used in 
judging something, a criterion” {Webster’s 265). But it also refers to a composition that repeats 
the same melody (such as in a Bach’s fugue). As an authoritative list, it means a selection o f  
authors considered great, those who have passed the test o f  time and whose sanctity and 
author-ity are indisputable. In the second sense, it means the set o f  values (aesthetic, moral, 
political) responsible for the inclusion or exclusion o f  authors. In the next dictionary meaning, 
a canon implies a selected library o f  the books that are assigned greatness by ideological 
apparatuses (a range o f  institutional sites and practices such as the universities, state cultural 
institutions, publishing, reviewing, or literary awards): “ Canon has been adapted to literary 
criticism to designate those works and authors whom the literary establishment, through a 
loose consensus, considers ‘major” ’ (Columbia Dictionary 37). To be accepted in die canon, 
therefore, means that a given work or author will be taught, read, studied, valued, and 
respected.
These simultaneous meanings o f the word canon are indicative o f the ideological 
complexity o f  the term. It must be thought o f  as a cultural practice, either taken by a group, a
critic or an institution that possesses clear political and esthetical agendas, although not always 
recognizing so. Therefore, a literary canon is never only an innocent list “o f  the best.” As in 
the biblical tradition, the canonization o f  a text or an author functions, above all, as a category 
o f  power. To canonize a text or an author means allowing it permission to enter the codices o f  
“ sacred” works. One o f  the strongest beliefs in canon-formation is that the included texts are 
embedded in trans-historical values. The usual humanistic assumption that underlies the 
practice o f  canon-formation is that authors included in the canon speak for the “human 
being.” Thus, great literature is taken as the receptacle o f  fixed and permanent universal 
meanings that enable us to understand the whole truth o f  human nature and o f  poetic practice.
When the discussion is the poetry and criticism generated in the first half o f  the 
twentieth century, specifically within the context o f  Anglo-American High Modernism, the 
names usually considered central and canonical by the literary establishment are those o f  
William Butler Yeats, T. S. Eliot, W. H. Auden, Robert Frost, Ezra Pound, and Wallace 
Stevens, with the essays and books o f  I. A. Richards, Cleanth Brooks, William Empson and T. 
S. Eliot recognized as the major critical statements. Their power can be measured (yet another 
meaning for canon is o f a ruler) by the space destined to these names in most standard 
anthologies.^
Certainly, at least in the United States, the canon manifests itself through basic 
ideological state apparatuses: not only the university but also by what Charles Bernstein has 
insightfully called “the official verse culture.” “ One o f  the most common and aggressive ways a
 ^For an excellent historical overview of the selective canons in the U.S., see Alan Golding’s “A History 
of American Poetry Anthologies” {Canons 279-307).
“I am referring,” writes Bernstein, “to the poetry publishing and reviewing practices o f The New York 
Times, The Nation, American Poetry Review, The New York Review of Books, The New Yorker, Poetiy (Chicago), 
Antaeus, Parnassus, Atheneum Press, all the major trade publishers, the poetry series o f almost all tlie 
major university presses. [...] Add to this the ideologically motivated selection of the vast majority of 
poets teaching in university writing and literature programs and of poets taught in such programs as
canon perpetuates and institutionalizes itself is through anthologies. They are still the best 
barometer for noticing the political and poetic criteria orienting the “ official verse culture” as 
regards principles o f  inclusion and exclusion. We can see how such principles operate, for 
instance, by looking at the most official anthologies in the U. S., The Norton Anthology of 
American Voetry and The Norton A nthok^ ofModeryi Voetry— t^he quintessential examples o f  what a 
canon looks like. As Ron Silliman aptly puts in his essay “Canons and Institutions; New Hope 
for the Disappeared,” “ the distinction between individual subjective canon o f  a specific reader 
and the social organization o f  public canons, such as we find in the Norton anthologies and 
college curricula, lies precisely in the factor o f  power. Public canons disempower readers and 
disappear poets. They are conscious acts o f  violence” (Politics 153).
In the earlier decades o f  the century, women modernists such as Virginia Woolf, 
Gertrude Stein, Mina Loy, and Laura Riding pointed to the fact that, looking at the canon o f  
Western literature, one perceives that it is composed in its vast majority by male white 
European middle and upper-middle class representatives. In the construction o f  the literary 
tradition undertaken by Eliot and, more recendy, Harold Bloom, canon-formation occurs 
between male poets confronting their “anxiety” by struggling to overcome the precursor’s 
influence.
The canon is attacked by Laura Riding in the “The Corpus.” In this essay she debunks 
Eliot’s idea o f  tradition:
The social corpus is tyrannically founded on the principle o f  origin. It admits nothing 
new: all is revision, memory, conformation. The individual cosmos must submit itself to 
the generalized cosmos o f  history, it must become part o f  its growing encyclopedia o f
well as the interlocking accreditation of these selections throu^ prizes and awards judged by these 
same individuals. [...] What makes official verse culture official is that it denies die ideological nature of 
its practice while maintaining hegemony in temis of major media exposure and academic legitimization
authorities. [...] The Corpus, in making categorical demands upon the individual, thus 
limits the ways in which works may be conceived and presented. {Anarchism 28)
Written in 1928, the piece is clearly a response to the criticism o f Eliot, “ die chief modem 
apologist for a hereditary canon o f  Western literary classics” (Asher 1). Riding was advancing 
questions that would be retaken during the 1960s by feminist criticism: What are the women in 
the literary game, beyond the roles as muses, victims or femmes fataks} Who decides the 
inclusion and exclusion and for what purposes? One problem that feminist criticism has been 
struggling with in the latest thirty years is the necessity o f  perceiving the limitations, the 
political and aesthetic implications o f  the literary canon. The pressing question becomes: To 
what extent is the exclusion from the canon not based on gender, race, ethnicity, and class 
prejudices? Excluding works by women from the canon serves to contribute to the oppression 
o f  other marginal groups as Other: that is, as not belonging to “ the Corpus,” which is founded 
on heteronormative criteria and, according to Riding, on a principle o f  group-identity.
In fact, we can better see Laura Riding in the context o f  modernism when we remember 
•that— l^iving in England as an American writer connected with Robert Graves— s^he made the 
terrible “mistake” o f  being a woman poet with tremendous intelligence and originality o f  
thought. She was not writing the kind o f  poetry that a woman was expected to write, and she 
was doing it profusely: since her arrival in England and before the departure to Majorca (1926- 
1930), Riding produced six books o f  poetry, two collection o f  critical essays {Anarchism Is N ot 
Enough and Contemporaries and Snobs), as well as two books o f  criticism written with Graves (one 
being nothing less than a survey o f  modernist poetry and the other an attack on anthologies!). 
However, she was not welcomed in the English literary scene. The reception o f  her work was 
severe, as the innumerous negative reviews published at that time demonstrate. The more
and funding” {Content’s
damaging attack came in the pages o f  The Criterion— t^he magazine edited by her archi-rival 
Eliot—where John Gould Fletcher (associated with Pound and Himself an imagist poet) 
ridiculed and reduced Riding’s poetry by claiming that she was an imitator o f  Marianne Moore, 
Graves, and Gertrude Stein. Riding’s poetry was frequently considered cold, cerebral, difficult, 
dreary, and futile. As Jed  Rasula rightly posits, “ In a poetic atmosphere sobered by T. S. Eliot’s 
august presence and pronouncements, Riding’s early work was almost certain to appear as an 
affront to the self-proclaimed dignity poetry had arrived at. She sprang, like Athena, fiilly 
armed” (“A Renaissance” 167).
In the patriarchal and traditionalist canon promoted by Eliot and the New Critics, which 
dominated English and American poetry until the beginning o f  the 1960s, there was no room 
for Laura Riding. Stricdy speaking, maybe there was such a place but only for a short period o f  
time, from 1922 to 1925, when the Fugitives published and praised her poetry in their 
magazine Fugitive. What has to be investigated, thus, is how a poet-critic so fundamental for 
modernist poetry and criticism, a poet who was acclaimed by some important poets in the 
1920s and 1930s, could be dismissed from the canon imposed by this form o f discourse. 
Literary accounts o f modernism frequently forget that women were not at all “marginal” to it, 
but at the center: they were editors (Nancy Cunard, Virginia Woolf, Sylvia Beach), and were at 
the head o f  key private presses and alternative magazines such as Voetry, The Dial, and The Little 
Review. They were writing futurist and feminist poetry as well as manifestoes and innovative 
and ground-breaking works (Riding, H. D., Stein, Loy).
Against the relatively homogenous modernist tradition designed by the New Critics, I 
want to stress the diversity and conflicting aspects o f  modernist poetry, in which Riding had a 
fundamental role as an independent poet, critic, editor, and thinker o f  poetry. It is important to 
bear in mind that, when addressing the diversity o f  American poetry, it is more appropriate to
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take “diversity” in its etymological root: not to imply a bland variety, as it is more frequently 
understood, but in the sense that the Oxford English Dictionary brings us: as signifying difference, 
oddity, contrariety, disagreement, wickedness. Thus, to locate the period in which a specific
object appears and its competing discourses— i^n this case, Laura Riding’s poetry and poetics__
becomes a fundamental task. The same applies to the exploration o f  “ the space left empty by 
the author’s disappearance,” as Foucault suggests, for my purpose here, the usual 
disappearance o f  Laura Riding from canonical accounts o f  contemporary theory and poetry. 
N ot mentioning the quality o f  her innovative poetry, only her achievements in A  Surv^ of 
Modernist Poetgi (1927)— discussed more extensively in chapters 2 and 3— a^s well as the 
definitive impact the book had on critics such as William Empson and Cleanth Brooks, would 
be enough to replace her position among the founders o f  Anglo-American modem criticism. 
However, the vocabulary used by poets and critics to define her is surprising: “Blue Butter 
Balls” (Louise Bogan), “ tiie witch o f  truth” (Marjorie Perioff), “prize bitch” (William Carlos 
Williams), “anomaly” (Cary Nelson), and “eccentric” (Helen Vendler). The peculiarity o f  her 
work is also evident in the difficulty critics have in placing her in the context o f  contemporary 
poetry: “neo-Metaphysical poetry” (Sona Raziss), “New Critical poet” (David Perkins), 
“philosophical poet” (W. H. Auden), “proto-feminist” (K. K. Ruthven), “a modernist puzzle” 
(Victor M. Cassady), and even “proto-Language poet” (Jerome McGann).
Contrary to Riding’s belief, expressed in the second epigraph to this chapter, one should 
say that, even if one can Platonically think o f  poetry as a vacuum, a poem does not exist in a 
vacuum,^ for this would mean to erase its existence from human transaction. More than a 
specific form o f human utterance, a poem is always the product o f the discursive formations o f 
the historical place and country in which it flourishes. Thus, it becomes necessary, in my
 ^ “A poem [...] is not an effect (common or uncommon) of experience; it is the ability to create a
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methodology, not only to situate Riding within Anglo-American modernism but also to 
consider “ the politics o f  literary forms” o f  the period. This implies paying attention to how 
poetic forms inform specific ideologies and ways o f  thinking (Bernstein, T>olitics vii). The 
problem is that “both the formalist and new critical maps,” as Bernstein writes, “ tend to treat 
stylistic developments as a series o f  autonomous technical ‘advances’ within an art medium and 
without recourse to sociohistorical ‘explanation’: a canonical strategy that underwrites the 
teaching o f  literature in most university settings” (Ibid. 237).
The New Criticism and its use o f  Eliot’s author-function created a hegemonic modernist 
episteme, or an assembly o f  principles, laws, and concepts that became canonized. Another 
more common result o f  the hegemony o f the New Critical method, as Eagleton explains, was 
that “ [rjescuing the text from author and reader went in hand with disentangling it from any 
social and historical context” {U.terary Theory 48).*
In Tradition and Individual Talent,” a key essay for Anglo-American modernism, 
notoriously, Eliot defends how each poem and poet had to be set up within the whole range o f  
the (male) European tradition o f  poetry,- from Homer, Dante, and Shakespeare to Yeats. 
According to Eliot, a poem is valuable if it is in agreement with this tradition— t^hat is, with a 
specific discourse on poetry— a^nd in how the poem and the poet respond to it. By this time, 
we have at least a sense o f  how, paradoxically, the author became a function o f  the New
vacuum in experience— i^t is a vacuum and therefore nothing” {Anarchism 17).
« The poet, anthologist, translator and critic Jerome Rotlienberg sums up, in the Preface to 'Revolution of 
The Word, the poetry scene in America’s “tranquilized fifties” for the young poets: “To us the news 
hadn’t yet filtered that the age o f the modem, the experimental & visionary (for we sensed it even as 
wisdom), had passed: to be replaced by a return to the old forms, to conventional metrics, diction, a 
responsible modernism, liberal & reformist, rational & refined, & goodbye to the madmen of language. 
Those were the first lessons of college days. They called it Auden or- Lowell, Tate or Wilbur. Middle- 
ground, like the politics then emerging. It became a question o f amelioration. A shift o f stance. A little 
tou^ening of Tennyson. Change the topic, the conversation. Change the footnotes. Kierkegaard 
instead o f Darwin. Church instead of Nature. But tlie body of die poem must be untouched. Tlie 
images must be inherited & the inheritance must be along the line of what was called the ‘great 
tradition.’ Western. Christian. Wliite. ” (xi)
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Criticism’s discourse. What flinction? As Foucault states in his essay
[A]n author’s name is not simply an element in a discourse (capable o f  being either 
subject or object, o f  being replaced by a pronoun, and the like); it performs a certain role 
with regard to narrative discourse, assuring a ckssificatoiy function. Such a name permits 
one to gnup together a certcun number of te :^ , define them, àfferentiate them from and contrast them to 
others. In addition, it establishes a relationship among the texts. {Foucault Reader 107, my 
emphasis)
It becomes clear now how Foucault’s definition can be instrumental in analyzing the role 
Eliot and the New Criticism had in the discursive formation o f  the contemporary literary 
criticism and poetics. The definition also sheds light on Laura Riding’s place in this context, 
since her discourse on poetr)' is in some ways at the basis, o f  New Criticism, as we shall see. 
For better or worse, the relationship between the author’s function and the institutional 
practice o f criticism, with its construction o f  a canon o f  indisputable authors, was a reciprocal 
one: Eliot was operational not only as the poet o f  The Waste Land, but on the discursive 
formation o f  New Criticism itself, hating the immediate effect o f  the reshaping o f  the whole 
Anglo-American canon. As J. L. Austin has described, Eliot’s role as poet and critic was “ the 
most ambitious feat o f cultural imperialism the century seems likely to produce (qtd. in 
Eagleton 38). New Criticism, in turn, used the poetry o f  Eliot to reinforce its values, reshaped 
the English canon by the réintroduction o f  die Metaphysical poets, but also privileged a group 
o f modern poets that was used to define and justify its critical formulations. Discourse and 
practice, thus, lived, as it were, in symbiotic relationship in Eliotian and New Critical literary 
ideology. Thus, crucial questions arise: Why certain autliors are “in” and other authors “ out” 
with respect to the received accounts o f  modernism? ''X'l-iich is to say, more directly perhaps, 
how and for whose interests does the canon function? Why is it that autonomy, balance.
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difficulty, closure, and unity were the privileged terms in the critical discourse on poetry, rather 
than interaction, disruption, simplicity, openness, and fragmentation?
Riding’s case is fascinating in such a context also because one may say that she was 
partially responsible for her own “decanonization” from Anglo-American poetry: first, by 
stopping writing poetry after 1939 and vanishing from the literary scene; second, by attacking 
critics who failed to approach her poems according to her view; third, by forbidding the 
republication o f  her poems if editors did not include a statement in which she explained the 
reasons for her decision. Moreover, it is interesting to note, in this context, the construction 
(or deconstruction) o f  her authorial identity, which can be exemplified by the several changes 
her name took along her career: Laura Reichental Gottschalk, die young wife o f  a history 
professor, Laura Riding Gottschalk, die poet who was eulogized in 1924 by the Fugitives as 
the revelation o f American poetry; Laura Riding, the independent poet, thinker, editor, and 
cntic o f  modernist poetry who invented her own surname; and Laura (Riding) Jackson, the 
wnter who rejected poetry at die height o f  her career, on tlie grounds that poetry was an 
inadequate medium to achieve what she considered to be the truth-properties o f language. 
Therefore, in this study, I will be using respectively the names Laura Riding and Laura (Riding) 
Jackson to refer to her authorial positionings before and after her renouncing o f  poetry.
Open Reading
In this introductory chapter I will attempt to apply what Foucault defines as archeology 
within the historical frame and identify several discourses produced on modernism in die first 
half o f the twentieth century. I will focus on the great institutional influence o f  Eliot’s poetics 
and New Critical formulations on the academy, criticism, and anthologies o f the period. This
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link between power and knowledge, Foucault claimed, characterizes the disciplinary aspect o f  
all modem political (and, in our case, poetical and literary) organizations. Archeology then, 
becomes “a task that consists o f  not— o f no longer— treating discourses as groups o f  signs 
(signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically 
form the objects of which they speak"' {Archeology 137, emphasis mine). What becomes necessary for 
the revisionist critic who wants to contextualize the period when this discourse on poetry 
achieved its hegemony is to trace die ftinctioning o f  these discourses within that same 
historical period. As Bernstein has pointed out, when speaking on the necessity o f  describing 
the politics o f poetic forms, “ it is essential to trace how some uses o f convention and authority 
can hide die fact that both are historical constructions rather than sovereign pnnciples” (Politics 
239). This mediodology also allows us to see die Anglo-American canon produced in the first 
half o f die century as a discursive formation in itself, and close reading as a major instrument 
o f  it, since it became the main form o f evaluation.
Contrariwise to the New Critical belief, a political reading o f  poetic forms asserts that 
the meaning o f a text— if there is such a thing as an unitary meaning—is not to be found 
exclusively in the “well-wrought urn”’ o f the poem itself, but can be enriched if understood in 
Its historical and cultural context. No act o f reading a tradition or a poem is apolitical, 
ahistoncal, and genderless as die New Criticism claimed. Influenced by Foucault’s thought. 
New Historicism surmises tiiat in the act o f evaluating literature it is crucial to understand die 
ideology o f the author, the historical time it was produced, as well as any other cultural element 
exhibited in the text. A fully historical and discursive account o f such a turbulent period,
•' Paul Lauter points out that the tides o f  critical landmarks o f  the period o f  heiglit o f  N ew  Criticism are 
indicative o f  tlieir discourse. In the bible o f  New Criticism, Cleantli Brooks’s The Well-Wrought Urn, its 
title IS self-explicative o f  its discourse: the poem  as an urn (an artistic static object ratlier tlian a tool, a 
product, or a process), well-wrought (craftly executed, well done), and metaphysical (since it directly 
refers to John D onne’s poem  “ The Canonization”  analyzed by Brooks) {f,anon and Contexts y i).
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following Foucault, can only be valid if we are able to see the interconnections, the links 
among the simultaneous discourses (or poetics) o f  the period. .
The need to control and regulate interpretation— a^s exemplified in the large 
institutionalization and systematization o f  the method o f  close reading— ^transformed 
interpretation in a form o f  power/knowledge in itself As pointed out by Eagleton, “ it 
encouraged the illusion that any piece o f  language, ‘literary or not,’ can be adequately studied 
or even understood in isolation. It was the beginning o f  a ‘reification’ o f  the literary work, the 
treatment o f  it as an object in itself’ (44). Logocentric discourse, on the other hand, is 
disseminated in the discourse o f  modernism: we have only to remember the persistence o f  
Kantian and Coleridgean concepts such as “autonomy,” “organicism,” as well as the Romantic 
.stress on the imagination, to see how much modernism is embedded in a “metaphysics o f  
presence” (with notions such as “ se lf ’ and poetry as “an overflow o f powerfUl feelings,” 
according to Wordsworth). As we shall see, the New Criticism established as canonical the idea 
o f  the poem as autoregulative, self-reflexive, with the oppositions “ closed” after interpretation, 
in perfect unity. The poem was taken as a powerfiil and authoritarian stance in itself that 
supposedly possessed universal value.
Discourse and power/knowledge, thus, become operative terms o f  analysis o f  the 
context o f  modernism. In order to carry out a cultural critique o f  institutions (with its 
mechanisms o f  control and regulation, norm-fixations, its power o f imposing questions on the 
nature o f  reality, canon-formation, and poetry), the methodology will elicit the discussion o f  
some competing discourses existing in modernism. Power here is taken as a relational, never 
merely institutional, term. As described by Foucault, it takes not necessarily the form o f violent 
imposition, but is dispersed through mechanisms o f  control and conduct that are subtle and 
never explicitly ideological in the political sense. Among the more immediate effects o f  such
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normalization o f  discourse— a^s it occurs in canon-formation— i^s the exclusion o f  what is 
considered other, deviant, eccentric, abnormal, dissociated.
A broader and more practical response to the question o f  the main features o f  modernist 
poetry, as understood in this methodology, is presented in Jerome Rothenberg’s and Pierre 
Joris’s recent, internationalist, and experimental anthology o f  modernist and postmodern 
poetries. In the two volumes o f  Poems for the Millennium, which gathers 360 poets from all over 
the world and covers one hundred years o f  poetical production, the editors pass in review a 
“ tradition o f  the new” in which appear names such as Rainer Maria Rilke, Fernando Pessoa, 
Laura Riding, Federico Garcia Lorca, Paul Celan, Mina Loy, the Russian Futurists, European 
avant-garde movements such as Dada, Surrealism, as well as the poets o f  the Caribbean 
Negritude. In their anthology, as one would expect, they stress modernism as an international 
phenomenon, indicating a major shift that took place not only in the way poets and artists 
thought about their art but also in the world we live in; “What began to take shape, then, was 
the idea o f  poetry as an instrument o f  change— a^ change that would take place foremost in the 
poem itself, as a question o f language and structure as well as o f  a related, all-connecting 
vision” (2).
Rothenberg and Joris identify eight main emphasis or impulses in the description o f  
modernism and its avant-garde movements that will be workable in this study, and it is highly 
important to sum them up in order to relate to Laura Riding’s poetry and poetics, with the 
purpose o f  situating her work within a broader context o f  modernism. The procedure will 
serve, in Chapter 3, to see Riding’s allegiances or opposing artistic attitudes regarding these 
same modernist impulses. I will summarize what Rothenberg and Joris identify as modernism’s 
constitutive features;
1) Experiences with “new forms o f  language, consciousness, and social/biological
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relationships,” followed by an attempt to revise the human past.
2) Interdisciplinarity: poetry intersects with painting, sculpture, cinema, music, drama, 
and philosophy.
3) The discovery o f  the unconscious or alternative forms o f  conscious states as a 
possibility for language experimentation, with language itself becoming an instrument o f  vision 
and change.
4) A retaking o f  the idea o f  poetry as performance, as ritual, with the appearance o f  
radical forms o f  sound poetry and “textsound works” (2).
5) A  radical investigation o f  meaning and language and its visual, aural, material, and 
typographical features, as well as “explorations o f  new languages and those sublanguages 
(dialects, pidgins, etc.) that had long been at the fringes o f  accepted literature” (3).
6) The discovery and reinterpretation o f  ancestral traditions o f  poetry (ethnopoetics) in 
which the poet as a shaman appears not as a model to be seized, but as the configuration o f  
the intensities o f  language through language.
7) The liaisons between politics and modernism, with poets commonly organizing 
poetical/political movements.
8) Poetry as a free play o f  language, as a passionate exploration o f  poetical and meaning 
possibilities.
Modem/Modemism/Avant-Garde
The Oyford English Dktionaiy points to the fifteenth century as the time when the word 
modem gained some social currency in the Western world. It derived from the Latin modemus, 
coined from modo (meaning “ just now”). Hodiemus, in a similar manner, derives from bodie
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(“ today”). Etymologically, the word points to the appearance, in the human realm, o f  a 
paradigmatic cultural shift, with the advent o f  “a new consciousness o f time, imbued with a 
sense o f  acceleration and discontinuity” (Giles 178). Or, as Jürgen Habermas reminds us, as a 
term “to distinguish the present, which had become officially Christian, firom the Roman and 
pagan past” (“Modernity” 3). To be modem means to exist in a different and transitional 
phase, with a heightened sense o f  living in an “unrepeatable time” (Calinescu 3).
In tracing die changes in the idea o f  modernity throughout history, Matei Calinescu 
distinguishes two conflicting notions emerging in the second half o f  the nineteenth century: 
“modernity as a stage in the history o f  Western civilization— a product o f  science and 
technological progress, o f  the industrial revolution, o f  the sweeping economic and social 
changes brought about by capitalism— a^nd modernity as an aesthetic concept” (41). The first is 
a bourgeois notion o f  modemity, with its belief in progress, scientific and technological 
advances, as well as with the concern with time, the cult o f  reason, and “the idea o f  freedom 
defined within the firamework o f  an abstract humanism, but also the orientation toward 
pragmatism and the cult o f  action and success.” The second, still according to Calinescu,
the one that was to ring into being the avant-gardes, was fi-om its romantic beginnings 
inclined toward radical antibourgeois attitudes. It was disgusted with the middle-class 
scale o f  values and expressed its disgust through the most diverse means, ranging from 
rebellion, anarchy, and apocalypticism to aristocratic self-exüe. So, more than its positive 
aspirations (which often have very little in common), what defines cultural modemity is 
Its outright rejection o f  bourgeois modemity, its consuming negative passion. (42)
In Calinescu’s account o f  modemity, it was in the middle o f  the nineteenth century, in France, 
that the idea o f  modemity came to be applied to the split referred to above and became an 
aesthetic concept: modernism as a necessity created in cultural response to the new conditions
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and experiences presented by modernity. As Calinescu posits, “Aesthetic modernity should be 
understood as a crisis concept involved in a threefold dialectical opposition to tradition, to the 
modernity o f  a bourgeois civilization (with ideas o f  rationality, utility, progress), and finally, to 
itself, insofar as it perceives as a new tradition or form o f authority” (10). The validity o f  
Calinescu’s definition is that it keeps us aware o f  modernity as both a cultural and an aesthetic 
concept.
The Kantian notion o f  art’s autonomy and its purposiveness without a purpose, 
formulated in Critique of Judgement (1790), invades modernity as early as 1835 in its radicalization 
presented by Theophile Gautier’s formulation o f  iartpour I'art:, to claim the uselessness o f  the 
artistic object was a response to the increasingly capitalist and utilitarian spirit o f  the times. 
Aestheticism— a^n attitude that promotes beauty as an end in itself— was a reaction to the 
massification and vulgarization o f  art. Modernism became attached, in the artistic sphere, to an 
attitude o f  resistance to the increasing commodification o f  cultural objects: as a cultural 
response.
But how was the time to which the modernists were responding? “Our time,” or, as it is 
more commonly understood, the twentieth century— t^his great “Age o f  Extremes,” as Eric 
Hobsbawn has called it in his seminal book— is one marked by contradictions. If, on the one 
hand, the Enlightenment project, progressive and rational, would point to an unending 
industrialism, scientific advances, and urbanization, it also produced a crisis provoked by two 
o f  the most inhuman wars o f  all times, occurring in a short span o f time. Virginia W oolfs 
famous claim— “^human nature changed around 1910”— ^assumed a cmel and astonishing 
reality in 1918. The period from 1918-45 would live through the rise o f fascism, Hider’s power 
in Germany, and two global conflicts, while the rise o f  Soviet Communism and its unfolding in 
other parts o f the world represented alternatives to bourgeois and capitalist societies. The age
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was also profoundly impacted by the years o f  world economic depression provoked by the 
Crash o f  1929, in New York City. It was also “ the greatest period o f mass migration in 
recorded history” (Hobsbawn 88). It is the time o f  the Jewish Holocaust, ending significantly 
with the atom bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
With all this complex landscape in mind, events and facts explain why, in the cultural 
realm, a common word to describe modernity’s Zeitgeist was chaos. The breakdown o f  old 
conceptions o f  the world and the creation o f  new ones (Freud’s unconscious, Einstein’s theory 
o f  relativity, scientific and technological advances in all fields o f  knowledge) was to cause a 
radical effect in culture as a whole. Old certainties vanished, and art should react and explore 
this new condition. Under the pressure o f  time and change, poetry would be deeply affected by 
this Zeitgeist'.
The defining characteristic o f  Modernism was its insistence in that the mind be subjected 
to this wholly new kind o f  stress. Poetry became an ‘intolerable wrestle with words and 
meanings,’ a hauling and straining, a racking o f  the mind’s power o f  comprehension. 
Older and traditional definitions o f poetry— the spontaneous overflow o f  powerfiil 
feeling, the best words in the best order—were impatiently dismissed. Obsessive 
attempts to say ‘the unsayable’ made extreme demands on the mind’s elasticity. N ot only 
literature but all art o f  the period seemed to be intent on stretching the mind beyond the 
very limits o f human understanding. (Bradbury and MacFarlane 72)
As an aesthetic and cultural category, modernism can be summed up by the word change. Many 
artists felt that the old instruments and forms allowed by tradition were not enough to capture 
the world and its dramatic changes. A  new mind, therefore, demanded new poetic forms. 
Accordingly, in the realm o f poetry, a characteristic move from the side o f  the more
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experimental modernism® has involved, as Rothenberg posits in Revolution of The Word, “a range 
o f  procedures that bring out the opaque materiality o f  language as a medium, as against a 
‘romantic’ view o f  language as purely a transparent window toward an ideal reality beyond 
itself’ (9). In the present study, modem will be used in the more neutral chronological sense, 
indicating key social and historical changes, in closer connection with the Xenn contemporary (the 
sense o f  pertaining to our time). Modernist, on the other hand, will be used specifically, as a 
concept, in reference to those works and writers who^consciously questioned and disrupted (or 
attempted to disrupt) classical. Romantic, Victorian, and conventional values. The same can be 
said in the case of, for instance, French Symbolism (with the poetics o f Charles Baudelaire, 
Arthur Rimbaud, and Stéphane Mallarmé). Early modernist poetic values were also being 
articulated in Great Britain (with Hopkins’s “ inscapes”) and in America with the experiences o f  
Walt Whitman (who called his Leaves of Grass a “ language experiment”), Edgar Allan Poe, and 
Emily Dickinson. We cannot forget that the appearance o f  the term to designate a poetic 
movement originated in the Latin American fm-de-siécle, with Ruben Dario’s formulation o f  
modemismo (which in many ways was an original response to French decadentism and late- 
Symbolism).[In this study modernism refers to the development o f a wide range o f  
experimental poetries produced in the first decades o f  the century up to 1945, the end o f  
World War II. I use raàcal in the etymological sense o f  the word, to indicate a poetry that 
addressed the root o f  the problem o f poetry: language].
Modernism and avant-garde are terms that have been sometimes synonymous, 
sometimes, opposites. Since the discussion is extensive, I will glimpse some definitions and 
approaches. Michael Bradbury and John MacFarlane are criticized by Astradur Eysteinsson, for
* Rothenberg mentions experiments in typography (from Mallarmé to Marinetti), concrete and visual 
poetry, Charles Olson’s “projective verse,” the chance poems o f the dadaists, the poésie sonorv, the texts 
o f Stein, among otiiers.
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instance, for taking the avant-garde as simple preparations for the so-called conquest 
represented by the canonical works o f  modernism, thus isolating potential avant-garde 
impulses and works o f  art within modernism. Peter Bürger, on die other hand, makes a crucial 
(and problematical) contribution to tiiis debate by stating that modernism is still depended on 
the ideas o f  the autonomy o f  the art object as inherited from Romanticism and Sym bolist' 
aesthetics. Modernism still privileged, as Bürger sees it, the organic view o f  the artistic object, 
dius positing a separation and a distinction between art and life praxis. On the other hand, he 
states that the av an t-^d e movements o f  the first decades o f  the twentieth century such as 
Dada and Surrealism (and I should add Russian and Italian Futurism, Cubism and 
Simultaneism) had as one o f  the main objectives exacdy the questioning o f  art as a bourgeois 
institution, simultaneously with the deconstruction o f  the autonomous view o f the artistic 
object. More importantly, the avant-garde wanted to breach the gap between art and life 
(Artaud’s “Theater o f Cruelty,” Dada’s performances and chance poems, Lorca’s theory o f  the 
poet as possessed Duende, Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades), displacing the authority and the 
aura o f  die artistic object. Following diis logic to the poetical realm, the modernists were 
creating a new logocentric fetishism, while the avant-garde was displacing the author’s 
authority, the emphasis on notions such as “ craft,” and creating the poem as a field o f  
experiences, a place o f dialogue, interaction. Therefore, in Bürger’s account, modernism 
embraces the autonomy o f  art, while the avant-garde rejects it.
Here I prefer, as Eysteinsson suggests, to use avant-garde in conjunction with 
modernism, in order to point out the more radical, norm-breaking aspects o f modernism, 
those works and poems that transform poetry in an experience o f  limits. This norm-breaking 
and anti-traditional aspects o f  the avant-garde had the characteristic o f being commonly 
organized in poetic movements which not only questioned scientific rationality and
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Enlightenment paradigms but also the bourgeois institution o f  art itself Art, in its non-organic 
view as generated by the avant-garde, became highly critical o f  the past, self-reflective and, in 
its more negative and radical version, self-destructive. On the other hand, and criticizing 
Bürger’s polarization o f  modernism versus avant-garde, Bernstein reminds us that, once the 
disruption o f  habitual patterns o f  thought and perception is at the core o f  modernism as a 
whole, avant-garde and modernism must be thought as “ fractions o f the same dialectical 
movement” {A  Poetics 102).
Therefore, modernism has tended to be thought o f  as a modem version o f Aestheticism, 
deriving from Romanticism and Symbolism, influenced by the philosophy o f  Kant and Walter 
Pater, as well as the poetry o f  Teophile Gautier and Stéphane Mallarmé; according to Huyssein 
and Bürger, the idea o f  autonomy o f  the work o f  art continues to be taken as modemism’s 
paradigmatic defining feature. Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde sees modemism’s aestheticism 
as detached from the praxis o f  life while obscuring “ the historical conditions o f  this process as
in the cult o f  the genius, for example” (40). The skeptical, self-critical avant-garde, on the other 
hand, was a reaction to this idea o f  modemism, and had as its mission (as in Tzara, Artaud, 
Duchamp, Breton) to close the gap between life, social praxis, and art. The avant-gardistes, 
posits Bürger, view [art s] dissociation from the praxis o f  life as the dominant characteristic o f  
art in bourgeois society” (Ibid. 49). I f  we place Riding’s poetry and poetics within the debate 
on modemism versus avant-garde as described by Bürger, we see the relativity o f  Bürger’s 
binary opposition as well as the already mentioned difficulty in locating Riding’s achievements: 
if, on the one hand, she is closer to the avant-garde impulse by advocating a strong rejection o f  
aestheticism,’  or when she conducts a critique o f  literary canons and their institutions,“  on the
 ^As she mentions in Rational Meaning. “Where language is converted into the mere instrument of an art, 
it loses its virtue as the expressive instrument o f humanity” (24).
10 “From the beginning, poetry was for me territory of life, not literature.— T^o know oneself to be m a
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other hand, by believing in the autonomy o f  the poem (although she claims that her approach 
is more humanistic than literary), she is closer to the modernist agenda.
The Case of Laura Riding
“Laura Riding is the greatest lost poet o f  American poetry,” poet and critic Kenneth 
Rexroth proclaimed in 1971 (108). N o doubt, Riding’s exclusion from the now familiar Anglo- 
American modernist poetry canon is surprising. She was included in a canonical textbook, Tbe 
Norton Anthobg^ of Modem 'Poetry (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), with six 
poems. However, she strangely disappeared from the second edition (1988). The editors, 
Richard Ellmann and Robert O ’Clair, justified the exclusion o f  Riding and other important 
poets based on practical and didactic reasons: “The difficult decisions to omit some o f  the 
first-edition poets and poems were based on a canvass of teachers, which showed that they were 
seldom if  ever taughf (“Preface” xlvi, emphasis mine). Riding reappeared in the 1996’s edition, 
but with four poems less than in the first one. Besides, in the two volumes o f  David Perkins’s 
A  History of Modem Poet^, while whole chapters are devoted to Yeats, Eliot, Williams, and 
Pound, Riding’s poetical achievements deserve only a page and a half
The fact remains, however, that her poetry and criticism raise seminal questions on 
language, self-knowledge, gender, intellectual freedom, and the human mind, and therefore 
must be placed at the core o f  the contemporary poetry debate. Jo-Ann Wallace points out in a 
1992 essay that Riding’s critical and creative independence, her refiisal to “ cede interpretative 
authority,” is what makes her so interesting for us: her work “has points o f  similarity to the 
diree most important critical movements o f  the last sixty years. She shared with New Criticism
Wodd is to have a story to tell of oneself and live and tell fully, exactly” (“Some Notes” no page)
25
a strategy o f  close textual analysis, with feminism a strategy o f  exploring female difference, and 
with deconstruction a strategy o f  rigorous linguistic analysis; and yet, although her strategies 
were similar, her intention was always quite different” (120). Thus, it is problematic to see that 
Riding’s seminal work, even today, is marginalized simultaneously from the “official verse 
culture” and from the branch o f  feminist criticism which claims the existence o f  a “women’s 
literary tradition.” ”  In the first case, she is not mentioned in The Harvard Book of ContemporaTy 
Voetjy (edited by Helen Vendler in 1984) nor in Harold Bloom’s colossal The Western Canon 
(1994). In the second, and despite the discussion on opening up the canon, she is absent also 
from The Norton Antho/ogy of Literature by Women: The TraM on in English (1985), edited by two o f 
die most important names o f  feminist criticism, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar. At this 
moment, year 2000, there are in the U. S. only two books devoted entirely to the critical 
discussion o f  her work: Joyce Piell Wexler’s Laura BJàng’s Pursuit of Truth (1979), and Barbara 
Adams’s The Enemy Sef: Poetry and Criticism of Laura Riàng (1990)^^ against the hundreds o f 
titles dedicated to Stevens, Pound, Eliot, or more recent poets who have acknowledged 
Riding’s influence, such as Sylvia Plath or John Ashbery.
A pressing question is how and why she was forgotten. Several reasons for that have 
been advanced: not only editors were, for decades, totally uninterested in republishing her 
important books but, as we have seen. Riding herself was in part responsible for the fact that 
her work was progressively gone from anthologies and from most histones o f contemporary
”  I refer to this tradition as fomiulated by English and American feminists such as Sandra Gilbert and 
Susan Gubar, Alicia Ostriker and Elaine Showalter.
To be mentioned, also, Wexler’s Laura Riding. A  mhliograpf^  (1981) and Deborah Baker’s In Extremis: 
The Ufe of Laura Riding (1993). The situation, fortunately, is likely to change, with the publication of 
several o f her books. In 2001, as part o f the celebrations of Laura Riding’s ce.nttn?irf. Anarchism Is Not 
Enough will be published by die University of California Press. In January, will be released a new and 
authorized biography of Riding (by Elizabeth Friedmann), a whole issue of die important literary 
magazine Chelsea, a collection of her most important essays (Jhe Laura Riding R ead er),.well as Lisa 
Samuels’s doctoral thesis Voetic Arrest—Laura Riding Wallace Stevens, and the Modenust Afterlife, to be
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poetry. Fkst, by refusing to allow her poems to be included in anthologies after 1938 without 
including a statement where she explained the reasons for her decision o f renouncing poetry. 
This attitude, I must add, was a question o f coherence: it is not by chance that one o f  her 
polemical books was titled A  Pamphlet Against Anthohges. She sustained her dislike for 
anthologies as late as 1964, arguing in an unpublished manuscript that “anthologies damage the 
way-of-access to poetry” (#6304, Box 94, Fol. 20). However, the decision to renounce poetry, 
in itself, is not enough to justifj^ her ^drtual in\nsibüity from any discussion invohông Anglo- 
American modernist poetry and criticism. Other reasons for her “disappearance” have been 
explained by her allegedly difficult personality, which led her to a radical critique o f  the 
“professionalization” o f poetry she observed in modemism and in the academy, as well as her 
total independence o f any school or trends o f  literary modemism. As Alan Clark states, in a 
private correspondence:
Laura’s objection to those words o f academic criticism is characteristic, and I think it is 
similar to her objection to being called a “ feminist”— and even, sometimes, to being 
called a “modernist”  (in any but the widest, least confining, o f senses). The common 
point seems to me to be a determined assertion o f the right o f the writer (any writer) not 
only to classify his-or-her work, and to describe his-or-her interests, in his-or-her own 
way, but, fiirther, to have work and interests dealt with in their own terms— n^ot in the 
arbitrary conveniences o f an imposed, an essentially foreign, critical terminology. (Letter 
to the author)
I believe that it was her poetic and critical independence which annoyed and still annoys 
many critics, heightened by the fact that she engaged in polemics with anyone who attempted 
to discuss her poetry without taking into account the terms exposed by her project. That is
released by The University of California Press.
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why her case is paradigmatic in terms o f  cultural authority. She refiased to be co-opted either 
by the literary establishment or by academics who insisted on making her a proto-feminist. As 
she asserted in a statement in 1991, “ I have never belonged to any ‘school’ o f  poetry— though 
the values I defined for the poetic use o f  words, which were nothing other than the values o f  
language treated not only as a verbal discipline but one on which the intellectual integrity and 
total spiritual worth o f  poems depended, became associated in people’s minds with as a school 
o f  my instituting” (qtd. in Chevalier 808).
Although, as has been stressed. Riding was shortly associated with the Fugitives group__
later New Critical poets— t^he quotation above shows that the writer, at 90, was well aware o f  
her importance and place in the history o f  modernist poetry and criticism. More surprising is 
tiiat, for a short period o f  time, especially during the 1920s, when she became associated with 
tiie Fugitives, her poetry was highly acclaimed, privately or not, not only by Ransom and Tate, 
but also by Yeats, Williams, Auden, Graves, and Stein. In 1936, for instance, Yeats wrote to 
Dorothy Wellesley:
You are right about Laura Riding. I had rejected her work in some moment o f  stupidity 
but when you praised her I re-read her in Tbe Faber Book of Modem Vene &  was delighted 
in her intricate intensity. I have written to her to apologize for my error & to ask leave to 
quote ‘Lucrece and Nara,’ ‘The Wind Suffers,’ T h e Flowering Urn.’ She will refuse, as 
Graves has, but as a matter o f  honor I must ask. This difficult work, which is being 
written everywhere now [...] has the substance o f  philosophy & is a delight to the poet 
with his professional pattern; but it is not jo u r rvad or mine, <& ours is the main road. ..(Letters 
58, my emphasis)
Auden, whose early poetry is strongly influenced by Riding’s abstract and stark style, 
called her “ the only living philosophical poet” {Poems 410). And, despite tfie common criticism
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o f  her poetry being formless, Williams praised her work exactly for its innovative form, that is, 
for its capacity to subvert sense (to defamiliarize language) and to create new meanings 
through “a perfect literalness and lucidity o f  phrase” [Something 97). Her poetry, Williams 
wrote, “ is constantly seeking and arriving at, point by point, a station beyond what might be 
termed common sense” (Ibid.. 98). And he adds: “The form is the invention or the 
perception— d^ie form is the discovery, the adventure, the greatest achievement o f  the poet in 
its time” (Ibid. 99).
By radicalizing the approach o f  the poet with its material, words, by making poetry the 
place were language occurs as verbal exchange, as a field o f  an encounter. Riding saw poetry as
the ideal medium for language to be converted into truth. Poetry could render truth__“even if
it is a contradictory one,” as she writes in die 1939 preface o f  her CoHecied Poems—  through an 
accurate use o f  language. Poetry became for Riding a profound investigation o f language, and 
o f  thought, a practice destined not to the delight and approval o f  a tradition, a market, or a 
reader’s expectation; as with Martin H eide^er, poetry is the foundation o f Being by the means 
o f  words, as an “uncovering o f  truth o f  so fundamental and general a kind that no other name 
besides poetry is adequate except truth” (Poems 407). As Riding herself remembers, she was 
since the beginning more humanistic than literary in her project.
Even though she was a radical individualist who opposed the idea o f poetry as a 
reflection o f  the Zeitgeist, pure and simple, her poems exemplify many conflicting and dialectic 
aspects o f  modernism and the avant-garde. For one thing, her project relies to a great extent 
on the notion o f  the “independence” o f  the poem, although never separating it from life, and, 
at the same time, does not call for any tradition (as in Eliot or Pound). On the contrary, the 
autonomy o f  the poem was not only die recognition o f language as a being in itself, but also a 
place where the other and the I could be joined: “The poet does not simply observe or record
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‘life,’ but creates a language in which the human condition can be read, can indeed be made 
possible” (Carr 55). A  poem, once written, became a reality separate from the poet, a “ self- 
explanatory creature.” As in Stein’s or in Stevens’s, in Riding’s poetry o f thought language is 
not only reflective but also creative o f meaning. In her project there is a strong desire to 
overcome the barriers between genres (prose, poetry, translation, essay) and subject matters 
(criticism, philosophy, linguistics, cultural critique); her project aims at dissolving the distance 
between life and art, between the “literary” and the literal. From our privileged viewpoint, such 
emphasis on language and its process would seem to make Riding a precursor o f  the radical 
and postmodernist movement o f  Language poetry, functioning as an important poet’s poet 
that is more acknowledged by avant-garde poets (John Ashbery, Michael Palmer, and Charles 
Bernstein) than by critics.
Powerful and canonical neo-New Critics such as Bloom and Vendler are definitively 
unable to recognize her achievements as a poet and her talent as a critic. Vendler, in a 1993 
article for the Neiv York Review of Books, claims that the quality o f  Riding’s poetry is “dubious” 
while agreeing with Paul Auster’s thesis that her renouncing o f poetry is indicative not o f  
poetry’s failure to capture truth, but that she had reached “her own limit in poetry” (12). 
Although one might take this interpretation as plausible, the renouncing itself does not 
invalidate the importance o f  her poetry and her work. A reader who follows Vendler’s line o f  
thought is led to believe that Riding stopped writing poetry not on the grounds o f  humanistic 
and linguistic principles— a^s the author herself affirmed throughout her career— but due to her 
failure as a poet: Riding would have stopped writing simply because she was a bad poet. 
Vendler’s final word on Riding reaches the absurd o f  dismissing her existence as a poet: “ It 
seems likely to me that if Riding survives, it will be as a storyteller {Progress of Stories, The Trojan 
Ending ratiier than as the lyric poet she wanted to be” (12). But one may ask Vendler if Riding
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ever wanted to be “a lyric poet.” In fact, one might argue that Riding’s poetry is a rejection o f  
lyricism as understood by Vendler, that isj as inherently expressive o f  a lyric “ I,” based on a 
Romantic notion o f  voice, and in poetry defined by Wordsworth as “an overflow o f  powerful 
feelings,” in a rejection o f  “natural speech.” Vendler’s statement sharply contrasts with those 
by poet-critics such as Bernstein, one o f  the articulators o f  the Language Poetry movement, 
who takes Riding as a key modernist poet, philosopher, and theoretician: “N o North American 
or European poet o f  this century has created a body o f  work that reflects more deeply on the 
inherent conflicts between truth telling and the inevitable artifice o f  poetry than Laura (Riding) 
Jackson” (^ tion al ix).
It is important to remark that— in terms o f  Riding’s importance as a critic, as a thinker 
o f  modernist poetry and one o f  its formulators— i^t is rare to see critics recognizing the 
importance o f  her critical books— s^uch as Anarchism Is N ot Enough and Contemporaries and Snobs, 
or, for that matter, A  Survg of Modernist Poetry— for the development o f  modem criticism 
(which will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3). Dates are important here: A  Survey appeared two 
years before I. A. Richard’s Practical Criticism (1929), three years before William Em pson’s Seven 
Types of Ambiguity (1930), and fourteen years before John Crowe Ransom’s The New Criticism 
(1941), thus a long time before the effective arrival o f  New Criticism on the literary scene and, 
consequently, before it became a powerful discourse.
As we shall see in Chapter 3, in that pioneer book. Riding and Graves were already 
calling for a “new method” o f  poetic explanation more adequate to read poetry {Survg 21). 
They denounced the stress on paraphrase in the reading o f  poems, exposed the “ fallacies” 
(142) o f  traditional interpretation, by focusing on “ the poem itself’ (89) through detailed and 
innovative analysis. The book was a passionate defense o f  modemist poetry against the 
accusations o f  difficulty and illegibility. As I have stated, in the 1920s, Riding was one o f  the
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few critics to publicly defend the centrality o f  poets such as Gertrude Stein and e. e. cummings 
for the experimental and radical poetry o f  the time.
Cleanth Brooks— considered the quintessential New Critic and whose books 
Understanding Poet^ (with Robert Penn Warren), The Well Wrought Urn and Modem Poet^i and the 
Tradition became not only best-sellers but responsible for the dissemination o f  the practice o f  
the method o f  close reading originated with Riding and Graves— i^s among the few who 
acknowledges, however briefly, her fundamental intervention in modernist criticism. In 
recalling the origins o f  New Criticism, Brooks remarks that Empson
shared with I. A. Richards a book that he had read written in America by Laura Riding 
and Robert Graves entitied v4 Pamphlet Against Anthologies. Riding and Graves had taken 
one o f  Shakespeare’s sonnets to pieces and rebuilt it again to show how deep and how ' 
rich it was— i^n other words, they did what we might call a ‘New Critical’ reading. But they 
didn't call it that, of course. Empson told Richards he could do what Riding and Graves had 
done with one poem with any poem in the English language. Richards challenged him to 
go and do it, and three weeks later Em pson had the groundwork for Seven Types of 
Ambiguity done!” (“Afterword” 372, my emphasis)
The statement suggests that what matters for Brooks is not who actually applied the method 
tiiat would be transformed in the discipline o f  “ close reading,”  but those who were the first to 
find a name for the enterprise, the first to “professionalize” the procedure. In this sense, it was 
Practical Criticism and Seven Types of Ambiguity and not A  Surv^ of Modernist Poety that took the 
credit for influencing the New Criticism and for the “ invention” o f  the method o f close textual 
scrutiny (although the French explication de texte is an important precursor). Maybe due to his 
advanced age at the time o f  the interview (Brooks died a few months later), he mistakes A  
Pamphlet Against Anthologies for A  Survey of Modernist Poety, as well as the place where it was
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written (actually, Egypt and England). However, Brooks’s memory was good enough at least to 
detect where the original method o f  close reading had originated, before it was systematized by 
die New Critics. It is important to recall that Riding and Graves did in their books other close 
readings, besides the one on Shakespeare’s sonnet, above all in a spectacular reading o f  a poem 
by Cummings and a poem by Riding herself, as we will see in Chapter 3. However, Brooks, in 
his influential and canonical books, not only forgot Riding altogether in his account o f  
modernist poetry and methodology (never publicly mentioning her) but elected a significantly 
different canon, one that would become hegemonic for thirty years or more and that has Eliot, 
Yeats, Frost, Auden, Stevens and Tate (and not cummings, Stein or Riding as its legitimate 
names.
It is ironic that the co-inventor o f  the method would be decanonized by the same critics 
who most took advantage o f  it for the New Critical approach. If, as Chris Baldick argues, 
“ [njothing distinguishes twentieth-century literary criticism more sharply from that o f  previous 
ages than this close attention to textual detail” (13), the name o f  Riding and Graves would 
necessanly have to appear in any literary account o f  the most important American modernist 
cntics and theoreticians o f  poetry in the period, side-by-side with the names o f  Pound and 
Eliot.
I f  the most important methodological feature o f  New Criticism was close reading, then it 
would be logical to acknowledge Riding and Graves’s importance in its foundation. And, even 
though the English New Critics Empson and Richards acknowledged at some point the 
influence which Riding and Graves’s method had on the textual strategy o f close readings, the 
importance o f  the achievement is rarely raised by American New Critics. As I have been 
arguing, there was a deliberate attempt to exclude the name o f Laura Riding from the whole 
history, by Empson and even by Graves himself.
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After the break-up o f  the partnership with Riding in 1939, Graves began to proclaim 
himself as the sole author o f  the book (which they, by the way, previewing future misreadings, 
were smart enough to insist in the opening page o f  A  Surv^ that it consisted o f  “a word-by- 
word collaboration”). Graves went to the point o f  including large parts o f  A  Survg in his 
collection o f  critical essays. The Common Asphodel, without ever mentioning Riding. The erasure 
o f  Riding from the modemist history o f  criticism also occurs with Empson, who in the second 
edition Seven Tjpes of Ambiguity (1947) excluded tiie name o f  Riding as the co-inventor o f  the 
method he appropriated and developed: “ I ought to say in passing tiiat he [Graves] is, so far as 
I know, the inventor o f  the method o f  analysis I was using here” (xiv). Surprisingly, in a private 
letter addressed to Riding on September 10*, 1971, Brooks advances exactiy the thesis that it 
was precisely an 7\merican woman poet-critic living in London who invented tiie method o f  
close reading; “ I have wondered how much the impulse toward what was called the New 
Criticism— a^nd in its more extreme forms associated with Em pson’s [...]— came to England 
from this side o f  the Atiantic through your own offices” (“Letter,” #4608 no page).
Another point to be made is that, although Laura Riding was connected with the 
Fugitive group for a short period o f  time, her view differed significantly from their Agrarian 
and reactionary agenda. Secondly, she would not subscribe to the ideal order o f Eliot’s canon. 
As we have seen. Riding was against die idea o f  a literary tradition and skeptical about the 
canon, which she saw as a type o f  “boy’s club,” a masculinist group formation whose Corpus 
“ is used as the rallying point o f  the group, the counterpart o f  the primitive clan totem, the 
outward and visible sign o f  a long-extinct grace” {Anarchism 31). Or, as she posits in 
Contemporaries and Snobs-. “N o one seems to realize that the destmction o f  poetry as a tradition 
would not destroy poetry itself’ (142).
While the New Critics took the poem as an enactment, through its organicist functioning
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and nature, o f  a social and cultural idea, either to separatist or religious ideas (Wallace 117), and 
characterized the modem poem as “a full commitment to metaphor” (Brooks), Riding had the 
single objective o f  investigating language and the uncovering o f  meaning in the poetic process 
in relationship with the human being. As she explained in 1995, she was trying “ to function in 
the field o f  human criticism rather than in that o f  literary criticism” (“The Promise” 23).
She took poetry as the highest form o f human communication, and used it to explore 
the process o f  thought faithfully, with no space for ambiguities, through a progressive de- 
metaphorizing o f  her poetry. She wanted to make poetry achieve a new kind o f  literalism 
through lucidity o f  expression and, through reason, by accurately saying what she needed to 
say. Contrarily to the New Critics, she identified ambiguity with “uncertainty o f  meaning,” “ an 
evasion o f  truthful statement” {Rational 512), representing a failure from the poet’s part to 
express what he/she means: “ the New Ambiguity— ^and/or the New Criticism— ^postulated a 
given created linguistic confusion as the generic and necessary character o f poetry [...]” (Ibid. 
513).
Because Riding is not very well known, before expounding on the construction o f  the 
Anglo-American poetic canon (Chapter 2), her poetics (Chapter 3), and her poems (Chapter 4), 
I find useful to summarize her life and career.
A Life Dedicated to Language
Laura Reichenthal was born in New York City, on January 16, 1901. The daughter o f  
Nathaniel, a Jewish immigrant bom in Austria (who was also a tailor and a socialist), she had 
an unsettied and poor childhood. Her mother, Sarah, was the daughter o f  German Jewish 
immigrants and worked, until becoming an invalid, in the textile industry. Laura was educated
35
in the rigorous principles o f socialism and Marxism defended by her father, who dreamed o f 
transforming her in an American Rosa Luxembourg. Due to her father’s constant shifts o f 
jobs, she attended a dozen different primary schools. At Brooklyn’s Girls’s High School, 
however, she was able, according to herself, to receive an “extraordinarily good language- 
education. At Cornell University, I was also very fortunate in teachers ^  languages, literature, 
history)” (ChevaUer 808). When she was 15, she told her father that she was renouncing the 
political ideals to become a poet. Her father vehemently disagreed \vith her decision. With 
several grants, from 1918 to 1921, she was able to attend Cornell University, although never 
completing a degree. She also attended courses at Urbana and Louisville. Her first poems date 
firom this periocL In 1920, Riding married her history professor at Cornell, Louis Gottschalk, 
changing her name to Laura Reichental Gottschalk. Sensing that the name sounded too 
pompous, she changed to Laura Riding Gottschalk.”
1924 was the first turning point o f her career, when she was praised by the Fugitives as 
“ die discovery o f  the year”  (The fugitive 130). The praise could not be higher firom the future 
New Critical poets, who conferred on her the Nashville Prize for poetry. The high claim 
Riding received by Tate in the pages o f the magazine is proof o f their respect for the originality 
o f  her poetry. It is also indicative o f the value criteria that would become a hallmgrW o f the 
New Criticism: “With a diverse play of imagination she combines in her poetry a sound 
intellectuality and a keen irony which give her work a substance not often fovind in current 
American poetry. Her poetry is philosophical in trend, yet not divorced from life, but generally
'3 Riding thus explains in a 1983 statement the changes o f  her name: “My student n a m p  was 
‘Reichental.’ While still a student I married Louis Gottschalk. When I began submitting poem s to 
magazines, I wanted a middle name for fiiller identification, but I disliked the phonetically cumbersome 
effect o f  the two Germanic surnames, either pronounced as such or in Anglicized phonetic renderings. 
‘Riding’ was an invention paying respect to the first sound-quality o f  my family name while, 
phonetically simple, having a certain identity-weight. After five years o f  marriage there came a divorce; I 
dispensed with the name ‘Gottshalk’ and made ‘Riding’ my name for all purposes, legally”  {Cornell
36
tense with emotion and concerned with profound issues”  (“Annoimcements”  130). Riding 
would become for a brief period o f time an honorary and then a full member o f the group, 
although she only once took part in their gatherings. After 1925, when she left the U. S., her 
contact with the New Critics would totally cease. Riding also managed to publish poems in 
some o f  the most prestigious magasdnes o f  the period, such as The Nation and 'Poetry. Her 
critical independence, however, did not allow her to establish any ties with the future New 
Critics: soon she divorced her husband and spent a brief period in New York City, where she 
met personalities such as Edmund Wilson, Malcolm Cowley, and became a close friend o f 
Hart Crane’s. Deeply attracted by her poetry published in the pages o f The Fugitive, (and 
especially by the poem “The Quids”), Graves invited her to come to England for a 
collaborative project, a book on modemist poetry (which he was formerly going to write with 
T. S. Eliot). In 1926, she made a decision similar to many o f her contemporary modernists, 
beginning her expatriate and independent career in Europe (Baker 15).
Riding arrived in January and soon joined the Graves family (Nancy Nicholson and their 
four children) on their move to Egypt, where Graves was awarded a professorship at the 
University o f  Cairo. Graves, who was relatively known in English literary circles, would 
become her parmer for the next thirteen years, during the richest period of their literary life. 
Back in England after six months. Graves convinced Leonard and Virginia Woolf (who had 
just pubHshed his Poems (1914-1926)) to pubHsh Riding’s first book o f poems, The Close Chaplet, 
through their private press. The book sold only twenty-five copies and, as we have seen, was 
compared to Graves s book and harshly criticized by John Gould Fletcher in the pages o f 
Eliot’s magazine, The Criterion, which infiiriated Riding and her partner. The result, as Baker
AkmniNews 86 (1983):12).
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tells in In Extremis, “was the souring o f Graves’s personal and professional relationship with 
EUot”  (Ibid. 159).
With the popular success o f Graves’s lumrence and the Arabs—a biography o f his fiiend 
T. E. Lawrence-—they managed to found their own pri.vate press (The Seizin Press, 1927- 
1938), publishing their own works and also authors such as the New Zealand filmm^lfpt- Len 
Lye and Gertrude Stein. In 1927 A  Survey of Modernist Poetry, written in 1926, was published. In 
1928 they published another collaborative work, A  Pamphlet Against Antholo^es, followed by 
Riding’s solo critical works Anarchism Is Not Enough and Contemporaries and Snobs (Ibid. 160).
Emotionally stressed due to a failed affair with a young Irish poet, as well as to the type 
o f relationship she was maintain!pg with Graves and. his wife, Nancy, Riding attempted to kill 
herself in 1929, jumping from the fbrth-floor window o f Graves’s apartment in London, 
followed by him, who jumped from the third-floor. Graves had minor injuries, but Riding 
almost got killed and had to spend some months in the hospital, risking to become 
permanently crippled. The suicide attempt was not only a scandal in the literary world but also 
a turning point in her literary and personal life. Looking for a quieter and cheaper place to Hve 
and work, and accepting a suggestion by Stein, Graves and Riding left for the Spanish island o f 
Majorca. In the village o f Deya, they continued publishing their books, as well as f o r m i n g  a 
litde community o f writers and artists. In 1936, with the outbreak o f the Spanish Civil War, the 
couple had to leave Majorca in a few hours, returning to London (Ibid 339).
In 1938, at the peak o f her poetic career, Riding published Collected Poems, containing 181 
poems selected from her earlier nine books. It was, ironically, her farewell to poetry. In 1939, 
she and Graves were invited by the American poet and critic Schuyler B. Jackson for a visit. 
Riding returned to America, Jackson and Riding fell in love, and it was the end o f the 
partnership with Graves. Around 1940, she renounced poetry and vanished from the literary
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scene until the 1960s. In 1972 she published what she called her personal evangel, Tbe Telling^  
as well as Selected Poems: In Five Sets. In the preface to the latter book, she summed up her earlier 
decision to abandon poetry, with a disturbing phrase: the discovery that “ truth begins where 
poetry ends” (15). Now signing Laura (Riding) Jackson, she spent the rest o f her days living 
modestly in a house without electricity in Wabasso, Florida, where fo rm erly the couple had 
managed a small citrus packing business. Turning to the stady o f linguistics, she wrote with her 
husband the ambitious Rational Meaning: A  New Foundation for the Definition of Words (published 
posthumously in 1991), a book on the nature o f language. It was only in the last year o f her 
life, 1991, that Riding got some kind o f official recognition from the literary Establishment, 
winning the BoUingen Prize for her “ lifelong contribution” to poetry. She died on September 
2, at 91 (Ibid. 420).
\
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE POETIC CANON OF MODERNIST 
POETRY
... cheated history—
CHAPTER 2
Which stealing now has only then 
And stealing us has only them.
(Riding, Poem 73)
In this chapter, in order to introduce die poetics o f Laura Riding, I first contextualize 
the main discussions that were occurring in Anglo-American poetry and criticism in the 
first half of the twentieth century. After a brief presentation of Pound’s Imagism and an 
account o f its influence, I concentrate on the hegemonic discourse on poetry o f that time, 
dominated by T. S. Eliot and the New Critics, and the consequent canon they created. I 
hope the chapter’s subtiries indicate my intentions: ‘T . S. Eliot and the Impersonal Theory 
o f Poetry,”  “Dissociation of Sensibility,” “The New Criticism,” and “Close Reading.”  In 
“Problems of New Criticism,”  I address questions regarding close reading and the New 
Criticism as a whole. My next step is to discuss alternative, or counter-modernisms that 
were occurring at the time (“Alternative Modernisms”), involving neglected poets from the 
grouping named objectivists, as well as Gertrude Stein. I close the chapter witli a discussion 
o f “Laura Riding as Modernist Thinker,” focusing mainly on the groundbreaking work A  
Survey of Modemist Poetiy (1927).
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Ezra Pound
In the establishment of a modernist Anglo-American poetics Ezra Pound (1888- 
1972) is a key-figure, and more paradoxically so because he tends to be embraced both by 
conservative and more radical critics. His arrival in LxDndon in 1908 and his articulation of 
Imagism and Vorticism (which makes him also an avant-garde representative) are 
frequently taken as die point o f departure to Anglo-American modernism. Pound also had 
a canonical power, not only through his influence as the poet o f Th Cantos, but as a 
theorist o f poetry, an editor, a contributor o f magazines such as Poetry and The Criterion, as 
well as a cultural polemicist, translator, and critic. As a canon-builder. Pound was almost 
single-handedly responsible for the launching of modernist poets who were either 
influenced or changed by his impact: William Buder Yeats, T. S. Eliot, H. D., William 
Carlos Williams, Robert Frost, Louis Zukofsky, and Marianne Moore.
In the received accounts o f An^o-American modernism, Imagism and Vorticism are 
taken as the first genuine Anglo-American poetical movements. Pound and the Imagists 
offered a specific poetic project, with its laws and prohibitions, its recipe of how poets 
should write in order to avoid the Victorian and Romantic poetic conventions. Few 
documents had more impact on the discourse on poetry in the twentieth century than the 
imagists’ manifestos. In what is generally considered the first manifesto of Angjo-American 
modernist poetry, “A Retrospect,”  published in Poetry in 1913, Pound, H. D., and Richard 
Aldington asserted the three cardinal stances o f the movement:
1) Direct treatment of the ‘thing,’ whether subjective or objective.
2) To use absolutely no word that does not contribute to the presentation.
3) As regarding rhythm: to compose in the sequence o f the musical phrase, not in die 
sequence of a metronome. (Literary Essays 3)
The first stance claims for an imagist poetry: concrete depiction of images, rejection
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o f rhetoric and avoidance o f abstraction or intellectualizarion. The second defended a 
poetry o f precision and brevity, o f accuracy o f expression, always guided by the power of 
the image. I must also mention the influence o f philosopher T. E. Hulme in the creation o f 
Imagism. Influenced by Henri Bergson’s notion o f dutie, as Bradbury and MacFarlane posit 
in their study on modernism, Hulme and the imagists had the belief that “no image can 
replace the intuition of a duration, but many diverse images, borrowed from very different 
order o f things, may, by the convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise 
point where there is a certain intuition to be seized” (235). The image— defined by Pound 
as “That which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant o f time” 
{Literary Essays 4)—became an instmmental notion in the discourse on modernist poetry, 
and was one heavily attacked by Riding and Graves in their A  Survey of Modernist Poetry, as 
we shall see later on. Finally, the third stance o f Imagism cl^ms free verse as die ideal form 
for modernist poetry. Only writing in free verse and breaking with meter and traditional 
forms was it possible to “make it new.”
Pound’s influence and importance to contemporary poetry and poetics is undeniable. 
Among his contributions is the; “ ide6gramic metiiod,”  die editing of Eliot’s The Waste Land, 
the promotion o f an opening of the canon throu^ translations of the poetry o f other 
cultures and ages (China, Egypt, Japan), and the language experience of The Cantos, which 
stands canonically as die most radical poem-collage of die present century.
T. S. Eliot and the Impersonal Theory of Poetry
As in the case o f Pound, no account of v^nglo-American poetry produced in die first 
half o f the twentieth century is complete if does not deal with Eliot’s poetics. His influence, 
not only as a poet, and editor, but most fundamentally for our purposes, as a critic, cannot 
be ignored, especially if one wants to study the critical discourse on poetr\- that became
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dominant in the first half o f the century. As one of the pioneers o f poetic 
experimentation—^whose masterpiece The Waste Land (1922) became the canonical 
modernist poem o f the century—^Eliot also became the main individual responsible for the 
shaping o f the canon during Riding’s career, as well as being influential in the development 
o f the New Criticism. More importandy, he favored a shift from Romanticism and 
Victorian poetry to the seventeenth-century Metaphysical poetry of John Donne, Andrew 
Marvell, and Richard Crashaw. His poetry and criticism exposed a formalism that would 
make him to be considered by the New Critics as the ftindamental poet of Anglo-American 
modernism (Gillory 148).
In an essay that has been considered one of the seminal and influential documents o f 
Angio-American modemist criticism, “Tradition and Individual Talent” (1919), Eliot 
argues that the sense o f tradition is essential for the modernist poet. The question of 
having a “liistorical sense”  meant a perception “not only of the pasmess o f past, but o f its
presence” (E ss^s 4). When the modern poet writes, according to Eliot, he does so “with a 
feeling that the whole o f literature of Europe from Homer and within it the whole of 
literature of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous 
order” (Ibid. 4). Since no poet creates in a vacuum or has meaning alone (which would be 
very difficult to imagine indeed), die candidate to become part o f this tradition must have 
this historical sense o f origins if he aims at having any poetic value, and he has necessarily 
to be compared or contrasted with his precursors. To escape from the vacuum o f existing 
outside literary history, die poet needs to embrace tradition in a dialectical way. Eliot sees 
this tradition as being “complete” before the arrival o f the new poet but, in order to 
continue a whole, the tradition needs to make room for “the really new” work of art 
among the existing literary monuments: “the whole existing order must be, f  ever so slightly, 
altered; and so the relations, proportions, values o f each work of art toward die whole are 
readjusted; and this is the conformity between the old and the net)!" (5 my emphasis). The only
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option left to the poet is “the necessity that he shall conform, that he shall cohere” (Ibid).
Altliough Eliot’s insight that the new works alter the old order and our sense o f them 
apparently leaves room for an avant-garde project, could there be a better description o f 
how the canon performs its politics of poetic forms? Poets only have meaning if compared 
with other poets that belong to a same tradition. In other words, if you are a European, 
what you write must be written with the European tradition in mind, and not with North- 
American, Latin American or Chinese traditions, for instance.'
Let us follow Eliot’s diesis. As he describes the process o f canon-formation in his 
essay, the “really new” work has necessarily to adjust, to conform with traditional 
assumptions, in order to be accepted and have its value considered. Candidates to this 
“ closed” canon must show their credentials first and prove dieir filiation witii the 
European tradition of verse if they wish to achieve canonical status; one has only to 
conform with the discursive formation of a tradition already established. The new is 
allowed entrance in the canon only if it is able to produce masterpieces, which perform the 
miracle to be new even under the shadow o f a powerful heritage, represented by what Eliot 
calls “tile mind o f Europe” (Ibid. 6). Tlius, with his model Eliot not only reduces die 
potential for change as excludes from view (with the exception of America) all non-English 
literary or extraliterary traditions. In Eliot’s discursive formation, new works are valuable if 
they conform with preset mles, and dieir value depends on how much they fit or fail to fit 
an ideal order manifested by die great works.^ Therefore, Eliot’s scheme limits the 
possibility o f revolutionary or so-called “disordered” poetic projects.
In his famous essay, Eliot also attacks Romantic ideas and formulates his own idea of 
modernism. By debunking notions such as inspiration, genius, and sentimentality, he ends
1 As IS known, Eliot revised this position in a late essay, entitled ‘T he Frontiers of Criticism”, in 
Poetiy and Poets. T. i " . E/ioi (London: Faber and Faber, 1957, 103-119).
2 The idea o f literary history as a struggle among “ strong” authors and their predecessors— as the 
members o f a same family or group— takes a Freudian and conservative turn in Harold Bloom’s 
Anxiety of influence— A  Theory of Poetry (1973).
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up stressing what would become another cornerstone in modernist discourse, namely, 
“impersonality” : “poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion” 
(Ibid. 10). In this process, it seems, the more impersonal, the more traditional a poet 
becomes, since “the progress o f an artist is a continual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction 
o f personality”  (Ibid. 7). The modern poet, according to Eliot, has no personality to 
express, but a particular medium: language. In this medium, and throu^ this medium, 
impressions, images, and experiences can be combined. The emphasis on the medium, in 
fact, represented a paradigmatic shift from the Romantic idea of genius and values, such as 
spontaneity, to the modernist idea o f  the poem’s intricate structure o f meaning. Moreover, 
a basic error o f critical evaluation, according to Eliot, was to take the poet’s life as the 
explication of the poem. This move from the poet to the poem would be essential not only 
for a generation o f poets (including Riding, though in a more conflicting way, as we will 
see), but for the development o f New Criticism. However, poetry—especially the type 
favored by Eliot and the New Critics— w^as seen as an autonomous artifact, always 
ambiguous and ironic, and even though it was composed of paradoxes and conflicts, it 
achieved a final unity, an ideal order above ordinary life (Baldick 67).
Eliot is more concerned, in his poetry and criticism (being trained in philosophy), 
with states o f mind rather than with lived experiences; the poet does not necessarily have 
to undergo the experiences described in die poem. As we have seen, poetry is a “turning 
loose o f emotion,”  and an “escape from personality” (Esst^s 10). The poet’s aim is not at 
all to express emotion, but to produce emotions dirou^ the use of an “objective 
correlative.”  As he defines it in the essay “Hamlet,”  the notion of “objective correlative”  is 
more related to the effect o f the objectified artwork than to the source and subject matter 
o f the artwork. As “a set o f objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the 
formula of that particular emotion” (766), we see tliat the power of the visual image, to
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Eliot, was ideal to function as translation o f emotions and complex states o f mind.
If one of the main concepts advanced is impersonality, it is curious to note a 
dissociative aspect implicit in Eliot’s theory. He writes that “the more perfect the artist, the 
more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates” 
(Ibid. my emphasis). Thus, paradoxically, in order to overcome the “dissociation of 
sensibility” between thought and feeling the poet had first to separate the personal from 
the impersonal, the private from the public, and the “ self’ from the tradition. The poem 
became a mask to distract us from the maker. Therefore, the overcoming of the dichotomy 
o f mind and body—present in the doctrine of “dissociation o f sensibility” itself— a^s I hope 
to demonstrate, becomes not only one o f the core questions for modernist poetics but also 
crucial for the discussion o f Laura Riding’s poetry and poetics.
Dissociation of Sensibility^
Eliot’s hypothesis formulated in the essay ‘The Metaphysical Poets”  (1921) and 
elsewhere advances that there once existed a poetic sensibility that was able to fuse thou^t 
and feeling. Such sensibility was corrupted and lost during and after the poetry o f the 
seventeenth-century, especially in the period immediately after the Elizabethans and 
Jacobean dramatists. From Philip Massinger on, Eliot argues, thought and feeling became 
more and more separated in the language of English poetry. In the eariy poetry o f the 
seventeenth century Eliot identifies “a quality o f sensuous thought, or o f thinking through the 
senses, or o f the senses thinking’ (Essays 247, my emphasis). On the other hand, he argues
 ^ Sensibility, as understood here, is opposed to “ sentimentality,”  which according to Eliot, the New 
Critics, and Pound carried connotations o f “ femininity,”  as well as being linked with Wordsworth’s 
definition o f poetry as “an overflow o f powerful feelings.”  Sensibility means here the balance o f 
thought and feeling, mind and body, the senses, in their double signification: as meaning, and as 
bodily senses. Following Lisa Samuels and George Lakoff, sensibility in this study relates to 
“concerns with embodied thought and emotional knowledge”  (Samuels 197). It relates to the ideal 
o f  creating a yin/yang relationship between body and mind, a desire for a perfect blend o f tliought
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that Victorian poets such as Tennyson and Browning “think; but they do not feel their 
thought as immediately as the odor of a rose” (Ibid. 247). Since the great age o f 
Metaphysical poets'*, therefore, and due to the turbulent political changes that ended up in 
Civil War and took die Catholic church out o f power, a dissociation of sensibility has set in. 
English poetry dramatically declined, never able again to achieve that fusion. To complete 
his job of rethinking a tradition from a hypothesis, Eliot accuses Milton and Dryden o f 
having major responsibility for this tragedy o f contemporary poetical sensibility. In their 
poetry, Eliot argues, it is either d iou ^ t or feeling; “they thought and felt by fits, 
unbalanced”  (Ibid. 248). Sentimentalism suffocated the reflective potential o f poetic 
language in their works. Even Keats and Shelley failed in overcoming diis dissociative 
disease: “In one or two passages o f Shelley’s Triumph of Life, in the second Hyperion, there 
are traces o f a struggle toward unification o f sensibility. But Keats and Shelley died, and 
Tennyson and Browning mminated”  (Ibid. 248). As I hope to demonstrate, Eliot’s thesis 
o f dissociation is strategic for his revaluation and reshaping o f the tradition o f En^ish 
verse for his time. Moreover, it became almost a synonym o f modernist sensibility.
In the same essay, however, Eliot observes instances o f a unified sensibility in the 
Italian poetry o f the Duoccento, in poets such as Guido Cavalcanti and Dante, as well as in 
the nineteenth-century French Symbolist poetrj'. Laforgue and Corbiere’s ironic modes are 
compared to the Metaphysical sensibility o f the English poets. Thus, following the 
problematic historical account he presents, one may be led to believe that the problem o f 
dissociation between thou^t and feeling not only started in a very precise historical setting 
(seventeenth-century England), but related curiously to the Italian and French poetries o f 
other periods. Eliot finally suggests that this problem also haunts modern poetry, since he 
claims that English poetry “wM?r recovered from this dissociation” (247 emphasis added). 
The solution or cure for this dissociation o f thought and feeling in modernist sensibility—
and sensation, senses (meanings) and the senses (physical, bodily).
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which is equated witli the religious disintegration of the modem world and its values-
could be solved only if poets became more intelligent and critical, more complex. Difficulty 
becomes, thus, an evaluative criterion best fit to deal with modernity’s decadence and 
chaos:
We can only say that it appears likely that poets in our civilization, as it exists at 
present, must be difficult. Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, 
and this variety and complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce 
various and complex results. The poet must become more indirect, in order to force, 
to dislocate if necessary, language into his meaning. (248 my en^hasis)
Modernist poets had to overcome this dissociation througji a more intellectual use o f 
poetic language in order to write “valuable” poetry, This was achieved by approaching 
language not only as a transparent vehicle o f reality, and poetry as an “overflow of 
powerful feelings,” but as a more complex perceptual and linguistic experience. Eliot, 
responsible for the canonization o f the poetry o f Donne in the context o f modernist 
poetry, praised him as possessing “a mechanism of sensibility which would devour any kind 
o f experience” (Ibid. 247). For Donne, argues Eliot, thought and feeling were siinultaneous 
experiences in the writing of a poem: in his poetry we can feel througji his mind and think 
throu^ his body. How this unification is achieved can be seen in the well-know example 
o f  Donne’s image of the lovers as a pair o f compasses. In the poem “A Valediction 
Forbidding Mourning,”  the speaker addresses his wife as he is about to temporarily leave 
on a trip.® In the last three stanzas, the speaker makes o f his departure an occasion to 
reinforce his feelings toward the woman, managing to explain their relationship and prove 
his fidelity by means of an extended simile:
I f  they be two, they are two so 
As stiff compasses are two;
An age, I must add, marked by the question of the spirit versus the senses.
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Thy soul, the fix’d foot, makes no show 
To move, but doth, if th’other do.
And though it in the center sit.
Yet, when the other far doth roam.
It leans, and hearkens after it.
And grows erect, as that comes home.
Such wilt thou be to me, who must.
Like th’ other foot, obliquely run;
Thy firmness makes my circle just.
And makes me end where I begun. {Complete Poems 88)
T hrou^ the use of a radical and unexpected image (the two lovers as the pivot o f a 
compass), Donne was able to articulate the precise instant an immediate experience 
becomes thou^t and vice versa, thus representing, for Eliot, a major example o f a unified 
sensibility. This ideahof poetic use of language in which images are charged with diought 
and feeling aptiy fits Pound’s definition o f image as “that which presents an intellectual and 
emotional complex in an instant o f time.”  That is exactiy what images do here: the poet 
was able to use language and thought to communicate ideas through emotions and vice 
versa. The attachment between the two souls is compared to the legs o f a compass: as tiie 
speaker must begin to draw the circle (his departure and return), he has to leave the center 
(their life together). Paradoxically, as the speaker distances from the center, the moving leg 
becomes still more attached to the other one, which, although fixed, also obliquely 
“ follows” die other’s movement (thus implying the speaker’s loyalty). It is die \^ry fixidity 
(or steadfasmess) o f his wife which determines his movement. They are both a single
5 The poem is also a fine example of the Metaphysicals’ extended metaphor.
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instrument: their souls are attached as the twin legs o f a compass. The image has the 
function o f precisely objectifying a complex feeling and thought. Here is an apt example of 
how an image is not being used by Donne ornamentally, but totally “woven into the fabric 
o f his thou^t” (Eliot, Varieties 123). This intelligent and more elaborated type o f image 
was the one typically valued by Eliot, the New Critics, as well as by Pound’s Imagist 
theories.
For the poet with a unified sensibility, the world resembled the Baudelarian “ forest 
o f symbols,”  something to be devoured and translated by the poet’s sensibility. The fact 
that similar ideas were already stated in Romanticism as well as by other modernist fellows 
cannot be overiooked,® thou^ in Eliot the notion takes a totally different direction and to 
a very specific end: nothing less than the revision of the whole canon o f Anglo-American 
poetry, with the use of the unified sensibility as a normative and evaluative category, 
lowering Victorian and Romantic poets and developing another tradition, one which comes 
from Donne and the Metaphysical poets (Crashaw, Cowley) and not from the names of 
Neo-Classicism and Romanticism (such as Milton, Wordsworth, Blake) or Victorianism 
(such as Swinburne and Tennyson). That tradition, finally, would be represented in 
contenr^orary poets who exhibited those qualities observed by Eliot.
As one would expect, not all critics took Eliot’s thesis o f a literary dissociation o f 
sensibility for granted. The theory has been attacked by Tuve and Bateson. One o f the 
more lucid attacks came from Frank Kermode. In Romantic Image, he argues that Eliot’s 
model is totally a-historical: since the dissociation can be found in different periods o f 
times and places, why set it as belonging mainly to seventeenth-century English poetry? 
Kermode states that “ if we were to pursue die dissociation back into the past, we should
Matthew Arnold, A. Gtosart, and A. Symons were among the ones who were able, before Eliot, 
to point to the unification o f thought and feeling in the metaphysical poetry. In Grosart’s edition o f 
Crashaw’s poems (1872 and 1873), he notes “ the seventeenth-century peculiarity o f feeling thought 
as sensation”  (see a lso j. E. Duncan’s The ^vivalofMetaphysical'Poetry). Hulme and Pound, as I have 
said, hold similar ideas. Hulme identified a similar unification o f thought and feeling in Italian
50
find ourselves in Athens. It would be quite reasonable to locate the great dissociation in the 
sixteenth-century or the thirteenth-century as in the seventeenth; nor would it be difficult 
to construct arguments for other periods” (142).
Wliether or not one agrees with Eliot’s thesis, its impact as a discursive practice 
cannot be underestimated; the literary sensibility it imposed became a critical standard o f 
evaluation during the formative phase of High Modernism. Influential critics such as R. L. 
Leavis, I. A. Richards, and the New Critics accepted Eliot’s thesis, which became in turn a 
justification to reshape the canon o f Anglo-American poetry, displacing the Romantic and 
Victorian poets to privilege the Metíçhysical poets, as well as the difficult modernist poetry 
of Yeats, Pound, and Eliot himself It is also crucial to be aware of the ideological claims 
behind Eliot’s thesis, since it can be seen as a moral explanation for the “chaos and the 
vices”  o f modemity and the English tradition o f verse.
Because, to my mind, it is inadequate to discuss poetry without taking into account 
discourses that surround it, I can see how the notion o f a “dissociation of sensibility”  was 
symptomatic o f a mind/body dichotomy operating within modernist poetry itself there is 
no doubt that in Eliot’s accounts the mind is always the privileged and dominating term. 
Thus I can say that this rationalist approach to “ sensibility,” at least in the version o f Eliot 
and the New Critics, is what was really “dissociated” and “unbalanced” in an age that did 
not know or acknowledge this. Finally, the Eliotian modernist quest for a reunification o f 
body and mind was not achieved. In fact, it is ironic to observe how the Eliotian and New 
Critical program is itself dissociated, because in its binary constructions (mind/body, 
thought/feeling, tradition/individual), it is clear that the first term is always dominant, thus 
perpetuating the “dissociation” Eliot had condemned in the Romantics and Victorians. 
Furthermore, I would like to ask; if Eliot really thought o f mind and body as being 
naturally simultaneous, why would he have tlie need to create such theory? I agree with
poetry after Dante and Cavalcanti, and Pound associated it with medieval and late medieval poetry.
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Lisa Samuels when, discussing what she calls the “Eliotic ideology,”  she states that “ [i]n 
insisting on forceful intellect and linguistic difficulty, Eliot’s program ironically perpetuates 
the dislocation of thought from feeling, which must chase after thought to try to figure out 
its ‘meaning.’ Eliot confirms the intellect as father o f the body” {Poetic Arrest 200). 
Kermode also identifies the dissociative aspect implict in Eliot’s theory: “The tmth may be 
that we shall never find a state or culture worth bothering about (from the literary point o f 
view, that is) in which language is so primitive as to admit no thinking that is not numinous 
(142).
The New Criticism
T. S. Eliot, I. A.. Richards, W. K. Wimsatt, and William Empson, in En^and, John 
Crowe Ransom, Cleanth Brooks, R. P. Blackmur, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, and 
Renne Wellek, in the United States, are generally considered the main names o f New 
Criticism. The movement had an enormous impact on the study o f literamre and on 
An^o-American criticism and scholarship mainly during and after World War II. More 
importantly, by their intervention these critics had a seminal role in the formation and 
legitimization of a restricted Anglo-American poetry canon. One o f the main problems 
faced by the New Critics at the time was that traditional literary evaluation had forgotten
not only “the text itself’ but was unaware of the revolution in modern poetry that was 
taking place not only in America but also in Britain. On the other hand, in the discourse of 
the New Critics, the privileged space traditionally given to the Romantics and Victorian 
poets was replaced by the Metaphysical poets or even by contemporary poets working on 
the Metaphysical mode.
In 1920s America, a movement called Fugitives, grouped around Vanderbilt 
University, began to edit a literary magazine. The Fugitive (1922-25). As Southern regionalist
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and Agrarians, diey aggressively rejected Northern values: they were against capitalist and 
progressive ideals, confining themselves to a separatist and regionalist politics. The political 
idea of maintaining the traditional Christian, agrarian, and autonomous community of the 
U. S. South—2i more organic model o f society than the one presented by Northern 
industrialism—-soon was transferred to literary evaluation. These new academic critics 
would set a revolution in literary criticism that, as in the case o f Eliot and Pound, cannot be 
ignored, since it changed the status not only o f the literary criticism but of the shape o f the 
TVmerican poetical canon from the 1930s to the 1950s. These new critics were reacting 
against the common amateurishness o f literary journalistic reviewing practice then 
dominant, and against certain specialized academic scholarships such as historicism and 
philology (Cain 94). More importandy, they opposed the ideological approach of the 
Northern Marxist critics, who were progressively being' quieted due to the increasing 
anticommunist and anti-Marxist ideas arousing between die wars. To be sure, as many o f 
the New Critics were also poets, it is understandable that they would, in the formulation o f 
their new methodology o f literary analysis, focus on the poem itself, on its poeticity and 
literariness. " ‘
As early as 1919, as we have seen, Eliot had called for a criticism that would 
concentrate on the poem, not on the reader nor on the poet’s personality, although similar 
claims had already been made by Edgar Allan Poe, Walter Pater, and others in the 
nineteenth century. The aestheticist claims o f the New Critics, with their rigorous texmal 
analysis, were also symptomatic o f the need felt in the American academy to narrow and 
define its field of knowledge (Cain 95).
Against the politicization o f  Marxist Criticism (in its will to understand art and poetry 
in ideological context) the New Critics felt that, in an increasin^y scientific and 
consumerist society, poetry had lost its importance as a stmcture of knowledge, as well as a 
binding sense of community. As Ransom states, they felt the need to create objective and
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descriptive criteria o f evaluation for the analysis o f poetry; “Here are some articles o f faith 
I could subscribe to: That literary criticism is a description and an evaluation of its object. 
That the primary concern of criticism is with the problem o f unity— t^he kind of whole 
which the literary work forms or fails to form, and the relation of the various parts to each 
otlier in building up this whole’”  (“My Credo”  45). In critical terms, the New Critics were 
against the pedagogical trends dien dominant in Anglo-American literary criticism at their 
time. In "Criticism, Inc.” (1941), Ransom reacted against impressionist criticism, with its 
approach to the poem as a personal statement. In the traditional line o f biographical and 
historical criticism of a poem, they argued, readers and critics tended to emphasize the life 
o f the poet at die expense o f the poem itself. I f  there is such a thing as a meaning of the 
poem, it was certainly not to be found in the author nor in the reader, neither in the social 
nor in the historical context. The poem’s “organic unity” had an ontological status. 
Ransom and the New Critics accused the other critical trends of reducing the poem’s 
evaluation to biographical and psychological evidence, as well as to its historical context, 
thus obscuring the discussion of the poem in itself It was, in general, a proposal o f a more 
intrinsic study of literature, as it became canonical and influential with books such as Renne 
Wellek and Austin Warren’s Theoiy of Literature (1949).
Another feature of the discursive formation o f New Criticism was W. K. Wimsatt 
and Monroe C. Beardsley’s denouncing of what they called “the affective fallacy” : that is, 
any attempt to evaluate the poem from the reader’s viewpoint. On the other hand, in the 
evaluation of a poem the meaning could never be reduced or equated to the autlior’s 
feelings or intentions at the moment of writing the poem (“intentional fallacy”). Like any 
other work of art— 'i. painting, for instance—a poem was seen as an object constituted of 
aesthetic autonomy; it had, again, an ontological status. The poem was thought o f as a 
being in itself, an organic structure whose meaning and final unity could only coincide with 
the detailed examination of its parts and formal features. A good poem, argued the New
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Critics, was able to achieve otganic unity througjh a number o f effects and opposing 
conflicts such as ambiguity, irony, paradox. In short, through verbal “tensions,” as Tate 
formulated it, in opposition to what occurs in literal language, the configuration o f poetic 
meaning is achieved by the poet’s ability to explore the denotative and connotative 
meanings o f words to their limit. “Rather than just reflect an experience outside itself, 
literature dramatizes experience within the theater o f its form” (Baldick 83).
In the New Critical discourse, a poem is always complex, a place of conflict where 
the “drama” of meaning (Brooks) aims at achieving a final unity or harmony. The critic’s 
role is to unfold this process where thougjbt and feeling are balanced and where chaos 
finally becomes order, tiius showing how the poet was able to combine heterogeneous and 
frequent conflicting elements in an organic relationship. A good poem, in the New Critical 
view, are always organic, the parts reverberating in its whole and vice versa, and where 
form is never separated from content. The critic’s task was to prove the formal unity by 
tracking the formal relations in the poem, through a close and detailed reading of a text.
Close Reading
The procedure o f close analysis was pursued to its extreme in 1930 by Richards’s 
disciple William Empson, in the New Critical landmark Seven Types of Ambiguity. This 
method o f critical reading became the main discursive practice o f the New Criticism. The 
book and its definition o f ambiguity—“any verbal nuance, however slight, which gave 
room for alternative reactions to the same piece o f language”  (1)—was fundamental to the 
New Critics.
The New Critics advocated that, as a self-contained and autonomous artifact, the 
poem had a meaning to be found through a careful and detailed close reading. As one 
would expect, a typical close reading started with several readings o f the text itself Then,
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the focus fell on the relationship between the title and the poem. The next step was the 
uncovering of possible literary allusions in the poem, and how the title and the allusions 
shed light in the overall meaning of the poem. After being able to identify the core o f the 
poem, its theme, as well as its diction and tone (if ironic, mysterious, serious, noble), the 
reading examined the denotations (referentiality) and connotations (polysemy), and 
searched for important etymological roots o f the words in the poem. Proceeding from 
looking for the poem’s formal patterns, came the analysis o f important poetic elements: 
metaphors, symbols, images, as well as prosodic aspects (stanzas, rhymes, meter). At this 
time, the reader was able to explore the dramatic conflicts the text unfolds and identify its 
main paradox. A final move consisted in ejq)laining and proving how the poem is able to 
achieve a final harmony and organic unity through the relationship of all its elements, how 
its tensions were finally conciliated in a organic unity, therefore defining the uniqueness 
and quality o f that specific poem. How the poem’s meaning was made by many conflicts, 
dramatically animated, according to the New Critics, could only be arrested by a close 
reading.
With the formalist method of literary analysis as sketched above. New Critical 
methodology gained an enormous power within the academy as well as well among general 
readers and poet-candidates, mainly with the best-seller Understanding Poetry (1938), by 
Cleanth Brooks and Robert Penn Warren. According to Alan Golding, this can be said to 
be “the single most influential poetry textbook published in this century [...], mainly 
throu^ its role in ‘disseminating’ (the phallocentric metaphor is appropriate) New Critical 
judgments and methodology” (102). Far from operating neutrally, the bestseller acted on 
the Anglo-American scene as an instmment o f the educational institutions, having a poetic 
and canonical impact, inasmuch as it was also an anthology, a selection of poets whose 
regulative and prescriptive method could be applied best: the book gathered what its 
authors considered “the best”  exhibits o f modernist poetry. As the method should explain
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the poem and the poem should confimi the method, the choice o f poems always depended 
on descriptive values implicit in the method: “complexity,”  “ irony,” “paradoxes,” 
“ambiguity,”  “tension,” “ indirecmess.”  Thus, close reading became the perfect method not 
only to deal with the more difficult type of poetry produced by the Metaphysical poets, but 
with the complex modern poetry being produced by Eliot, Pound, Ransom, Auden, 
Stevens, Moore, Yeats (but not Riding.
Problems with the New Criticism
It seems natural, from the historical point o f view, that such a method o f focusing on 
the text alone would have found resistance at a time when the An^o-American academy 
was, according to the New Critics, dominated by biographical and historicist analysis, and 
which always reduced the meaning and evaluation o f a poem into a paraphrase. From our 
present point of view, such methodology presents several shortcomings in the broader 
context o f a politics o f poetic forms. First, by concentrating on the internal dynamics o f 
the text, the New Critics tended to ignore its extemal dynamics, that is, they treated as 
irrelevant questions o f history, psychology, author’s intention, biography, and the reader’s 
experience. As advocates o f aestheticism and o f the autonomy of poetic language, tliey 
transformed poetic discourse into a substitute for An^ocentrism and religion. Even thou^i 
they defended the difference o f poetry from other types o f discourse such as science, 
philosophy, and history, this form o f literary criticism soon became a routine and a 
“ science” of interpretation o f literary texts in itself, a “power/knowledge”— i^n fact, a 
hegemonic procedure. It gave literary criticism respectability, transforming the reading o f 
poems into an autonomous and authoritative discipline in itself, widiout having to rely on 
historicism and psychologism. However, it is ironic to observe that, with their rigorous 
mediodology, the New Critics ended up constmcting the smdy o f poetry as a science, witli
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its laws, principles, much like the science that most o f the New Critics were reacting 
against.
Another fact frequently dismissed in the discussion of the context o f modernism, as 
well pointed out by Jed Rasula in American Poetry Wax Museum, and as I have reiterated, is 
that when critics write about the canon formation of American poetry, few are able to 
mention that, for at least three decades or more, the New Critics not only held in power in 
terms of academic methodology, but were simultaneously imposing a canon. Rasula 
criticizes contemporary critics o f American poetry, arguing that, in discussing the New 
Criticism’s consequences and methodology, tiiey often and oddly neglected that “New 
Criticism was in effect a public relations firm that pioneered and then successfully 
promulgated a certain brand o f poetry. Insofar as a canon of Modem American poetry has 
seemed self-evident to so many critics and anthologists, the New Criticism succeeded” 
(Ibid. 69). Rasula sees the permanence of New Critical and Eliotian values operating even 
today in the reception and formation of the American canon, exemplified in the figures o f 
powerfiil critics such as Helen Vendler and Harold Bloom. For Rasula, the New Criticism 
“ remains the most successful T&iericUn literary miovement o f the century” (Ibid. 70). One 
of the immediate consequences o f the hegemony of the New Critics in the history of the 
canon of American poetry can be detected in the fact that the names that mosdy got 
visibility and became successfiil were poets who were either linked with, receptive to, 
blessed, or discussed by the New Critics: Wallace Stevens, Robert Frost, John Berryman, 
Robert Lowell, Elizabeth Bishop, Delmore Schwartz, Randal Jarrell, Yvor Winters, among 
others. This explains, partially at least, the consequent erasure from the canon of such 
important figures such as Gertmde Stein, Mina Loy, Lorine Niedecker, Louis Zukosfky, 
George Oppen, Langston H u^es and, ironically, Laura Riding.
The best example of the liaison of the American canon and New Criticism is 
presented in Brooks’s influential Modem Poetiy and the Tradition (the The of the tide being
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indicative o f Brooks’s limiting choice, while Tradition echoes Eliot’s ‘Tradition and 
Individual Talent”). Again, the victory of the official history of modern poetry as told by 
the New Criticism led to a simplification o f a much more diverse past. Rasula posits that 
official anthologies and versions o f modernism tend to transform poetry in a kind o f 
museum: a selection of exhibits and major poets, “the modernist version of the curiosity 
cabin, the museum, is a device for taming and ordering diversity” (Ibid. 479).
Nevertheless, as one o f the most influential discourses on contemporary poetry, the 
New Criticism was important for pointing to the necessity of never losing the text itself 
from view when discussing literature, although contemporary literary criticism is becoming 
more and more contextualist. It has also made us see the fundamental role o f the reader in 
the constmction of a possible meaning o f the poem, and called attention to poetry not only 
as a “language art”  but also as a distinct and legitimate stmcture o f knowledge. Even a 
Marxist critic such as John Fekete, although linking the New Critics’ organicism with tiieir 
conservative politics, is able to praise the advances in literary analysis promoted by the New 
Criticism:
The insistence that tiie work o f art is a construct, a dense object, a closed stmcture of 
objectification, is a genuine advance for a critical theory over all earlier biographical, 
‘historical,’ ‘sociological,’ ‘philological,’ or other scholarly methodologies. Until the 
aesthetic status o f a work o f art is established, tiiere can be no aesthetic discussion, 
stricdy speaking, and Ransom and the New Critics are important in bourgeois theory 
for asserting the ontological status o f art as aesthetic. (102)
New Criticism offered readers a method o f reading poetry that can be used in different 
ways and with different intentions. It is still a valuable tool that can be appropriated by 
Feminist Criticism or Black Studies, for instance. Moreover, with close reading, we have 
learned to pay attention not only to what die poem means but how it means. This was a 
valuable advance promoted by the New Criticism in relation to excessively intrinsic forms
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o f criticism of their time. Criticism was unaccustomed to paying attention to the assembly 
o f devices used by poets when writing a poem, to the poetic process (poiesis) in itself. But I 
disagree with the New Critical belief that to concentrate solely on the stmcmres o f the text 
offers the poetically correct interpretation. Disagreeing with Fekete, I would argue that 
much is lost when we reduce our appreciation of poems as “closed stmctures o f 
objectification.”  Because the New Critics came to believe in the methodology o f close 
reading as the only possible way for analyzing poems, the procedure has become a new 
orthodoxy, a formalist routine.
What the New Critics were unable or unwilling to recognize is that there are no 
single, correct ways o f reading, only possibilities o f readings, made by different readers and 
by different historical, racial, social, sexual, and political contexts. Believing in the 
autonomy and unity o f poems as artistic objects, the New Critics’ so-called objective 
criticism privileged form at the expense of other possible contents (content here 
understood as the biographical, historical, personal data o f the poet, and tiie poem’s time 
o f composition), apparentiy forgetting that poems are written by persons, who have bodies, 
ideologies, political ideas, living in a certain time and culture. As Terry Eagleton posits,
Reading poetry in the New Critical way meant committing yourself to nothing: all 
that poetry thaught you was ‘disinterestedness,’ a serene, speculative, impeccably 
even-handed rejection o f anything in particular. It drove you less to oppose 
McCarthysm or fiirther civil rights than to experience such pressures as merely 
partial, no doubt harmoniously balanced somewhere else in the world by their 
complementary opposites. It was, in other words, a recipe for political inertia, and thus 
submission to the political status quo. {Literary 50, emphasis mine)
Furthermore, as I have argued, the vulnerable point o f the method is that it tended to 
privilege a specific type of poetry and a narrow cast o f poets, eschewing works and poems
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that do not aim at organic unity or balance, for instance.’ How to discuss the structure o f 
works such as Stein’s Tender Buttons, Pound’s Cantos, Williams’s Kora in Hell and Spring and 
A ll, Mina Loy’s dada-fiiturist poems, or even Laura Riding’s abstract and literal poetry, in 
terms of organic unity, ambiguity, balance, and closure? Or, for that matter, works that set 
as their major goal exactly to deconstruct such aesthetic values, as well as those works that 
react to the idea o f finding a final meaning in art, as in the poetry o f avant-garde 
movements?
The New Critics also believed in the existence o f a poetic language separate and 
distinct from ordinary language. The unity and difficulty of form as advocated by them 
were not only a rejection of the chaos o f modernity, but a formalist response: the poet, as 
Eliot writes in “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” had to find a way of “controlling, o f ordering, 
o f giving shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which 
is contemporary history” (qtd. in Kolocotroni, Goldman, and Taxidou 371). For Brooks, 
poetry’s themes may change and vary historically, but its formal structures do not: thus, in 
every reading the critic looked for the same effects and features— irony, unity, ambiguity, 
paradox—^which in turn were taken as an evaluative norm for all good poems. In “The 
Language o f Paradox” we find Brooks at his most reductive. Defending the notion that 
other discourses (such as ordinary language, science, philosophy) were “naturally” opposed 
to poetic discourse, he forgets that many modernist poets were working exactly to break 
with such a distinction, by incorporating languages, dialects, working with the “ found 
language” o f newspapers in collagist compositions, or trying to incorporate discourses that 
lyric poetry had traditionally avoided. In the same text. Brooks criticizes “the tendency o f 
science to stabilize terms, to freeze them into stricter denotations,”  while “the poet’s
’ In Poetry, Language, and Politics,]o\\n Barrell writes that the New Critics’ notion of balance 
is itself “a term o f value witli a crucial flinction in middle-class ideology, underwriting tlie 
political authority o f ‘consensus,’ or die ‘middle-ground,’ by representing as irrational 
extremism whatever cannot or whatever reflises to be, gathered in tlie middle-ground” (6).
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tendency is by contrast disruptive”  {Contemporary 36). One might ask if it is not exacdy the 
scientific and stabilizing discourse o f criticism which is achieved throu^ a typical close 
reading? What, after all, was evident in the privileged position o f a close reading: the 
disruptive discourse o f poetry or the scientific and stabilizing discourse of criticism? ‘The 
truth tlie poet utters am be approached only in terms o f paradox,”  argues Brooks (Ibid. 
36). If  “all”  poems always speak the language o f paradox, what would the critic do with 
works which establish a radical literalism and de-met^horization o f poetry, aiming at 
emptying language from any ambiguity (such as Riding’s), or to push meaning to its limit by 
means of nonsense, discontinuity, and fragmentation (such as in the work o f cummings, 
the American Dada, Stein, and even Pound’s Cantos)} In the same text. Brooks criticizes the, 
“ tendency of science to stabilize terms, to freeze them into stricter denotations,”  and “the 
poet’s tendency is by contrast disruptive.”  As Riding had alerted as early as 1928, in 
Anarchism is not Enough'. “By persistence, the poem can be made into something, but then it 
is something, not a poem...”  (18).
As we have seen, the poem had to be taken as a purely formal and aesthetic object 
outside history, time, aside from the author’s subjectivity aftd intention. Somt aspects o f 
the New Critical approach announce features o f Poststmcturalism and deconstruction, e.g., 
the emphasis on the text itself, above its author. The New Critical moment also coincides 
with the moment that the critic’s power became more dominant Faced as a complex and 
form-content binary machine, the final unity of the poem could only be revealed by the 
dierapeutic examination o f the New Critic. As Allen Tate would argue, reading a poem 
aimed at proving that through its tensions, oppositions, paradoxes, the poem finally 
achieved an equilibrium. But one may ask if it is not at this exact moment that a poem 
becomes a commodity, a tamed object, with the feeling that the critics and readers really 
caught “the meaning”  of die poem? William E. Cain points out to a paradox implict in the 
New Criticism: its major weakness is that “it generates ‘close readings’ witliout apparent
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limit, saturating the text with so much interpretation that ‘the text itself—^which the New 
Critics sought to rescue— t^ends to disappear”  (102). Or, as Riding and Graves have warned 
in A  Survey. “It must be admitted that excessive interest in the mere technique o f the poem 
can become morbid both in tlie poet and the reader, like the composing and solving of 
cross-puzzles”  (25).
As a consequence o f the New Critics’ dominance in tlie universities as well as in the 
new canon established by them, the once dismptive aspects o f modernism became tamed. 
In 1958, Delmore Schwartz thus described American poetry: “What was once a battlefield 
has become a peacefiol public park on a pleasant summer Sunday afternoon”  (26). One of 
the immediate effects o f the long lasting hegemony of Eliot and the New Criticism was 
that it reduced the real and radical diversity o f American poetry produced from 1900 to 
1945 to a list o f inajor white male Anglo-American poets.
Marxist critics such as Eagleton, as we have seen, argue that this type of criticism is 
“a recipe for political inertia.”  To be sure, the view of the work of art as an autonomous 
object, as Bürger posits in his Theory of the Avant-Garde, is a dissociative and bourgeois 
concept in itself Its major flaw is that it posits itself as existing outside social reality and 
social praxis (46). The avant-garde movements, on the other hand,
view [such] dissociation from the praxis o f life as the dominant characteristic o f art in 
bourgeois society. One o f tlie reasons this dissociation was possible is that 
Aestheticism had made the element tiiat defines art as an institution the essential 
content o f works. Institution and work contents had to coincide to make it logically 
possible for tlie avant-garde to call art into question. (49)
A flagrant feamre of the discourse on poetry promoted by Eliot and the New 
Criticism, thus, besides the problematic, limited canon it created, is that it erased, for the 
purposes o f literary evaluation, accounts of gender, race, class, biographical, and historical 
information. They treated as irrelevant possible contexts that could be used to clarify the
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poem’s meanings or that might enrich our understanding of poems as cultural artifacts. 
Feminism, Black Studies, Queer Studies, Marxist Criticism, and New HUstoricism have 
attacked this failure on various grounds and to various degrees. Some of the conservative, 
elitist, reactionary, and even religious aspects o f New Criticism began to be exposed more 
intensely from the 1960s on. This attack seemed to be validated not only by the frequent 
religious discourse behind the discussions o f poetry, but also by Eliot’s conversion to 
An^icanism (followed by other New Critics), and the conversion to Roman Catholicism by 
Tate and Wimsatt. The allegiance of some of the New Critics such as Ransom, Tate, and 
Warren to the cause o f Agrarianism, moreover, exposed the conservative face o f the 
movement. Good poetry became a cure for the moral decadence the New Critics saw as 
affecting contemporary society.
If the medical m et^hor applies here, we can say that through close reading the New 
Critics treated the poem ‘like a patient etherized upon a table”  (to use Eliot’s line), one 
whose mental health conditions could only be revealed as good or bad through a scrutiny 
of the patienf s “behavior,” throu^ the unlocking o f its “problem.”  Or the poem was put 
on a divan: the critic forced the poem to deliver all his repressed meanings, tensions, and 
ambiguities, an analysis taken under the view of the poem ultimately as a dramatic piece o f 
language necessarily paradoxical. Or, as Brooks asserts, “The unity which it represents is 
achieved by the resolution of complexities, and thus die structure of the poem reflects w^ hat 
the poem is saying” {Modem 81). This task was achieved when the critic managed to balance 
die oppositions presented by the poem, but now recovered in a final unity, as an integral 
and well-adjusted piece o f language. Commenting on a poem by Carl Sandburg—one 
among many American poets to be “decanonized” widi the New Critical entry in die 
literary scene—Brooks blames Sandburg for his “lack of psychological subjectivity, die lack 
o f complexity in tlie poet’s attitude, the weak dramatic sense, the general ‘crudit}' o f 
form’— a^ll diese are aspects o f a violent repudiation of tlie poetic tradition” (Ibid. 73).
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That is: for Brooks, healthy poets, in a line akin to Eliot’s thought, are those who conform 
to a tradition, those who are able to overcome the poetical malaise, namely, dissociation of
sensibility. By disciplining the reading, the poem was considered bad and punished witli 
exclusion if it refused to deliver its ambiguities, paradoxes, and ironies. In the meantime, a 
subject is created: the poem. And, by extension, we, readers, became absolutely subjugated 
by the poem’s final authority as uncovered by the critic.
Alternative Modernisms
After having established Eliot’s and the New Critics’ influence, I can say that the
“official verse culture” version on the American poetic canon in the period from 1900 to
1945 is one that historically coincides with Eliot’s position as the most important modern
poet and critic o f the period, next to other poets supported by the New Critics. However,
if one looks carefully at the range o f poetics o f the period, one can see that it is richer in
modernisms than the institutional versions led us to believe.
The first problem is that, by establishing 1922 as modernism’s official beginning, tiie
official version erases from view not only die whole period from 1914 to 1922, but also
seminal achievements o f poets such as Stein, e. e. cummings, Louis Zukofsky, Mina Loy,
Langston Hughes, George Oppen, Laura Riding, at the same time that it occludes avant-
garde movements such as Dadaism, Futurism, not to mention other international 
modernisms that were taking place around tiie world. Writing from the viewpoint o f a 
Latin American poet, Octavio Paz criticizes Anglo-American poets such as Eliot and 
Pound for being incapable of recognizing their immediate precursors (Cubism, 
Simultaneism, Futurism and Dada) as well as the importance of tiie avant-garde o f the first 
decade of die century for the cultural milieu o f tiie time, preparing die terrain for tiieir own 
works. Unfortunately, inside the academy, littie effort has been made to establish
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connections and accounts o f the international avant-garde movements o f the period and 
their unfoldings in the United States.
The frequent omission of names listed above is indicative o f the reductive side o f 
this concept o f modernism, canonically expressed in the eternal figurations of the names o f 
Yeats, Eliot, Frost, Auden, Stevens, and Pound. Revisionists of twentieth-century poetics, 
such as Perloff, will not conform In an incisive argument against the “normalization”  o f 
the history of modernist poetry, she asks an important question: “It has, for example, 
become a received piety that Tiigh Modernist poetry was the poetry of the ‘well-wrou^t- 
um,’ the self-enclosed, autotelic, spatialized artifact. Does that definition cover the case o f 
Bretch? O f Marinetti? O f Appolinaire? O f Gertmde Stein?” (Poetic 2).
What is more ironical in this constmction o f the canon o f American poetry, as critics 
such as Rothenberg, Perloff, and Bernstein observe, is that it commonly reduces the 
modernist movements being articulated around the ^obe to this specific Angjio-American 
and frequendy “antimodernist”  and traditionalist view o f modernism, one that would 
become canonical by the end o f the World War II.® Critics from the “left”  in the American 
academy agree that to talk about modernist American poetry in the 1990s still means the ' 
repetition of an elite team, an already predictable list o f male authors from England and 
America, a canon that allows few possibilities o f canonical variation, musically speaking. 
Moreover, as we have seen, the permanence of Eliotian and New Critical ideology in the 
so-called official verse culture is evident in influential canon-builders such as Vendler and 
Bloom For Perloff, it is the European avant-garde movements that best testify to the 
appearance of “radical”  Anglo-American modernism, specifically that occurring between 
wars, such as Dada, Futurism, and Surrealism, in a list o f names in which appear Tristan 
Tzara, Guillaume Appolinaire, Marinetti, Vleimir FGieblinikov, Stein, Loy, Huidobro,
* Robert von Hallberg states the connection betu'een nationalism and canon-formation coinciding 
with the Anglo-American post-war period: “Certain historical moments, those o f consolidation, 
such as after a war, say, when a nation is given to patriotism and appeals to shared traditions, seem
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André Breton, and Antonin Artaud. As Perloff states:
Again, if modernism is equated with Angjio-American modernism, then the 
attribution o f order and hierarchy, organic form and autonomy, centering and 
aesthetic distance may well be applicable; if, on the other hand, we focus on 
Continental Europe, on, say, Italian Futurism and Dada, on Apollinaire and 
Cendrars, or on Klee and Tatlin, the picture is quite different. (Poeiiy On 18)
In her revisionist approach to modernism, Perloff not only opened the focus up to include 
international modernism, but investigated the concern with “a revolution o f the word” 
taking place at the time. She stresses the view o f poetry as an investigation o f language 
possibilities, but with a more systematic radical questioning o f bourgeois tradition and art. 
I f  one sets the received version o f modernism within the context o f Peter Biirger’s 
discussion pointed out earlier, one sees reason to believe that, from our privileged point o f 
view at the turn of the century, Eliotian and New Critical versions o f the recent poetic past 
were all less radical and modemist than we once thought. We can see today with more 
clarity not only the formalist and limiting aspects o f their agenda, but the several 
conservative, "religiôus, and ethnocentric elements implicit in their ideology.
Adopting a more social and historical approach to the question, Cary Nelson’s 
Repression and Recovery is helpfiil here, since he detects a common and given dualism 
operating in the “official”  version: the constmction of American modernism as a contest 
“between an aesthetically but elitist and apolitical modernism and a tired tradition o f 
genteel romanticism” (21). This binary opposition— the basic mechanism o f any ideological 
constmction in claiming itself to be invisible— h^as the effect o f erasing other important 
movements and authors from view, diminishing literary history to a stable battle between a 
specific version of modernism versus a late Romantic and Victorian poetics. By creating a 
version that seems complete, closed, after tlie “batde” was won by the modems (Eliot,
especially propitious to canon-formation”  {Canons 3).
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Frost, Yeats, Steven, Auden), the version defended by influential names such as Bloom and 
Vendler closes off alternative, more dynamic and divergent versions o f modernism. And, 
most importandy, the contest described by Nelson—between elitist modernism versus 
genteel Romanticism— obscures or makes invisible cmcial poets and movements that were 
taking place in the period alluded (1900-45). Even more problematic is that the quest for 
the sin^e most representative name of the period points to a pervasive restriction o f 
diversity even witiain the confines o f the canon. Bernstein illustrates well this 
hyperreductive aspect o f the canon when he states that
Many o f the New Critics, like Vendler, constructed their own partisan map o f High 
Modernism, purged o f the more formally radical and avant-garde directions not only 
among excluded poets but, significantiy, within the poets canonized. It is the type of 
gutted modernism, which frequentiy transforms itself into outright antimodernism, 
that may lead some critics to cede “modemism” as a project to its most politically 
and aesthetically commentators and consequentiy to suggest that the avant-garde and 
modernism are antithetical. (“Comedies”  237)
Although Bernstein’s point is well taken, one observes that even American critics 
sympathetic to the avant-garde, like Perloff, cannot avoid falling in the trap of tiie 
canonical and New Critical reading o f modernism that she, herself, opposes. That occurs 
when she tries to prove, against the canon constmcted by Vendler, that our time would 
more rightiy be called a ‘Tound Era,”  as Hugh Kenner baptized it, rather than a Stevens 
one, as is claimed by Vendler and Bloom. The search for totalization o f a complex poetic 
era such as ours in the choice o f a single representative name for it— b^e it either “The 
Pound Era” (Kenner), ‘The Stevens Era,”  or tiie “Eliotian Revolution”—shows us how 
strong and pervasive is the hegemony o f these names even among the critics considered to 
be the left o f the literary establishment.
To pursue the discussion of the alternative modernisms of the period, I will follow
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what Jerome Rothenberg and Pierre Joris write in the preface to their monumental 
anthology of modem and postmodern poetry. Poemfor the Millennium-.
The history of twentieth cenmry poetry is as rich and varied as tliat o f the century’s 
painting and sculpture, its music and theater, but the academic strategj' has been to 
cover up that richness. Imagine— n^ow—a history o f modern art that left out abstract 
painting or collage or Cubism or Surrealism or Dada, and you have a sense of what 
literary histories (in y^merica for certain) look like to those of us who know that 
similar moves and movements exist in poetry and that many of the earlier 
movements in art—but Futurism, Dada, and Surrealism in particular—^were 
essentially the work o f poets. [...] In the American instance, views of “modern 
poetry” established by mid-century have largely continued to the present and, as they 
entered the standard anthologies and literary histories, have tended to play down the 
more revolutionary aspects o f modernism in favor o f the recognition of a handful o f 
“major” figures, many of whom are celebrated precisely for their antiexperimental 
and antirevolutionary positions or for their adherence to a relatively conventional 
view of poetic traditions and formal possibilities. (11)
European avant-garde movements, in their turn, were not satisfied only with 
rejecting previous poetic schools, but were also attacking the very institution and stams o f 
art, against the idea of poetry (or theater) as dissociated from tlie praxis of life. The avant- 
garde works aimed at dissolving the unity of the artistic object, at negating tradition, and 
opening the poem to other discourses that m i^ t not be thought as poetic at first glance. If 
the avant-garde has failed to destroy art as an institution, at least they did destroy “the 
possibility that a given school can present itself with tlie claim to universal validity”  as well 
as “the destmction o f the possibility o f positing aesthetic norms as valid ones” (Bürger 87). 
They exposed the bourgeois ideology behind even the modernist idea o f art, in its attempt 
to be a tmthfiil rendering of Zeitgeist, thus they “radically changed tlie place value of
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political engagement in art” (Ibid. 83).
We need to recall, as Nelson, Perioff, Rothenberg and other critics more sympathetic 
to poetic innovation have done, that in the Eliot and New Critical Era, political, black, 
feminist and queer poetry was being written, as Nelson demonstrates in Repression and 
that Dadaism was alive and well in America, as in the forgotten work o f Eugene 
Jolas, Walter Arensberg, Else von Freytag-Loringhoven, and Bob Brown; tliat Futurism has 
found a seminal avant-garde feminist voice in Mina Loy (only recently being rediscovered); 
that the objectivists (Louis Zukosky, Charles Reznikoff, George Oppen, Lorine Niedecker) 
were radicalizing and politicizing Imagism; not to mention that, as early as 1914, Gertmde 
Stein was constmcting her own version o f avant-garde, as Jerome Rothenberg shows in the 
anthology Revolution of the Word-—A  New Gathering of American Avant-Garde "Poetry 1914-1943. 
Other important movements were forgotten in the constmction o f American poetry canon, 
such as the Harlem Renaissance (Langston H u^es, Sterling Brown), and individual 
innovators like Abraham Lincoln Gillepsie and Jackson Mac Low. Names such as these 
cannot be left out in any fair account o f contemporary American poetry, lest we end up 
with a tamed version o f modernism The next step is to flashback to the first decades o f 
the century, precisely, to trace alternative and “dissident”  traditions and possibilities in 
order to have a more unstable and dialogic map of modernist and avant-garde poetry. 
Before discussing Riding as a modernist thinker and poet, I will focus on some aspects o f 
the poetics o f other and less-discussed poets from the period: the objectivists and Gertrude 
Stein.
Objectivism: Perceptive Poetics
An important trend appearing in American poetry in the 1930s, Objectivism 
remained until recently largely invisible in terms of academic and public reception. It was
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only in the 1960s that some o f the so-called objectivist poets started to gain recognition. 
Even thou^ they were “marginal” in the academic and institutional arenas, they inspired 
many y\merican postmodernist poets such as Robert Creeley, Charles Olson, Paul 
Blackburn, Allen Ginsberg, and the Language Poets.
Objectivism can be best understood as a set o f strategies (Finkelstein) derived from a 
rereading o f the poetics o f Ezra Pound and William Carlos Williams: Charles Reznikoff 
(1894-1976), Louis Zukofsky (1904-78), Lorine Niedecker (1903-70), George Oppen 
(1908-84), and Carl Rakosi (1903) are its representatives. As Michael Heller writes, 
“Whatever diferences the Objectivists have (and they are many), they all seem bent on 
discovering what Merleau-Ponty has called “the decisive moment of perception: the 
upsurge of a true and accurate world”  (8).
As in the case of Imagism, the movement was launched in' the pages o f Harriet 
Monroe’s magazine Poei^ . In 1931, by Pound’s insistence, Monroe invited Zukofsky to edit 
an objectivist issue. In the following year, ^ 4« Objectimt Ani/jology wzs released in France by 
Mary and George Oppen. Writing in total obscurity and experiencing difficulty in 
publishing their poetry, Oppen, Reznikoff and Zukofsky decided to found The Objectivist 
Press during the mid-1930s, and published some o f their own work (Oppen, Zukofsky), as 
well as Pound’s A BC of Reading and Williams’s Collected Poems (Dembo 2).
As Rothenberg writes. Objectivism seems not only a superation of Imagism but a 
dive into a Poundian and vorticist aesthetics: “I f  Pound’s dicta for Imagism brought ‘the 
direct treatment o f the thing’ as a foundation for poetry, his next movement—into 
Vorticism—opened the poem to those “liistoric & contemporary particulars”—rushing 
into the ‘vortex’ o f the poet’s mind & culture— a^t the heart o f Zukosfky’s formulation” 
{Millennium 525). Following the path opened by a tradition of experimental American 
poetry since Whitman (who called his Learn of Grass “a language experiment”), die 
Objectivists were eager to express their vision in as many poetic possibilities: from rJie
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haiku to the long and inclusive poem. The poem was seen as a “vortex”  which could 
absorb the “minute particulars,”  “history,”  “philosophy,”  as well as the other discourses 
which surround us, from “newspaperese”  to music. The main achievements are Oppen’s 
Discrete Series (1934), Zukofsk/s life-long poem ‘M, ” Reznikoff s Testimony (a prose work), 
By the Waters of Manhattan (1962), and Niedecker’s North Central (1968) and My Life by Water 
(1970).
In the preface to Toetry, Zukofsky ended up formulating the main aspects and claims 
o f the objectivist poetics. Writing on the poetry of Reznikoff, he outlines a poetics heavily 
marked by the three Imagist principles (“direct treatment of the thing,”  verbal economy, 
use o f musical—non-metrical— rhythm). Or, as Zukosfky states: “the poet’s image is not 
dissociable from the movement or the cadence shape of the poem” (“An Objective” 24). 
In what turned out to be, in fact, the manifesto o f the group and of the key documents o f 
American modernist poetry, Zukofsky argues that “the simile can be not a wandering 
ornament, but a confirmation o f the objects or acts which the writer is setting down” 
(“Sincerity and Objectivation” 280). This view is connected with an ethical approach to the 
world, as well as to the' materials o f die poem (words). To be objective means to enter the 
world with an openness and an always renewed awareness, “thinking with things as they 
exist”  (“An Objective”  20).
For Zukofsky, the test o f a poem is its “sincerity.”  However, the term must be 
understood not in the Romantic sense o f “an overflow of powerful feelings,” or as 
implying a poetics o f confession, but as a deeply ethical, poetical, and esthetical stance. The 
formal stance is stressed by the concept o f “objectivation,”  which reminds us that the 
poem is a constmction or stmcture of meaning, an artistic object made of language. The 
poem is taken as a perceptual object made of words, o f rests and movements, witii writing 
becoming an instrument that enables the poet to think with the things as they exist. 
Influenced by the philosophy o f Martin Heidegger, Oppen’s phenomenological attitude
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defines the poem as a “test o f tmth,” as already said, or o f “ sincerity;”  He believed that 
“there is a moment, an actual time, when you believe something to be tme, and you 
constmct a meaning from these moments of conviction” (‘The Objectivist”  161). ITie 
following fragment of a Reznikoff s poem (“Walking in New York” ), written in tlie midst 
o f the economic Depression, illustrates tlie objectivist poetic approach;
The tramp with torn shoes 
and clothing dirty and wrinkled— 
dirty hands and face—  
takes a comb out o f his pocket 
and careftilly combs his hair.
(Poems 208)
It is important to remark that, for the objectivists, the image is never an ornament, 
but always, as in the case of Reznikoff s fragment, a concrete representation o f an object, a 
state, or a human experience with clarity and precision. The poem as a reportage, as a 
statement of facts and things seen and rendered visible. This is the basic principle o f the 
objectivists; to bring objects, people, situations, into focus. In this sense, it is a 
development and radicalization of Poundian poetics, with its rejection o f abstraction, 
rhetorical excesses, and emphasis on the juxtapositions of images, as well as on tlie 
simplicity o f language and the use of direct speech. Williams had opened the possibility o f 
this poetics when he wrote;
As the cat 
climbed over 
the top of
the jamcloset 
first die right
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forefoot
carefully 
then the hind 
stepped down
into the pit of 
the empty 
flowerpot
(Poem 70)
As a classical example o f the American objectivist sensibility, ‘Toem”  stresses the 
immediate reality of an experience: the words o f the poem follow the movement o f its 
subject with photographic quality, as well as using words more common to what Williams 
called the American idiom. This fits Zukoksky’s ideal o f “ [t]he poem, as an act o f attention, 
focus[ing] the consciousness, making it more receptive to external, objective phenomena 
within a momentary span o f time” (Finkelstein 52). The objectivist poem, thus, turned out 
to be an act of perception, always dynamic, stressing the juxtaposition of images and the 
“minute particulars”  o f how the mind constructs the world. Influenced by visual arts and 
photography, in this poem Williams treats words and the world with photographic 
accuracy, depicting the things as they unfold from reality, the mind of the poet and the 
words mimicking the movements o f a cat. The line-breaks provoke a syncopated rhythm 
that also incorporates the unpredictable movements o f the animal, its hesitations and 
decisions (for the objectivists, as Reznikoff says, “ the rhythm is also part of its meaning” ). 
No commentary, no sentimentalization, no symbolism, and no mythology: the poem 
constructs itself as images appear in the poet’s retina, as a snapshot or a sequence of 
snapshots. Far from aiming at pure subjective description, in this basic form of objectivism
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poetry stresses “not so much things as the process o f the mind encountering those things. 
[It] strive[s] to erase the lyrical ego from [...] poems and deny the Romantic idea o f 
transcendence: sincerity demands truthfiilness to one’s local reality, one’s own perception” 
(Hirsch 4).
Other values respected by the objectivists were clarity of expression and the use o f 
colloquial American English. A lthou^ precision and concision were important values, 
many objectivists engaged in the long and experimental poem (Zukosfy ‘M ,” Niedecker 
luxke Superior, ReznikofPs Testi/m^). Objectivism was responding, in a important move, to 
the dilution o f Imagism in the hands o f Amy Lowell (“vknygism,” according to Pound). 
These poets were still assimilating or responding to the modernist revolution from the 
1910s and the 1920s. More importantly, they were reacting to the academic and arcane 
verse written under the dominance o f Eliot, Tate, and Ransom. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
they were, in fact, the countercurrent o f American poetry, distant from the academy and 
from public recognition.
These poets were well aware of their marginal status. With the exception of 
Niedecker, all of them were Jews. In die midst o f economic Depressi'on, the rise' o f 
Fascism in Germany, and in a clearly anti-Jewish cultural milieu, they felt the necessity of 
incorporating in their poetry their Jewish heritage as well as a sense of displacement. They 
also had, again with the exception of Niedecker, communist and socialist positions, 
although they were too experimentalist to follow the line of tlie more overdy political 
poetry of the period. Zukofsky, a New Yorker, was involved with organizations on the 
Left, and was a collaborator o f the newspaper T h Masses, o f the Communist Party. He also 
incorporated Marx’s thought in his poetry, mainly in his long poem “A ” (Scroogins 389).
The case o f George Oppen is also illustrative: like Laura Riding, he renounced poetiy 
(from 1936 to 1964), arguing that the writing of poetry was antithetical to the political and 
social action he felt necessary at that moment, when there were mass unemployment and
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misery in every comer o f the United States. In 1950, in the midst of the Cold War, and due 
to his political activities, Oppen had to flee to Mexico in order to escape being interrogated 
by the Un-American Activities Committee led by McCarthy. Charles Reznikoff, who had a 
journalistic and legal formation, was also deeply attuned to the misery and the 
powerlessness that he witnessed in the streets o f New York City. In his Testimony, he 
transformed into poetry judicial cases registered by American courts at the end o f the 
nineteenth-century, exposing the violence and injustices o f American culture.
Literally, these poets were marginal figures in the American canon until the late 
1960s, as Michael Heller demonstrates in his study Conmction’s Net of Branches: Essqj/s on the 
Objectivist Poets and Poetty. Niedecker, for instance, spent most o f her life living in a cabin in 
Blackhawk Island, Minnesota, outside literary circles, and with a heightened, Thoreauvian 
sense o f the environment. It was only when they started to be published by major 
publishing houses that they became visible for a new generation o f poets and readers. An
indication o f their marginal status within the canon o f American poetry is the fact that, 
until recendy, none of them appeared in any o f the canonical anthologies.
Gertrude Stein: a Wor(l)d Under Construction
If Objectivism stressed the poem as “a litde or big machine made of words” 
(Williams), while the New Critics idealized the poem as “a well-wrou^t um,” Gertrude 
Stein (1874-1946) was among the first American modernists to question the inherent 
mechanisms of this “language-machine” itself, as well as to open poetry to alternative 
word-orders than those prescribed by tradition and patriarchal culture. The goal o f her 
seminal work, as in Riding’s, is to investigate how language works, and how an alternative 
order o f discourse— a^s well as the sense of a fiillness o f being in language—can be achieved 
and found beyond and behind tlie so-called reality.
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As a former student of psychology and philosophy, and as many of her modernist 
fellows (again, such as Riding), Stein was deeply interested in the process of consciousness 
and its subdeties, and in perception, as thought in movement. Thus, her work progressively 
explored the phenomenological possibilities o f writing. Also influential to Stein was the 
cubists’ pictorial break with mimesis and perspective, its deconstmction of common 
objects (plate, botdes, violin) over and over again until the verge of abstraction. Stein was 
doing in poetry what cubist collage was doing in painting; depicting objects from 
simultaneous perspectives, apart from their conventional associations. One technique to 
attempt to depict objects as if taken in their four-dimensional quality was called faceting, the 
repetition and spreading o f fragments and outlines o f objects over and over through the 
canvas, until it becomes difficult to identify a center, or a central object or image. In 
language, this object is the word, the noun, and it is from the pulverization of the noun that 
Stein started. The intention was to offer several facets o f the same objects simultaneously, 
spread out on the page. Her aim diverges from Imagism and from some objectivist poets in 
significant ways: Stein aims at rejecting the level o f objectification or photographic 
representation still at the core o f die Objectivist poetics, widi the belief in a transcendental 
sign (the Image, the Ideogram), in order to pursue a high degree o f defamiliarization. 
“Stein’s lonely project was to reveal that ‘meaning’ lies not in symbolic references, that is, 
with reference to another, separate reality, but in the relationship that words have among 
themselves” (Kimber 36).
Let us start with her familiar circular phrase “A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose”® 
(1922) as a summa o f her main technique: repetition as difference. The line was first used 
in the children’s book The World is Round, being carved in a circular form in a tree by the 
heroine (later Stein used it as her stationery). At first, the line may appear as either a pure
 ^ ‘T h e  phrase was coined the year before in Sacred Family, but tliis piece was not published until 
1922 in Geograpl^ and Plays, and the phrase does not reoccur in her writing until that year, when she 
employed it in both “ Objects Lie on a Table”  and “As Fine as Melancta”  fqtd. in Neuman and
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tautological affirmation or a sort o f children’s game. A rose is a rose etc, ad infinitum. X  can 
be only X. Traditionally, in En^ish poetry, rose has been taken as symbol o f love, birth, 
deatli, and it was not improbable that Stein had this in mind when she commented that, 
with her line, for the first time in two hundred years, a rose had become red again in 
En^ish poetry.
If we repeat the line aloud for several times, and pay attention to tlie verbal music o f 
speech that is formed in the process, an interesting play of sameness and difference in the 
word’s meanings begins to emerge: “a rose is a Rose is arose Eros is arrows.”  Rase can be 
understood as a girl’s name, but the line also brings similar sounds as arose (connoting 
sejoial excitation or orgasm), as well as Eros, arrows (naming as pointing devices or vectors), 
Cesar, and Isa. Thus, many other combinations become possible: a rose is a Rose is Eros. 
Roses, arose! Eros is a rose is. Eros is arrows, Cesar is a rose etc. Or, in a Joycian fashion, a 
roseisaroseisarose, or arosecesaroseisarrowsisarrose. But, one may ask, what does one learn 
from this game? Is this poetry? According to Stein’s definition and practice, yes. In “Toetry 
and Grammar,” she writes: “when I wrote that phrase and later made that into a ring I 
made poetry and what did I do I caressed completely caressed and addressed a noun” 
{lectures 231).
If  there is such a meaning inherent in the word rose, it can only be understood in this 
collage o f conflicting sounds and meanings. The movement o f language is submitted, in 
unexpected ways, to the play between the signifier (tlie actual sound of tlie word rose) and 
its signifieds (the cultural meanings and sonorous possibilities o f the line). As Stein states in 
the same text: “Poetry is concerned with using with abusing  ^with losing with wanting, with 
denying with avoiding witli adoring with replacing the noun. Poetry is doing nothing but 
losing refusing and pleasing and betraying and caressing nouns”  (234). Poetry, thus, to 
Stein, is a problem of naming.
Nadel 27).
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Stein’s verbal portrait of Picasso and his painting process reveals the peculiarities o f 
her own method (Picasso was also painting her portrait at the time): ‘This one was working 
and something was coming then, something was coming out o f this one then. This one was 
one and always there was somediing coming out o f this one and always there had been 
something coming out o f this one...This one was one who was working”  (B^ader 142). Stein 
aims at capturing the movement o f Picasso’s mind at work; she aims at demonstrating that 
the painter, in the act o f painting, becomes so intensely concentrated that he forgets 
himself, that in some sense he becomes the objects he “describes.”  Stein is mimicking her 
own style, in fact. Stein applies Picasso’s method o f composition to a new treatment o f 
words and sentences, incorporated in her fundamental idea o f “beginning again and again,” 
which will have a strong impact in some poems of Laura Riding’s. The use of repetition 
and participles aims at translating a feeling of a continuous present: Stein wanted to make a 
deeper reflection on the act o f composition itself and on our uses o f language. The result is 
that the artistic object becomes not a mimetic account o f what she saw, but a newly created 
reality, a language reality. Stein discovered that “ [t]he only way to state the truth perceived 
was to state it in the language as fresh as the perception itself What was important was 
difference, not similarity”  (Dydo 47). Stein has demonstrated that language is not 
transparent as we have been taught to believe, but is as material as paint. The goal is a 
radical de-referentialization, a pulverization o f the referent, so to speak.
Turning our attention to what has been thought about language and poetry in Russia, 
for instance, we begin to understand the revolutionary directions Stein was taking. As a 
major theoretician of Russian Formalism, Viktor Schklovsky defended in “Art as 
Technique” (1917):
The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as diey are known. The 
technique of art is to make objects “unfamiliar,” to make forms difficult, to increase 
the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an
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aesthetic end itself and must be prolonged. [...] Tolstoi makes the familiar strange ^  
not naming the fam iliar object He describes an object as if he were seeing it for the first 
time. (58, my errçhasis)
The technique o f defamiliarization {pstranenjé) describes with precision what Stein had 
already achieved in one o f her most important works: the cubist prose-poems o f Tender 
Buttons: Objects, Food, Rooms (1912-14). As a series o f still lives of her immediate 
surroundings. Tender Buttons portrays the common objects o f domestic life. Extending 
Henry James’s idea of a “ continuous present”  and Cézanne’s and the cubist’s approach to 
painting, Stein began to develop, to explore in her writing the possibilities o f a procedural 
and cubist poetics. The first object reads
A CARAFE, THAT IS A BLIND GLASS.
A kind in glass and a cousin, a spectacle and nothing strange a single hurt color 
and an arrangement in a system of pointing. All this is not ordinary, not unordered in 
not resembling. The difference is spreading. (Tender 5)
In the context o f Anglo-American modemist poetics, how do imagist principles o f 
accuracy in presentation fit in a piece o f language which, after announcing its object as “A 
Carafe,”  in its very tide deconstmcts and negates the noun which it is supposed to present? 
Her poetics goes against the principle o f using “absolutely no word that did not contribute 
to the presentation,”  and the belief that “the natural object is always the most adequate 
symbol.”  The object is awkwardly defined as “A kind in glass and a cousin, a spectacle and 
nothing strange a single hurt and an argument in a system of pointing.”  It seems that we 
are in fact, here, with a different view regarding precision, concision, and unity. Stein wants 
to question referentiality itself As Ulla E. Dydo explains, “ [i]n the worid of Stein’s writing 
the bonds that tie words to things are loosened and names split off from objects. Stein 
attempts to perceive everytiiing afresh, as if she had never seen it before.[...] There is no
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hierarchy of words or o f usage”  (56). Compare Stein’s method with Pound’s famous poem 
“In a Station o f Metro” ;
The apparition of these faces in die crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bougji.
(Personae 109)
In Pound’s canonical imagist poem, even if we have some effect o f defamiliarization 
between the first and the second lines, the analogy is quite obvious; petals/faces, metro 
crowd/black bough. Despite the carefiil manner by which the subject is presented—  
influenced by Japanese haiku poetics o f juxtaposition— it caused a great impact in 
twentieth-century modernist poetics. In Pound’s poem there is a determined center— 
faces— a^nd the image follows a rational sequence o f events; first the title presents a pan o f 
the metro station in rush hour, then a zoom on a face or a couple of faces (friends tliat he 
is going to meet?) which the poet sees in the crowd. In die second line, the definition of 
the image, is compared to a black b o u ^ , that is, an undifferentiated mass o f people. The 
poem is still formally drawing its strength from the power o f metaphor, from the epiphanic 
image, in short, from mimesis.
Pound’s poetics has as one of its principles die rejection of abstraction, o f 
“intellectualization” and “vague generalizations.” In “A Few Don’ts by an Imagiste” 
(1913), Pound claims; ‘“Don’t use such an expression as ‘dim lands of peace.’ It dulls the 
image. It mixes an abstraction witli the concrete. It comes from the writer’s not realizing 
that the natural object is always die adequate symbol. Go in fear o f abstractions”  (Essays 5). 
On the other hand, Stein achieves in her poetrj' a degree of abstraction that sets her at the 
core of artistic movements such as Cubism and Abstractionism. As the cubists were 
attempting to reduce and dissolve tlie object in order to present it as if it had never been 
presented before, Stein was able, according to lading and Graves, to recognize that 
language “had to be reorganized, used as if afresh, cleansed of its experience; to be ‘pure’
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and ‘abstract’ as colour and stone” (A Survey 27^. In using words as if they had “no 
history,”  Riding and Graves claim, Stein’s poetics presents an antidote to a modernist 
poetics heavily dependent on Romanticism, Symbolism, as well as on the formula poetry =  
image.
Stein’s goal is not recognition, but strangeness. The problem she faced was o f 
another “order of things” : how to portray objects as they emerge from reality and are 
captured by our ever-changing thoughts about them, but before one begins to reorder the 
object in terms of conventional associations, personal memories, symbolism, and ordinary 
metaphors? A response to such an impasse is Stein’s (and Riding’s, I would add) major 
contribution for modernist poetics.
Stein defies the logic o f syntax and o f imagist association by creating a verbal 
composition, a texture of language, which attempts at every time to defy the reader’s 
expectations. She names and un-names at the same time, as in this piece:
WATER RAINING
Water astonishing difficult altogether makes a meadow and a stroke. (Tender 12) 
Stein’s text delays its meaning through the very attempt to present a signifier. One of the 
main techniques is to use the verb to be not to identify name and thing (not to copulate as 
the “is” o f identity) but to create a greater distance between the terms, even running the 
risk o f seeming absurd and giving nonsense formulations. As she does in this fragment o f 
“A PLATE” : “A lamp is not the only sign o f glass. The lamp and the cake are not the only 
sign of stone” (7). The tides in Tender Buttons promise to describe what can be barely 
described. Stein’s language embodies perception as a process made of disjunctions, 
discontinuities, not the powerful overflow o f images in the eye’s retina. “ [H]er attention 
was no longer focused on tíie universais o f experience, but on die process o f experiencitig
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each moment in the present tense as it intersects with the consciousness!” (Dubnick 71, my 
emphasis). It is as if she was implying to the reader; “It is a bottle, but it is opaque. It is not 
to be seen through. This is a language game. Are you in?” That is, Stein advises us, in the 
act o f reading her language-games, not to expect mimesis, and to be open to the fuU music 
of words and sentences. The goal is simultaneously to push to the extremes of the linguistic 
possibilities and to test our human possibilities in relation to our uses o f language.
As Shirley Neuman and Ira B. Nadel point out, “ [h]ad scholars had Saussure’s 
formulations book available to them before its publication in the 1950s, and had the 
linguistic observations o f the Russian formalists not had to wait for the mediation o f 
Roman Jakobson for their impact on Western literary criticism, we would certainly have 
been quicker to articulate Stein’s relation to language” (xix). If  tlie poetic function is to be 
found every time language directs its energy to itself, as a code, this is fully achieved by 
Stein in the poetry she wrote. The first paragraph of “RoastbeeP’ is another fine example 
o f Stein’s technique o f repetition as difference;
In the inside there is sleeping, in the outside there is reddening, in the morning 
there is meaning, in the evening there is feeling. In the evening there is feeling. In 
feeling anytliing is resting, in feeling anything is mounting, in feeling there is 
resignation, in feeling there is recognition, in feeling there is recurrence and entirely 
mistaken there is pinching. All the standards have steamers and all the curtains have 
bed linen and all die yellow has discrimination and all the circle has circling. This 
makes sand. {Tender 21)
Or, as one might hear, in the last sentence, ‘This makes sense!’ If this is a description o f a 
roastbeef, it is one only glimpsed in die fragment by the word reddening. In such a 
description there is no center, in the conventional understanding of the term. Stein’s tides 
immediately depart from the objects they claim to portray; as a result, the pieces are verbal 
constructions activated by an object or a series o f objects. As in a cubist painting, one feels
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disoriented in trying to find accurate description, since there is no defined object to grasp, 
the object’s signification being disseminated throu^ the canvas, so to speak, made highly 
abstract and bordering the limits o f referentiality: the linguistic object is less a photography 
than a recreation o f the artist’s mind, the movement o f signification itself
The case is that Stein’s notion o f language, as early as 1914, was deconstmctionist 
avant-la-kttn. Madan Sarup’s description of Derrida’s theory is an apt analogy to what Stein 
was actually doing in her language, only forty years before:
In Derrida’s view of language the signifier does not yield us up a signified directly, as 
a m i r r o r  yields up an image. There is no harmonious one-to-one set o f 
correspondences between the level o f the signifieds in language. Signifiers are 
continually breaking apart and reattaching in new combinations, thus revealing the 
inadequacy of Saussure’s model o f the sign,' according to which the signifier and 
signified relate as if they were two sides o f the same sheet o f paper [...] In other 
words, Derrida argues that meaning is not immediately present in a sign. Since the 
meaning of a sign is a matter o f what the sign is not, this meaning is always in some 
sense absent from it tdo. Meaning is scattered or dispersed along the whole chain o f 
signifiers; it cannot be easily nailed down, it is never present in any one sign alone, 
but is rather a kind o f constant flickering o f presence and absence. (35)
In the quotation above, one could easily replace Derrida by Stein in order to have an apt 
description o f what she was doing in her poetry. Since perception has other logic than that 
of grammar and syntax, the result is a text that simultaneously creates and erases meaning. 
Stein understands perception and language as an endless process o f repetition (sameness) 
and differences—DeJamilian^tion\ to render the object as seen for the first time. She 
wanted to describe her immediate reality from multiple viewpoints, in process, as in a 
cubist painting. Thus, her importance to a radical modernist poetics. In poetic pieces such 
as “Cezanne,”  ‘Treciosilla,” Tender 'Buttons and Stands in Meditation, Stein goes against the
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Symbolist tradition of modernism, which is still grounded on a concept o f the unitary 
image (Pound), or the “objective correlative” (Eliot). As Charles Bernstein sums up, 
“Stein’s focus became the words themselves; her declaration is that o f mrdness. The writing 
has become so dense that the meaning is no longer to be found in what the words 
represent, or stand for, but in their texture: the repetition, juxtaposition and stmcture of 
phrases, sentences, and paragraphs”  (“Inventing”  58).
In a similar way to Riding's poetics, Stein aims at de-automatizing our perceptions 
througji the breaking of conventions, througji a poetics that stressed the incantatory 
powers o f language, and through a rejection of conventional symbolic references that we 
culturally bring with us in.our lifetimes. As an avant-garde poet, probably the most 
important o f American radical modernism, Stein wanted to press language to its limit and 
the price she had to paf for several decades was the still common accusation o f 
unintelligibility and nonsense. For critics like Michael Davidson, however, “what makes 
Tender Buttons so vital is not the strategies by which meaning is avoided or encoded but how 
each piece points at the possibilities o f meaning. Unlike the symbolists who create beautiful 
' detai;hable artifacts, Stein’s prose is firmly tied to the world—but it is a world constantiy 
under constmction, a world in which the equation of word and thing can no longer be 
taken for granted” (197).
Bearing in mind these various poetics and critical discourses on poetry developed by 
the modernists in the first half o f the twentieth century, I turn now to Laura Riding’s 
positioning to these questions, as exemplified in her partnership with Robert Graves in A  
Survey of Modernist Poetry.
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Lauia Riding as Modemist Thinker
[M]odernist poetry is a declaration o f the independence of the poem.
{A  Survey 124, italics added)
Although not commonly acknowledged, in terms o f the Anglo-American scene one 
can advance the thesis that A  Survey of Modemist Poetiy (1927), by Laura Riding and Robert 
Graves, was the first study on poetry to use the term modernism in the polemical senses 
proposed in Chapter 1. In fact, it was a pioneer work whose challenge was to confront and 
explain modernist poetry written in English in the first two decades o f the century. Or, as 
Riding writes retrospectively, modernism was “a usefijl term for the spot-lighting o f the 
development in its effective existence as a self-unifying agglomeration of loosely kindred 
trends. And the book proved a useflil critical report on die make-up of the temper of the 
twentieth-century’s pioneer version of ‘modernist poetry’”  (“Engaging”  21). As we have 
seen, critics, in general, have had a hard time trying to locate the exact appearance o f the 
term in the Anglo-American context. Calinescu, unable to identify the precise appearance 
of the term—mainly in its polemic and dissident meaning—has nevertheless to rely on 
Riding and Graves’s book in two pages o f his opening chapter: “By 1927, when Laura 
Riding and Robert Graves publish tiieir collaborative Survey of Modemist Poetiy, the term 
must have established itself as a meaningfiil—though still largely controversial— Literary 
category” (83).
More commonly than not, even critics who never mention Graves and Riding as 
poets are able to point out to the historical importance o f A  Survey, and how it immediately 
inserted itself in the literary debate of its time. In The Concept of Modernism, Eysteinsson 
mentions A  Survey in order to reinforce his argument that the impulse to define modernism 
is simultaneously an impulse to define a canon:
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It is not hard to demonstrate that canon formation has been both h i^ly  arbitrary 
and of prime significance in Anglo-American modernist studies. In one of the first 
books to use the concept, A  Sumy of Modernist Poetry, Laura Riding and Robert 
Graves make E. E. Cummings their representative modernist, but the “movement” 
appears to include both Eliot and Hemingway, whereas Williams and Pound (and all 
the Imagists) are a^essively  banished without any logically presented reason. (86) 
Although Eysteinsson and Calinescu blame Riding and Graves’s book for never trying to 
work out a definition o f these terms, the first one contradicts himself by admitting that 
“ [t]he main elements for such a definition are there, however, and the reader can bring them 
together and work out afairiy consistent concept of modemisrri' (84, italics mine).
In my opinion, far from being arbitrary, the book is inclusive and polemic in its 
approach, at least in the main proposed scope: the T^gjo-American poetry o f the 1920s. 
The book presented discussions of authors very different among themselves such as Stein, 
cummings, Eliot, Moore, Yeats, Tate, Hopkins (who was published for the first time only 
in 1918), Pound, Williams, Ransom, Crane, Stevens, and Riding herself Far from what 
Eysteinsson clairhs, in the conflicting context it presented, A  Survey was making radical and 
prophetic choices: the two writers who are claimed as genuine modernists—  Stein and 
cummings— a^re two authors who, contrarily to Eysteinsson’s argument, were until recently 
very much outside the “official verse culture” o f literary modernism— a^t least the one 
defined by Eliot and the New Critics. Moreover, those two authors (in a list that would 
include Williams, the Objectivists, and Riding would be instrumental for a new generation 
of poet-critics as exemplars o f alternative modernisms to the Eliotian and New Critical 
ones. Stein was praised in A  Survey due to her approach to language and experience, her 
awareness that language “had to be reorganized, used as if afresh, cleansed of its 
experience” (274). Her use of repetition and her technique of “beginning again -and again,” 
moreover, are praised for “breaking down the possible historical senses still inherent in the
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words” (285). cummings, on tQie odier hand, was eulogized for his original poetical 
approach, his compactness o f expression, and for his innovative poetic experiences as an 
example of how to avoid the conventional form that generally stood between the reader 
and the poem (41). The conclusion they reach is that “poems in the future [will] be written 
in the Cummings way if poetry is not to fall into pieces altogether”  (19).
In important and symptomatic ways, the book is a clear response to the more neo­
classical and history-oriented Eliotian and Poundian versions o f modem poetry (the ones, 
by the way, that in fact became canonical). As Riding writes in Contemporaries and Snobs, 
poetry should be seen as “an ever immediate reality confirmed afresh and independendy in 
each new work rather than as a continuously sustained tradition, confirmed personally 
rather than professionall/’ (134). In terms of politics o f form, its strongest attack is on 
Imagism and other so-called “dead movements”  such as Georgianism and War Poetry, on 
the one side, and on the idea o f “tradition and individual talent,” on the other. The 
differences between modern and modernist as Riding and Graves conceptualized in their 
book can be better ^impsed in the severe treatment given to Imagism. They considered it a 
modern, but not modernist, movement. As "an example o f what they called "‘Zeitgeist- 
poetry,”  they accuse Pound and the imagists o f wanting “to be new rather than be poets; 
which meant that they could only go so far as to say everjrthing that had already been said 
before in a slightiy different way” (117). 'rhey accused the “marketing’ strategies o f the 
imagists as a symptom o f their modernness, which made them “a stunt o f commercial 
advertisers of poetry to whom poetic results meant a popular demand for their work, not 
the discovery o f new values in poetry with an indifference to the recognition they received” 
(117). Poetry was becoming dangerously a marketable commodity more attuned to 
publicity and to becoming popular at any cost, and it was being vulgarized in paradoxical 
formulae such as poetry is “news that stands news.” Imagism, thus, was a mere “new” 
literary affectation influenced by Japanese mannerisms, a fashionable manner of
presentation that was up-to-dating with the Japanese influence in painting. Another 
problem, as they saw it, is that the imagsts “believed in free verse; and to believe in one 
way of writing poetry as against another is to have the attitude o f a quack rather than o f a 
scientist toward one’s art, to be in a position o f selling one’s ideas rather than o f constantiy 
submitting them to new tests”  (117). In short, they criticized the limitations of imagist 
poetics, which had too easily become, by 1927, a new mannerism, although their poetic 
themes remained relativelyunchanged.^“
To Riding and Graves, the imagist theory o f poetry argued for poems that record 
“images, not sentiment—-pictuns, not modes of thought' (my emphasis). They also criticized 
Imagism in its belief o f style as “the use o f the language of common speech, but in a very 
careful way, as a paint-box.” Genuine modemist poets, they defended, wrote as they did in 
order to make the reader pay full attention, to increase his/her awareness o f language, and 
not to be “distracted”  or entertained as Riding and Graves saw occurring in imagist poetry. 
We could apply what Charles Bernstein says about American poetics to what was at the 
core o f A  Survey. Riding and Graves were stressing poetry as “a process o f thinking rather 
than a report o f things already settied, an investigation o f figuration rather than a picture of 
something figured out”  (Poetics 117). In their advance o f a poetry o f thought, o f complete 
awareness o f one’s language, the ideal o f a poetry as a verbal maximum aiming at maximum 
tmth led them to criticize Imagism as too referential and sentimentalist, too imbricated in 
the idea of language as a mere translation of images that invoke ideas, as it were, a kind of 
new realism.
Riding and Graves do not see modernist qualities as restricted to a specific period o f 
time but as inherent in language itself: they observe them, synchronically, as occurring at 
the very instant a specific poem (be it by Shakespeare or cummings) deviates from the
The argument developed in the book, surprisingly, is contemporaneous to Schklovsky’s theory o f 
“defamiliarization”— i^n the sense that the Russian Formalists also strongly rejected imagist theories 
o f  poetry, the idea o f  poetry as image.
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norm and tradition and advances deeper thou^t and linguistic experiences. Therefore, and 
paradoxically, modernist poetry in the sense defined by Riding and Graves is timeless. “It is 
always important to distinguish between -sX^hat is historically new in poetry because the poet 
is contemporary with a civilization o f a certain kind, and what is intrinsically new in poetry 
because the poet is a new and original individual” {Survey 163). This poetry, moreover, is 
marked, symptomatically, by its urge not only to defamiliarize language and its conventions 
but its willingness to assume some degree o f difficulty, as well as “a concentration on the poetic 
process itse^’ (115, italics mine). A poem is not only explained as being “a newly created 
thou^t-activity” (Ibid. 118), but one that has the virtue o f being explained better if taken 
in its own right of being, unparaphrasable. As would become more explicit in their 
examples o f close readings, the language-centredness o f Riding and Graves’s ^proach is 
implicit in this phrase: “The ideal modernist poem is its own clearest, fiillest and more 
accurate meaning” (Ibid.). By rejecting the belief in a specific style or “mask,”  or a specific 
manner o f writing poems, or in poetry as necessarily being a written response to a historical 
circumstance, they placed emphasis on the humanist problem o f language itself This is 
what makes the book symptomatic of modernism itself while it approximates Riding’s 
research to that o f Ludwig Wittgenstein, at least if we understand modernism to be, as 
Charles Bernstein rightly observes, “a break from various ideas about narrative and 
description to a focus on the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the medium tiiat implicitiy 
challenges any idea o f langua^ as having one particular ‘natural’ mode o f discourse” 
{Poetics 94).
Even more importantiy, the lesson that comes from A  Survey is that the force o f 
modernist poetry lies in its “ independence, in its relying on none of the traditional devices 
of poetry-making in the past nor on any o f the artificial effects to be got by using the 
atmosphere o f contemporary life and knowledge to startie or give reality” (179). For the
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modernist poet, each poem becomes a process o f discovery, the recording of a stmggle to 
make meaning and, if necessary, to invent new ones. A great part o f modem poetry, on the 
other hand, was too tied to the etymological meaning o f “modo” (just now); it was a poetry 
that suffered too much from what we might call Zeitgeist anxiety. It wanted too much to be 
contemporaneously accepted, up-to-date with the artistic fashions. The modernist poetry 
the book argues for has the task o f finding new values for the human being by putting 
language to a test. This poetry consciously defies ideas o f “ style”  and “readership,”  since it 
sees this idea as tied to bourgeois notions o f achieving popularity, o f poetry as a kind o f 
new commodity in the modem market. And, against the impersonal theory of Eliot, they 
quote Emily Dickinson as an example of an independent poet who belongs to no 
movement “and whose personal reality pervades her work” (122, my emphasis).
In short, modernist poetry, according to Riding and Graves, had nothing to do with 
the desire o f being modern, or up-to-date, nor with being a new version of a tradition (as in 
the new version o f Symbolism and Romanticism they saw present in Imagism and 
Georgianism), nor a neo-classical reflection o f the Zeitgeist pure and simply, as modem 
poetry (Eliot, Pound, Auden, H. D.) claimed to be.”  Riding and Graves rejected Eliot’s 
view of tradition as an overpowerfiil presence haunting the poet’s mind, one in which the 
“really new” works are those that can best fit in the shelves o f Tradition (or “tlie mind o f 
Europe,”  as Eliot also defines it). A  Survey neitlier subscribes to the Poundian assumptions 
that poetr/s central aim is “ to present an Image,”  nor to his famous modernist slogan 
“make it new,”  since the authors thought that this discourse dangerously brought about the 
permanence o f a given tradition, with the poet becoming the incarnation o f a new 
authority. As Riding would write in a late essay, “Literary ‘news’ is a commodity practically
“  In fact. Riding’s rejection o f the Zeitgeist vi a clear response to Eliot’s understanding of 
history, with his view that die poet is bound to his age. As we have seen in “  Tradition and 
Individual Talent” , for Eliot “tradition” is a matter o f historical sense, “which we tnay call 
nearly indispensable to any one who would continue to be a poet”  (Esst^s 4).
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identical with literary ‘history’; literary ‘history is a commodity practically identical with 
literary ‘news’”  (“Literary News” 664). Against Eliot’s credo. Riding and Graves believed 
that poetry should rely less on the idea o f a tradition and be more workable if understood 
as a mode o f investigation, and as an ever immediate reality confirmed afresh and 
independendy in each new work, rather than as a continuously sustained tradition:
The real task is, in fact, not to explain modernism in poetry but to separate false 
modernism, or faith in the immediate, the new doings o f poems (or poets or poetry) 
as not necessarily derived from history. Modernist poetry as such should mean no 
more than fresh poetry, more poetry, poetry based on honest invention rather than 
on conscientious imitation o f the time-spirit. (Survey 158)
Poetry, therefore, should be written less with an eye on tradition and more with an eye on 
language uses, and on language itself, less emphasis on the final product and more on the 
process.
In this ground-breaking book. Riding and Graves were, in fact, suggesting alternative 
ways o f opening the map of poetic possibilities, and in this sense closely following the 
modernist impulse described by Rothenberg and Joris, “acting off a new permission to' 
write a poetry freshly invented—reinvented—in each succeeding poem” {^ilknnium  5). 
Although I disagree with the book’s argument that Pound and the imagjsts did not discover 
new and fully modemist values, the book itself is indicative, as a whole, o f the diverging 
(political, artistic, ethical) views occurring at the height o f modernism. A great dose o f 
courage and spirit o f adventure were necessary to propose a map o f modernist poetry while 
it was still in formation. And, contra Eysteinsson and Calinescu, I believe that, on the one 
hand, far from merely despising or criticizing die poetry o f T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, 
Wallace Stevens, Marianne Moore, and Edna Vincent Millay, and on the other hand, far 
from endorsing the emerging canonical positions then being configured, the book was 
taking its stance while being also critically aware o f tiie “constmction” of modernism as a
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matrix o f correcting and complex discourses. In the case of Pound and Eliot, the authors 
o f A. Survey also saw the wish, from the part o f these trends o f modernism, to regulate 
literary history in such a way that a determined idea o f “order” passed as “natural.”
Writing retrospectively on A  Survey of Modernist Poetry, Riding complains about the 
easy rejection of the term—modernist—by contemporary critics to define a tendency in the 
poetic activity of that period, arguing that tiie critics forget that the issue was already 
approached in her and Graves’s survey o f 1927. She defends the term modernist, “as an 
appropriate characterization o f the stir o f consciousness, in the poets o f the first quarter of 
the century, o f a new time-setting, and o f the effort this induced to assure a marked 
difference in the poetic literature that bred itself in it from that o f the preceding century. 
The term had no other function than the identification o f this development”  (“Engaging” 
21).
CHAPTER 3 
LAURA RIDING’S POETICS
Poetics is the continuation o f poetry by other means.
(A  Poetics 160)
Introduction
Charles Bernstein’s parody (quoted above) o f the famous assertion made by 
Clausewitz (“politics is the continuation of war by other means”) is an appropriate 
provocation to begin this chapter. It s u ^ s t s  that what is usually called “die poetic”  is not 
merely isolated in its specific feamre— the poem— b^ut also embodied in the reading 
process, in the way one approaches poetry, thinks, and writes about it. Nevertheless, a 
poetics only proves itself coherent or contradictory by tlie success or failures achieved in 
the poems actually written by a given poet.
To speak of Laura Riding’s poetics is to speak of the rigorous set o f linguistic and 
ediical principles she posited to herself throughout her long literary career. First, let us 
consider what Riding meant by the word poetry and how she defined it before and even 
after renouncing it in 1941; besides, what roles and functions did she assign to tlie art o f 
language? I also mean the verbal strategies implicit in the poems themselves and her 
unique approach to words; fmally, how did she write and why she wrote the way she did? 
Even the prefaces Riding found indispensable to write to accompany her books point out 
to this necessity of precisely and consistendy defining the terms of her poetics.
Second, her method of reading poetry—expounded in several essays and books 
{Anarchism Is Not Enough and Contemporaries and Snobs), but mainly tlie method o f close
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scrutiny she devised in A  Survey of Modernist Poetry—are keys to tlie understanding o f her 
poetics and her poems. And, in my view, her poetics opens the possibility o f thinking 
about countermodernisms being articulated then, ones that vanished in the official 
accounts o f literary history. As Barbara Adams tighdy pointed out, “Riding’s early essays 
also provide the keys to her own practice o f writing poetry. The reciprocity between 
theory and poetic performance increases our understanding of both, and shows how 
Riding cut against the main currents o f her contemporaries, bypassing Imagism, Eliotian 
traditionalism and Stein’s abstract painterly manner of expression” (J^ he Enemy 26). I not 
only agree with Adams, but also think that it seems at least a fair thing to do, when dealing 
with Riding’s work, to try to apply the method she herself developed to read her own 
poems.
Thirdly, it is important to mention that her poetics never forgets the readers. On the 
contrary, it provokes and challenges them, while envisioning them as partners in the 
experience of poetry, as producers, and not only as passive receptors. Riding was aware o f 
the role o f the reader, but was critical o f the traditional roles and conventional 
expectations circulated by a literary tradition that refused to take seriously poets like 
cummings and Stein, and of the common rejection of poetic texts based on their 
“unintelligibility.” Or, as Riding and Graves posited; “ [m]uch of the so-called obscurity of 
poems was created by the laziness o f the plain reader, who wishes to hurry through poetry 
as quickly as he does through prose, not realizing that he is dealing with a kind of thought 
which, thou^ it may have the speed of prose to the poetry, he must follow with a 
slowness proportionate to how much he is not a poet” {Survey 149, emphasis added). 
Despite the arrogant tone o f this last remark, which seems more a provocation, what the 
authors were saying stiE holds tme in the context o f poetry in the end o f die twentieth 
century. The idea of poetry, generally speaking, is so much tied with Romantic 
assumptions about the poem as the tme voice of feeling, or the poem as an emotional
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transcription of a beautiful scene, a confession, that to ask readers to think (a bit more 
than they are used to) seems to be asking too much. In a capitalist world, where everything 
is disposable, wasted and consumed, and where the media frequendy treats poetry not only 
as an endangered species but as just another kind of entertainment— a^n exotic branch of 
the cultural industry— “difficulty” is the last thing the reader wants to face.' Poetry, Riding 
and Graves were proposing, was to be seen as a “kind of thought,”  a kind o f language that 
asked more from the reader than was the case in more conventional forms of writing or in 
everyday uses.
The linguistic peculiarity o f poetry in relation to other discourses was also remarked 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein at about tlie same time, when he pointed out: “Remember that a 
poem, even though it is composed in the language of information, is not used in die 
language-game o f giving information” {Zettel 27). The challenge of Riding’s poetics is to 
deny the apparent transparency o f language in poetic discourse, by focusing on the notion 
of text, in how we use language, on what words are and how they mean. Riding sees the 
text in front of one’s eyes as a performative, nonfrxed, and open activity. A poem is some 
thing to be “ rewritten” by the reader, and not simply read, as we more traditionally 
consider this experience, “l i  you write,” she says, ‘Vrite writing-matter, not reading-matted’ 
{Anarchism 20). That is why I believe that in many important aspects her work advances 
questions that would be later addressed by reception-theory and the poststructuralism of 
Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida.
Besides, the relationship between language, poetry, and tmth occupies a great part o f 
her career as a thinker and writer o f poetry. Or, as she retrospectively writes, in 1939, the 
year o f the outbreak of World War II: “No poet otiier than myself in my time has cared
1 Riding and Graves blame, with a prophetic note, not only the reader but also poetry itself for this 
situation (i.e. 1927): “ By domesticating itself in order to be received into the homes o f the ordinary 
reading public and by allowing its teeth to be drawn so that it would no longer frighten, poetry had 
grown so tame, so dull, that it has ceased to compete with other forms o f social entertainment, 
specially witli the new religion o f sport”  (^ -4 Surv^ 110).
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about poetry, language, and truth, in one integrated caring” (“Some Notes”  22). From the 
beginning. Riding discussed poetry more from a humanistic viewpoint than firom an 
artistic, merely stylistic one. Her suspicion o f many modernist “styles”  being developed at 
the time raises political questions such as: Can forms also be ideologically used to impose 
one’s “techniques” on the reader? Isn’t the profusion o f modernist styles and the search 
for “the new,” in many ways, a reflex o f commodity in the realm of poetry?
In the later part o f her career, mainly in Tbe Teläng, Riding achieved a sort o f styleless 
style. The goal o f her linguistic utopia was to capture the ‘Voiceless language”  she 
addresses in “The Wind, The Clock, The We” (Poems 181). Thus, her counteraesthetic view 
o f the question o f poetry and language differs in important ways from the New Critics (as 
well as from Pound and Eliot, for that matter). In Riding, the dialogic nature o f language 
(its ethics) always precedes its formal features (its aesthetics). Her creed in poetry as a way 
o f  unconcealing tmth—which is close to Heidegger’s phüosophy—was always more 
determinant dian its craft. As we shall see, she would come to the belief that the formal, 
esthetical elements o f poetry (its artifice) were not only blocking her ideal of reaching tmth 
through language but also had become, in fact, the main reason for her rejection o f poetry. 
Language, as human utterance, came before poetry in Riding’s poetics.
Due to what has been advanced above, it is at least curious to consider a remark 
made by Laura (Riding) Jackson in a private letter to Michael Trotman (April 19, 1986): 
...what you call my aesthetic. I do not have one. I do not have views on what is called 
that, as on what is called ‘poetics” ’ (Box 47, Fol. 1). Her problem with the term, I think, is 
due to the connotations of literary systematization and aestheticism that she rejected. It is 
in diis peculiar resistance to be absorbed by tiie literary system and its politics, in the 
attacking on art as an institution (Bürger), in writing a poetry following her own beliefs and 
rejecting ideas of order and tradition, wherein lies the avant-garde element in Riding’s 
modernism.
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However, against (Riding) Jackson, I would argue that every poet has a poetics, even
if one claims to have none. It seems contradictory for someone who asked to be read as a
whole—poetry, story, and criticism— to deny the reader the right to see how and if die
parts fit together. I believe diat, even if a poet does not voice or write about the poet’s
own practice, a poetics is inscribed in the very “ flesh”  o f the poems themselves— a^nd in
the differences or sameness among one another. A poetics is inscribed in the assembly of
one’s personal strategies and themes, in the peculiarities o f diction and style; it is present in 
statements and interviews as well as in one’s characteristic ways of wording the worid. In
short, a poetics is identifiable if we take poetry as poiesis-. the actual making o f poems, as
well as in one’s personal approach to language. That is evidentiy Riding’s case: few 
modernists have written and thought about poetry with more passion and coherence.
From 1925 until a few months before her death, in 1991, Riding consistentiy wrote essays,
letters, and books on the triadic subject o f truth-poetry-language. Moreover, she
maintained extensive literary exchanges on tiiese subjects with many of her
contemporaries, including Robert Graves, James Reeves, and Gertmde Stein. I believe that
tiie poems she left: present more than enough clues to trace a poetics, a distinct and
original way of thinking about poetry and writing. “I do not write poems about theory,” 
she remarked in a letter to the poet James Reeves dated March 6* 1933: “what may look
like theory is an immediate—gradually immediate—^adjustment of intrinsic location”
(#6304, Box 1, K-110-J-2-A). Finally, it is also important to study how she read her
contemporaries and her critique of contemporary poetry throughout her career.
In this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate that Laura Riding not only had a clear and
distinct poetics, but that her poetics stands as one o f the most extreme and paradoxical
stances o f An^o-American modernist poetry, to the point of abandoning tiie writing of
poetry altogetiier because o f the radicalness o f her project. She performs that difficult task
of making theory an extension of practice and vice versa, to paraphrase Charies Bernstein.
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Notoriously, from 1941 on, when she starts signing her name as Laura (Riding 
Jackson (so as to make clear tliat her activity as a poet was a thing of the past), she rejected 
the writing of poems and began to devote her energies to the study of the nature o f 
language (an anti-Saussurean dictionary o f “ rational meaning’"). She came to believe— a^s in 
the ‘Treface” written in 1970 for a book o f selected poems— t^hat “trudi begins where 
poetry ends”  {Selected Poems 15). As I shall also attempt to demonstrate, Laura (Riding 
Jackson ended up constructing a polemical antipoetics that in many ways conflicts with 
Laura Ridings notion o f poetry as the redemption of language.
What one can surely say is that few poets in this century have pushed to such a limit 
the idea of a poem being a performance o f language (directed by the embodied mind). In a 
late statement Riding explained that her development as a poet “ followed a gradual 
enlargement of the scene o f thought” {Rational 448). Assuming the risks o f all radical 
poetics,^ Riding considered poetry’s goal as simply to reach tmth,  ^ to attain a higher level 
o f existence and human communication. Her view o f poetry and language is highly 
philosophical, something diat places her work in the timeless debate regarding the 
relationship and differences between poetry and philosophy, from Plato to Heidegger. 
Writing her poems and essays unaware o f tiie lines o f thou^t that were being explored 
around the same time by Heide^er, Riding brought back a view of poetry as an 
exploratory activity and die utmost form o f human utterance that makes possible the 
uncovering of important human realities. Poetry, more than being a mere vehicle to 
express feelings or to capture the contemporary Zeitgeist, more than as a fancifial 
description of reality, should be able not only to reassociate feeling and thougjit, but to
2 I call it radical because, as the word radice etymologically implies, the question o f language is at 
the root o f her poetics. This attitude places her in the “ revolution o f the word”  implicit in the avant- 
garde projects as well in the general project o f  modernism (Joyce, Pound, and Stein).
 ^ As she writes in the original 1938 preface o f Collected Poems. “A poem is ah uncovering o f tmth o f 
so fundamental and general kind that no other name besides poetry is adequate except truth [...] 
Tmth is the result when reality as a whole is uncovered by those faculties which apprehend in
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achieve, in language, “a deep and deeper thinking”  {Sumy 161) accessible to all. At the level 
o f her poetics, verifying whether or not she succeeded in overconiing the dissociation o f 
sensibility diagnosed by Eliot in the contemporary scene is one of the tasks undertaken in 
this chapter.
Mindsight
The first text in which Riding clearly advances a poetics is “A Preface or a Plea” 
(1925). Written when she was 24, it was her first published essay, and it reads as an 
ambitious manifesto. In its polemic tone and its positionings, the essay managed to attack 
simultaneously Romantic, Victorian, expressionist, impressionist, and even modern 
theories o f poetry.
Riding begins witli the basic affirmation diat “the most distressing event in the life 
o f a human being is his discovery that he is alive” (First Awakenings 275). It is this basic 
knowledge— of being both body and mind at the same time— d^iat defines us as human 
beings. From the metaphor between life in darkness and life in daylight—echoing Plato’s 
allegory o f the cave— Riding then defines two main poetic attitudes that the poet and the 
reader may assume: the first one approaches life (as well as poetry) as “an evocation of the 
shadows” (275). In this attitude, art and poetry are turned into a form o f escapism or 
relief The constant light o f reality—sometimes too painful to endure— forces human 
beings to close their eyes to it, either in musing, sleeping, or fantasizing. In this attitude 
towards reality, poetry becomes a dmg or a medicine, alienating the poet and the reader 
from themselves. This is what Riding sees as wrong with the tradition of English poetry: 
too much faith in the “imagination” (or in the “unconsciousness,”  as in the modernist 
period) and too little faidi in reality, in the acmal facts and moments of one’s existence. In
teems o f  entirety, rather than in terms merely o f part”  {Poems 407).
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short, poetry had to “wake up.”  The problem o f poetry, then, she argues, is that
For the poets of the classic mold it is a strong cathartic that keeps them free from 
the malaise and dyspepsia and wraps them in an urbane pastoral Horacian peace; for
the Elizabethan, a pretty pastoral constitutional; for all the romantics, a drug—a 
stimulant for Byron, a delicious dose o f laudanum for Shelley, [...] a soothing syrup 
for the Victorians; a tonic for the realists; a heady wine for the impressionists; a 
profound emetic for the expressionists. In this strange company [...] the poetic 
tradition accomplishes the vitiation o f life in art. (276)
The rejection o f poetry as stated above calls for a different attitude from tlie poet, one of 
total awareness of the broad li^ t, therefore arguing for a poetics o f consciousness, o f 
awareness. Poetry had to be practiced less as a dream (no surrealism), a relief or a safety 
valve, and more as the investigation o f the very conditions o f the awakened experience, o f 
thou^t. Riding sensed that poets had historically relied too much in the unconscious at 
die expense o f leaving consciousness largely unexplored. Her goal is “to actually map the 
fullness o f thougjit and its movement,”  as Charles Bernstein discusses the embodiment o f 
thinking in the writings o f Ludwig Wittgenstein, René Descartes, Samuel Beckett, Louis 
Zukofsky and Robert Creeley, among others (“Thought’s Measure”  70). The art o f 
poetry, in some sense, became too confessional, a form of escapism. Riding condemns the 
Aristotelian description o f poetry and art as catharsis, as a move away from reality 
(consciousness, the realm o f light), into the realm of illusion, o f commodification.“' That is 
why she rejects the trade anthologies o f poetry, which treat poetry, in her view, “as a 
commodity destined to instructional, narcotic, patriotic, religious, humorous and other 
household uses” (A Pamphlet 26). In this process, she believed that poets and readers
'* In the Poetics, Aristotle refers to catharsis as the purgation o f the emotions in artistic reception, as 
if exposure to an affective work o f art could cause imbalance o f the passions or psychological 
distress. Catharsis can be understood in the medical sense (as purgation o f a stress), in a moral 
sense (a way to learn with the tragic piety), as well as in a hedonistic sense (man feels pleasure 
when attending to mimetic works o f art, as in a play).
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became passive receptors, submissive to the Muse (be it called History, Politics, or 
Religion), rather than active inceptors, makers o f meaning. On the other hand, she saw 
modern poets falling easily into the temptation o f transforming themselves into muses, for 
a public avid for novelties, styles, scandals, tragedies.
In “A Preface or a Plea”  Riding seems to retake Plato’s allegory o f the cave to 
criticize the Aristotelian theory o f art as mere catharsis, which she identified in late 
Romantic, Victorian, sjrmbolist, and modem poetry. What she wanted was to reformulate 
our relationship to life and to redirect our attitude towards the art o f language. Poetry had 
to be more than merely mimetic, the translation o f a sensation or the depiction o f an 
image; poetry had the task o f creating a new human reality by pressing meaning into 
language. Poetry, dius, becomes an act o f criticism: “I am insisting that the pressure is a 
challenge not to a retreat into the penumbra o f introspection but to the birth of a new 
poetic bravery that shall exchange insight for outsight and envisage life not as an influence 
upon the soul but the soul as an influence upon life”  {First Awakenings 276, emphasis 
added). In a line close to certain passages in Sir Philip Sidney’s “An Apology for Poetry,” 
the poet is seen not only as- a vessel o f a content that exists outside, in the world, but as 
creator o f meaning a shaper of a new reality. The poet had to become again the ignition 
o f language, o f awakened visions, rather than merely a translator of forces and tilings tliat 
are outside him. The formula “know thyselP’ is an imperative for Riding’s view o f the 
poet’s task. For tlie poet o f outsight (or mindsi^t), poetry turned out to be the leading 
and critical force in relation to reality; she praises poetry as a form o f knowledge higher 
than philosophy or science;
But the function o f the poet, o f the poetic mind, is inductive rather than deductive.
Life needs proving in poetry as weO as in science. Philosophy is but a compromise
between fact and fancy. The poet o f a new spiritual activity admits neither. He, tlie
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human impulse, is the only premise. He is the potter. He is the maker of beautv, 
since all form originates in him, and of meaning, since he names the content. Life is 
created with him. The poetry o f this mood will have still the wonder, still the 
exaltation. But the wonder will proceed not from the accidental contacts with a life 
that comes to us as a visitation but from a sense of self that adventures so steadfasdy, 
so awarely beyond it that its discoveries have the character of creation and the 
eternal element o f self-destiny. {First Awakenings 279, my emphasis)
Riding’s humanist and demiurgic approach echoes Sidney’s defense: “For Poesy, must not 
be drawn by the ears; it must be gendy led, or, rather, it must lead” (259). As a distinct 
form o f knowledge, poetry has a moral role to perform: that o f being a molder o f the 
human mind. It has, therefore, a formative function. As a maker, according to Sidney, 
“only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour o f his 
own invention, doth grow in effect o f another Nature, in making things either better than 
Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in Nature” (Ibid. 221).
Thus, reformulating stances “ taken from” Plato, Sidney, Whitman, Blake (‘T h o u ^ t 
is Act”) and Arnold (poetry as “criticism of life” ). Riding builds an alternative poetics, a 
modernist approach to the poetic state o f mind in which poets, as, potentially, any human 
beings, again appear as possessing the divine power of naming, o f recreating a new reality 
througji language. The key concept o f Riding’s manifesto is outsi^t (or mindsight), which 
can be summed up as poetry's power to affect the outside world rather than being effected ly it (what 
happens in an insig^t^. The poet must not be satisfied in simply translating reality, but in 
pressing meaning upon it. It is through one’s language uses, one’s naming, thinking— w^ith 
and tlirough language—that the world acquires meaning. Thus, outsight (or mindsight) 
refers to thought’s negotiation with language and tJie worid; the mapping of consciousness 
designed by the movement of the words in the poem—“a thing apart, atom by atom in a
5 In the Oyford English Dictionary, insight refers more commonly to the privilege o f seeing— the
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recreated universe o f its own” (First Awakenings 219)— in their full attempt to pressure 
meaning upon reality.* The poet must behave, as Riding’s Whitmanesque metaphor of the 
modernist poet suggests, as a courageous pioneer entering a new territory, and that is why 
the poet’s attitude may be seen as a little difficult and rude. Thus, die result of this process 
is that the poet
may be more difficult because more metaphysical since he is preoccupied chiefly 
with meaning, but a meaning inevitably rlythmical and poetical ’ since it is a barren life 
reborn, touched and shaded with accent, inflamed with his own soul and molded 
into a temporary or an eternal form that is a symbol o f peace and reconciliation
between the inner nature of man and the external world without him (280, emphasis added). 
The ideal modernist poem, one would conclude, becomes thus a “brave new world”  to be 
reshaped by the hands o f the maker and by the mind in its most awakened state. This 
negotiation between mind and reality, nature and human nature, as well as the relationship 
between thought and feeling, poetry and thinking, is at the core o f Riding’s exploratory 
poetics and o f her most important poems, as we will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. As 
“mindscapes,”  Riding’s poems become verbal places where thought and language aim at 
becoming one.
Open R(ea)iding
As we have seen in Chapter 1, in their greatest contribution to modernist poetics, A  
Survey of Modernist Poetry, Laura Riding and Robert Graves were eager to defend modernist 
poetry from the common accusation of what could be called “difficulty for difficulty’s
notion o f internal sight—  while Riding’s mindsight privileges thinking.
® Thus, the concept o f mindsight or outsight is directly connected with the concept of her poems as 
mindscapes, as I develop in Chapter 4.
’  Note that Riding’s affirmation that poetic meaning is “ inevitably rhythmical”  contradicts (Riding) 
Jackson’s attack on the craft o f poetry.
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sake.” In this seminal book, they devise a method o f analyzing poems to counter the 
common complaint directed at Riding’s poems and those o f other modernists—of being 
purposefiilly obscure. Riding and Graves begin by arguing that what happens is that the 
“plain reader,” more commonly, is unprepared or unwilling to face the differences in form 
and content posed by modernist poetry in relation to the more traditional and accepted 
modes of poetry (those, for instance, heavily grounded on the idea o f language as 
transparent vehicle pointing to reality, on the language o f everyday speech, metrical 
patterns, symbolism, conventional metaphors, rhymes, and subjects). In order to 
understand poetry, they argue, the reader must be open in order to assume a more 
participative, less passive and less conventional attitude in relation to what he reads. In 
short, he is invited to use his intelligence, and to be open to interact with what he is 
reading. Poetry is not a one-way activity, but always a transitive act, a transaction. The 
reader must realize that to read a poem is not the same thing as reading a newspaper (or, 
translated to the contemporary leisure, as watching TV), that a poem forces the reader to 
pay close attention to how language makes meaning in a way that one does not find in 
other activities or in everyday experiences. ‘T o  go to poetry is the most ambitious act o f 
the mind” (410), Riding writes in the preface of Colkcted Poems. One cannot merely rush 
over the words of a poem and say that one just does not understand it.
Poetry, being a form of knowledge (or “of life” , as Wittgenstein would say) requires 
close attention. In the act o f reading a poem we cannot limit ourselves to the reception o f 
its “message,”  its morale, only to what is being said; we also have to mind bow things are
being said, how language is being used, and to what ends. Poetry invites the reader to hear
f
the sound o f language, to follow the fabrication o f meaning. Reading and writing poetry 
become, in this process, critical activities. As Steve Birkens defines it: ‘T o  close-read a 
poem is, in part, to create a receptivity, a silence in yourself so that the work can leave an 
impression. [...] The goal o f close reading might be stated as follows: to hear the language
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o f the poem as intensely as the poet heard it in tlie process o f composition” {Electric Life 
91). This is exactly Riding and Graves’s goal in A  Sumy, to point out that readers have a 
greater responsibility for the making of meaning than they previously supposed. And, in 
the case o f modernist poetry, readers are frequently asked not only to create unexpected 
links, but also to fill in the gaps left by the type of poems written by modernist poets. The 
reader must, somehow, be the poet’s partner in the making of meaning. In these 
formulations, I believe. Riding and Graves were strikingly predating Barthes’s concepts o f 
“writerly” and “readerl/’ texts.
Barthes distinguishes the traditional text by the effects it has on its readers: the text 
o f pleasure {lisible) and the text o f bliss {escriptible). The first one “contents, fills, grants 
euphoria; the text that comes from culture and does not break with it.”  And Barthes 
identifies the second as the modem text, that “imposes a state o f loss, the'text that 
discomforts, [...] unsettles tlie reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the
consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with language” 
(Pleasure 14). And,'m S/Z \
Because the goal o f literary work (of literature as work) is to make the reader no 
longer a consumer, but a producer o f the text. Our literature is characterized by the 
pitiless divorce which the literary institution maintains between the producer of the 
text and its user, between its owner and its consumer, between its author and its 
reader. The reader is thereby plunged into a kind o f idleness— h^e is intransitive; he 
is, in short, serious: instead o f functioning himself, instead of gaining access to tlie 
magic o f the signifier, to tlie pleasure of writing, he is left with no more than the 
poor freedom either to accept or to reject. (4)
Decades before, in A  Survey, Riding and Graves took a poem by cummings to prove 
exactly the points made by Roland Barthes in the 1970s. Arguing for a new method o f 
reading poems while aiming at proving why a new metliod was necessan-, they ended up
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not only scattering tlie seeds o f the future practice of close reading, but also advanced 
experiments that Jerome McGann and Lisa Samuels call “deformative reading.” ® To 
illustrate the method. Riding and Graves take “Sunset,”  a poem included in the popular 
Anthohgj/ of Modem American Poetry, organized by Louis Untermeyer:
SUNSET
stinging 
golden swarms 
upon the spires
silver
chants the litanies the 
great bells are ringing with rose 
the lewd fat bells
and a tail
wind
is d ra^n g
die
sea
with
8 In “Defonnance and Interpretation,” Jerome McGann and Lisa Samuels develop the method o f 
deformative reading. Quoting Emily Dickinson’s suggestion that poems should also be read 
backwards, they develop alternative tools for the reading o f poems, in which “ theory is a 
subordinated relation to practice.”  In this type o f reading, the poem is rewritten or presented in 
alternative versions (backwards, without all nouns, only with verbs, edited, translated into another 
language etc.). “ Such a model,”  they stress, “ brings attention to areas o f the poetic and artifactual 
media that usually escape our scrutinity.”  (7) I will apply tliis method o f “ deformative reading”  in
d r e a n i
-S
Proceeding widi their close reading o f the poem. Riding and Graves begin by
focusing on the formal differences o f the poem from traditional poetry, even though its
subject is a common one, a sunset by the sea. First, they call attention to the disposition o f
the poem on the page: there is no respect for regular lineation (and none but one line
begins with capital letters). Second, tlie poem does not follow conventional punctuation.
The so-called description of a sunset is presented fragmentarily rather than in a logical
sequence. The poem is made up of a great deal o f disjunctions (heightened by verbal play) 
that reject the logic of cause and effect. Metrics is wholly rejected. Third, its grammar does
not present the connections tliat would make the poem more coherent and intelligible:
connectives and other words are “missing.”  Thus, to understand the poem the reader has 
to fill in more gaps than he is used to in conventional poetry.
For the sake o f  their argument, and inviting us to imagine Cummings’s poem as if it
were a skeleton o f a prehistoric specimen or a dilapidated papyrus, they propose to rewrite
“Sunset”  in a more traditional way, in order to make it more intelligible for what they call 
“ the plain reader.” It is as if the poem had to be reconstructed to get to a sense o f what
the author had originally in mind, his so-called intention. They were able to identify a
striking intertextual reference to Gourmont’s symbolist poem Litanies de la Rose/ They also
Chapter 4.
® Here are some parts o f the prose-poem Litanies de la Rose translated by Richard Aldington (I have 
placed italics to indicate images and words that also appear in Cummings’s poem): “Hypocrital 
flower. Flower o f silence. [...] Rase the colour o f puregoJH. O  treasure-chest o f the ideal, rose o f the 
colour o f pure gold, give us the key o f your ideal body, hypocrital flower, flower o f silence. Rise 
the colour o f silver, censer of our dreams, rose the colour o f  silver, take our hearts and turn them to smoke 
[ ...]  Dawn-coloured rose, colour o f the sky, colour o f  nothing, O smile o f  the sphinx, dawn-coloured
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observed the presence o f heavy alliteration in s, which is again stressed in the last line and 
isolated, thus giving us a clue to the context and setting o f the poem. The first word, 
stinging^  suggests a sharp feeling—like the sting o f a bee— a^n image reinforced by the 
presence of the word swarms, and by the s and z sounds o f the first lines. The word silver 
brings the idea o f coldness, contrasting with the idea o f homess su^ested by the words 
golden and inscribed in swarms. Silver, they suggest, stands for water (sea, a word which 
appears near the end of the poem), as golden for the warm light o f tlie sun. Now we have a 
definite setting: a sunset by the sea, whose sound is even more emphasized by die final 
capitalized S, which reconnects, full circle, with the first letter o f the tide. A heavy rhyming 
pattern, supposedly “lost” in the original poem— suggested by words such as swinging and 
ringing—is reestablished by being applied to other words in the poem: seas /  bees, bells /  
swells, and spires /  fires.
Now, Riding and Graves are able to reconstmct the (theoretically) original poem by 
using the words su^ested by Cummings’s “incomplete”  version. Here is their example o f 
the original hypothetical poem cummings should have written if he were a traditional and 
not a modernist poet (I will add italics to words that more or less belong to the original 
poem);
SU N SET  PIECE
Afier reading Re'mj/ de Gourmont
White foam and vesper wind embrace.
rose, smile opening upon nothingness. [...] Cup-shaped rose, red vase [...] Green rose, ,«<7-coloured 
rose, O navel o f the sirens, green rose, wavering and fabulous rose, you are nothing but water as soon 
as a finger has touched you[...] our bites make you smile and our kisses make you weep. [...] 
Crimson rose, O sumptuous autumn sunsets.{.. you are nothing but water as soon as a finger has 
touched you [...] you make the great eyes o f  the mignons dreamjinA more than one will//«_you in 
the knot o f  his garter [...] Papal rose, rose watered by the hands that bless the world, papal rose, and 
tlie tears impearled upon your vain coroUa are the tears o f Christ, hypocritical flower. The tears o f
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2 The salt air stings my dazzled face
3 And sunset flecks the silvery seas
4 With glints oigold like swarms o f bees
5 And lifts tall dreaming spires o f  l i^ t
6 To the imaginary si^ t,
7 So that I hear loud mellow bells
8 Swinging as each great wave swells,
9 Wafting God’s perftimes on the breeze,
10 And chanting o f sweet litanies
11 Where jovial monks are on their knees,
12 Bell-paunched and lifting eyes
13 To windows ro^ as these skies.
14 And this slow wind— h^ow can my dreams forget—
15 Dragging the waters like a fishing-net.
What is the point o f this exercise o f rewriting a modernist and difficult poem such as 
Cummings’s? The authors explain: “This version shows that cummings was bound to write 
the poem as he did in order to prevent it from becoming what we have made it. To write a 
new poem on an old subject like sunset and avoid all the obvious poetical formulas the 
poet must write in a new way if he is to evoke any fresh response in his readers at all”  (17).
I f  poetry is “aversion o f conformity in the pursuit o f new forms,”  as Bernstein 
claims. Riding and Graves’s election of cummings (as well as o f Stein and Hopkins) as 
radical modemist is illustrative o f the authors’ acute awareness o f the political aspects o f 
poetic form. That is, as Bemstein explains, “on the ways that the formal dynamics o f a 
poem shape its ideology; more specifically, how radically innovative poetic styles can have
Christ, hypocritical flower, flower o f silence. (Selections 70-74)
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political meanings. In what way do choices o f grammar, vocabulary, syntax, and narrative 
reflect ideology?” (The Politics vii). By playing with conventions, as Riding and Graves have 
demonstrated in their analysis o f Stein and cummings, it is possible to criticize traditional 
and passive attitudes toward poetic forms. As Bernstein reminds us, when we consider the 
conventions of writing, we enter into the politics o f language (Ibid. 235). In poetry, 
conventions put limits in what can or cannot be experienced. They create discourses.
The fact to be observed is that the rewritten poem offers less challenges to the 
reader than the original one. In order to make the poem, supposedly, clearer for the 
reader. Riding and Graves had to de-modemize it, peppering it with literary reminiscences 
or intertexts (Romantic imaginary sight), as well as a more familiar Catholic symbolism ,(Goi/’x 
perfume for rose, rosy window, jo iia l monks on their knees), and stock phrases (vesper winds, silver
seas, white foam). They also had to tie the freedom that the words have in the original, their 
relative autonomy, to an artificial end-rhyme scheme, in order to produce a more 
commonsensical poetical pattern: a fifteen-line sonnet!
Naturally, much was lost in this process o f rewriting. Riding and Graves noted the 
powerful silences suggested by the white spaces surrounding the words in the original 
poem (acting as musical intervals), as well as the almost graphic use o f the alliteration s o f 
the original (concentrated, significantly, in the final i"-, functioning as a stmctural emblem 
of the whole poem). These graphic and visual features are attenuated and almost disappear 
(by dieir very redundancy) in the new, “readeriy” version. Moreover, the links between 
words diat are left: to the reader to make in tlie original poem (like stinging /  gold swarms) 
and “wind /  is /  dragging /  die /  sea /  widi /  dream / /  -S”  are now imposed, too easily 
“explained” by similes (“glints o f gold Hke swarms of bees,”  “dragging die waters Uke a 
fishing-net.” ). In short, in Riding and Graves’s precursor exercise o f a “writerly reading,” 
in their “translation,” the original poem lost its peculiar characteristics. Its force and 
concision as a piece of language, its compactness, was regretfully lost in their experiment.
I l l
Many superfluous words had to be introduced in order to make the poem supposedly 
more intelligible, accessible to die reader. The conclusion they arrive at, in the context o f a 
book whose title is A  Survey of Modernist Poetiy, is that “poems must in the future be written 
in the cummings way if poetry is not to fall to pieces altogether”  (19). They take 
Cummings’s iconoclastic attitude as an example of independence and experimentation to 
be followed by anyone willing to write poems. The poet had to invent his own language, 
to make things a littie difficult for the reader, and not to follow preestablished patterns 
canonized by tradition, even if one mns the risk o f being accused o f being freakish or 
bizarre. Thus, what Riding and Graves are proposing is something suggested by Lisa 
Samuels; a reversal o f Shelley’s claim that poetry ‘Tielps us ‘imagine that which we know,’ 
showing instead how poetry can help us imagine what we don’t knonf’ (ii). To make things 
easier for the reader, as Riding and Graves have demonstrated, is to allow being absorbed 
by the conventional forms established by die dominant culture; it is to surrender too easily 
to the authority o f a tradition.
Chapter 3 o f A Survey extends the problems posed by tiie rewriting of cummings’s 
poem and represents a hallmark o f modernist literary criticism. It is also the chapter tiiat, 
as we have seen, William Empson took as a model (according to himself) for the method 
o f textual criticism developed in his famous Seven Types of Ambiguities. As a painstaking 
analysis o f Riding and Graves reading of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 129 (“Th’expense o f Spirit 
in a waste o f shame”) would take too much space, I would like to sum up what is achieved 
by it. In sixteen pages, the authors compare the significant differences between what is 
assumed to be closest to the original quarto (a manuscript o f 1609) and the one circulated 
in modern antiiologies such as The 0>ford Book of English Verse. Proceeding through a 
detailed analysis o f the sonnet, they prove how much die attempt to modernize 
Shakespeare— t^hrough repunctuation and change in spelling—had the effect o f losing 
much o f tiie force and richness o f Shakespeare’s original (the same, o f course, occurred
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with the editing o f Emily Dickinson’s poems). It was from the reading of this book and 
tlie authors’ analysis o f Shakespeare’s sonnet diat William Empson formulated his 
definition of ambiguity.
In the reading o f Shakespeare’s piece. Riding and Graves went the other way 
around; if with c-ummings’s poem they showed how a traditional rewriting o f a modernist 
poem has a damaging effect on the force of the original, now they demonstrated how the 
attempt to “modernize”  traditional or classic texts caused similar damage on the clearness 
and force o f the original, mainly, a damage for the richness o f meaning of the original text. 
The goal o f this experimental reading of Shakespeare’s sonnet was to prove the point 
established earlier in the reading of “Sunset” ; that the meaning of each word is the basic 
stmctural element o f poetry. That to alter a single word in the poem is to compromise the 
poem’s individuality and structural unity, and even other possibilities o f interpretation. 
With the experiment, they argued that using an unedited text and paying close attention to 
every feature o f a poem are the basis o f poetry criticism.
The Independence of the Poem
One of the key ideas presented by A  Sumy—^which became, besides the book’s 
close readings, a hallmark o f New Criticism— w^as the stress on the independence o f the 
poem. The organicist view o f poetry was already present in Coleridge’s formulations, but it 
reappears in 1927 to justify modemist poetics. Basically, what was stated is that poetic 
devices operate in an alternative logic that has to be faced in its own terms. Each part o f a 
poem is important in order to give the whole its coherence, its organic unity. Predating by 
twenty years Cleanth Brooks’s essay “The Heresy of Paraphrase” (1947), Riding and 
Graves were rejecting the belief in paraphrase as the only possible and suitable method for 
explicating a poem: “A prose summary,” diey state, “cannot explain a poem, else die poet.
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if he were honest, would give the reader only a prose summary, and no poem” {Sumy 87). 
The poem’s content is intrinsic within its form and therefore cannot be adequately 
understood if we are unable to face its formal features, its meaningful levels. In dealing 
with several poems, the authors argue that modernist criticism should avoid the belief that 
one can have a better understanding o f poetry merely by paraphrasing the poem and 
turning it into a prose statement, or merely by relying on autobiographical or contextual 
explanations. To do so, they argued, is to risk transforming the poem into a commodity; it 
is to kill its individuality as the product o f a human being. It is to reduce the poem to its 
exchange value. Therefore, they demanded diat we avoid looking for the key to the poem 
in the author’s biography and concentrate in “the poem itself’ (88).
Their pioneer textualist approach—^antedating by forty years Stmcturalism, 
Poststmcturalism and the Nouvelle Critique—was to defend the position that to rely 
mainly on paraphrase to get a sense of the poem’s “message” is to avoid dealing with the 
language reality o f the poem on die page. By paraphrasing the poem and being satisfied 
widi it, we transfonn the poem’s language into a mere convenience, a commodified way to 
interpret a reality that is supposedly outside the poem. To believe in paraphrase as the 
authority to the explanation of a poem is to rely on the conventional idea of language as 
being merely a transparent window through which we see the world, or to consider words
merely as a bridge one must cross rapidly if one does not want to fall into the abyss (a 
criticism that reappears in ‘Toet; A Lying Word”). It is to limit language to its practical 
uses. In order to better understand Riding and Graves’s line o f thought, I find it useful to 
recall Bemstein’s example between the differences o f a paraphrase and the telling of a 
dream: die problem is that if we try to pin ‘tiiinking’ down we project an image of it as 
an entity rather than, indeed, the very content ojlanguage. Like with a dream, the experience slips 
through our fingers if we try to recount it: we know that the telling of a dream is a quite 
different matter than dreaming itself’ {Content’s 66 my emphasis).
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The original experience o f reading a poem should not be translated into any other 
type o f discourse, be it scientific, religious, autobiographical, or historical. The best reading 
o f a poem should be another poem. The question o f poetry’s so-called 
“unparaphrasability”—^which, as we saw in Chapter 2, became one o f the tenets o f New 
Criticism—is direcdy connerted with the notion o f the poem’s independence from the 
author after it was written down. “Once the poems are ‘made,’”  Riding and Graves write, 
“ [the poet’s] personal activity ceases in them. They begin a life o f their own toward which 
[the poet] has no responsibility o f advertising and selling; that they reach the reader at all is 
an accident, an affair entirely between them and the reader. This, by the way, is not what 
used to be meant by ‘art for art’s sake”  (150). Preventing accusations o f aestheticism, the 
commentary serves also as a sharp criticism of the poet’s desire to show himself o ff as a 
special genius, or the impulse to advertise one’s poetry as if it were a “new” product on the 
poetic market (as in the case of Imagism, in their opinion). It is undeniable here that 
Riding and Graves were in accord with some aspects o f Eliot’s theory o f “impersonality,” 
but at the expense of giving a personality to the poem. However, different from Eliot, Riding 
and Graves rejected his “historical sense” and privileged individual and -personal 
experiences. Moreover, they did not believe in an overpowerfiil presence o f a tradition in 
the poet’s mind, but in the idea that each poem is governed by its own insight. The poet 
finds the poem’s form in the process o f writing it. Their view also differs from the New 
Critical one, for they see the poem less as a “well-wrou^t urn” and more as language 
interaction, an open-ended process. The authors o f A  Survey want to refurbish the 
Coleridgean idea of the poem as an autonomous organism, a “creature” made of language 
but who is free to have an independent life:
He [tile modernist poet] does not have to describe or docket himself for the reader, 
because the important part o f poetry is now not the personality of the poet as 
embodied in a poem, which is its style, hut the personality of the poem itsef, diat is, its
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quality o f independence from both tlie reader and the poet, once the poet has 
separated it from his personality by making it complete— a new and self-explanatory 
creature. Perhaps more dian anything else characteristic o f modernist poetry is a 
declaration of the independence of the poem. (124, italics added)
The authors argue that this attitude is required of modernist poets if they are interested in 
communicating new and fresher meanings (and of the reader and critic as well, if they are 
willing to understand and face these meanings). It is not that the poet’s personality ceases 
to be important, but that in order to fully appreciate poetry as the art o f language we had 
better “let the poem take precedence over the poet”  (Ibid. 131). Without relying on Eliot’s 
idea that the poet has to sacrifice his own personality for the sake o f a tradition— for what 
they praise in Dickinson, a poet “whose personal reality pervades her work” (Ibid. 122)— , 
is her independence o f any movement. Riding and Graves criticized the Romantic notion 
o f poetry as a revelation resulting from the mind of an inspired genius: they were against 
the Romantic obsession with the distinctive personality of the author. On the other hand, 
they were also attacking modernist fellows such as Pound, Stein, Yeats, and even Eliot, 
whom th,ey sa-  ^ as engaged in self-promotion and the cult of die self-importance of the 
“modernist genius.”  Riding and Graves asked the plain reader to put die poet aside for a 
moment and to concentrate on the materiality o f language o f the poem itself The notion 
o f the autonomy of the poem, thus, was a defense of poetry itself, again, not as somediing 
to be reducible to a biographical or moral summary, but as a form o f knowledge of a 
different degree and with its own mechanisms. Poetry is a challenge diat die reader might 
or might not be willing to overcome. In an open polemics widi the reader, they blundy 
argue that if the reader does not understand a poem, it is a problem he has to solve by 
himself
We have forgotten, however, that die plain reader, while he does not object to the 
poetic state o f mind in the poet, has a fear in cultivating it in himself This is why he
116
prefers the prose summary to the poem and to see the poem, as it began in the 
poet’s mind, as a genial prose idea free o f those terrors which the poet is supposed 
to keep to himself or carefully disguise. Part o f the reader’s reaction to what he calls 
the obscurity of certain poems is really his nervous embarrassment at feeling himself 
left alone with the meaning o f the poem itself (Ibid. 150)
To fear the face-to-face with the poem and therefore with language is to admit one’s 
limits. It is, at least, to recognize, as Wittgenstein famously formulated, that the limits o f 
our language are the limits o f our world. There is no way o f fiilly enjoying the poetic 
phenomenon without being at the same time prepared to face its difficulties, the 
challenges it poses to our sensibilities, its difference from other human verbal practices, 
and the fact that poetry is language in state of artifice. By de-automatizing language, by 
rendering it “ strange,”  the strategy of the modemist poet becomes to “make it difficult,” 
in order to force the reader stop and pay attention, to wimess how meaning is being 
constmcted (or deconstmcted) in a given poem. Riding and Graves believed that “increasing 
the time-length of reading is one way o f getting out o f prose into the poetic state o f mind, o f
• developing a capacity for minuteness, for seeing all there is to see at a given point and for 
taking it all with one as one goes along” (149 my emphasis). The goal o f this radical poetics 
was nothing less than to transform language itself into the vehicle o f thought (Bemstein). 
Or, as Riding beautifully pointed out in the poem “Earth;”  “And you may write it as it 
seems, /  And as seems, it is, /  A seeming stillness /  Amidst seeming speed” (44).
Interestingly enough, the argument raised by Riding and Graves described above 
reappears in American poetic criticism in the 1990s. In Radical Artifice— Writing Poetry in the 
Age of Media (1991), Marjorie Perloff seems to be practicing exacdy the defense o f poetry 
advanced by Riding and Graves in their 1927 book. Perloff s argument is that, nowadays, 
with the life environment taken by technology, images, the discourses of advertising, 
propaganda, and the banality of the mass media, the poets that she considers as being the
117
most radical in contemporary America are tliose who are stimulated to “make it difficult,” 
to emphasize poetry as a radical artifice, to write against “media discourses.”  Riding and 
Graves’s denouncing of the Romantic idea of “self’ or the traditional lyric “voice,”  as well 
as their criticism of the transformation o f poetry into a commodity, seems to support 
Perioff s miStmst o f the idea of a “natural”  language (hence their rejection of image-based 
poetries).
The Poem as Vacuum
Riding’s resistance to systematization and her constmction o f a poetics is 
exemplified in Anarchism Is Not Enough (1928), an experiment in interdisciplinary criticism 
that approaches questions of sexuality, canon, ideology, and poetry. As the tide may 
suggest, in these essays Riding was defending absolute self-reliance and individual 
experience, in opposition to ideologies and systems of thought that impose their authority 
on people, be it grounded on political ideology, gender categories, or literary tradition. The 
book resists and rejects any form o f authority that threatens human individuality. Even a 
specific poem, when transformed into a “thing”— that is, when canonized, 
institutionalized, or transformed into a commodity—^must be read with suspicion.
In the short essay “What is a Poem,”  Riding blames Romanticism for having caused 
on us an automatism, imposing as “natural” responses to a poem those solely dependent 
on the effects the author manages to create on the reader, “as if the duty of a poem was to 
give nothing but pleasure.”  After the “new” Romantic Edgar Allan Poe, Riding argues, 
poets began to be more interested in causing effects on the readers tiian in delivering new 
experiences. By focusing solely on technique, poets were becoming masters in the art o f 
flattery. “Mystery was replaced by science; inspiration by psychologism” (16). In this 
process, we got used to thinking of the poem as a thing tiiat produces “special effects.”
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This view constrained. Riding thought, the productive dialogue that exists when the poem 
and the reader are alone. The alternative position is to consider the poem not as a thing, a 
gadget programmed to produce certain results on the audience. She envisions the poem as 
an activity. In a kind o f Buddhist solution to the problem. Riding advances the idea that a 
poem is not a thing.
What is a poem? A poem is nothing. By persistence the poem can be made 
something; but then it is something, not a poem. [...] It is not an effect (common or 
uncommon) of experience; it is the result of an ability to create a vacuum in experience— i^t is 
a vacuum and therefore nothing. [...]. Whenever the vacuum, the poem, occurs, 
there is agitation on all sides to destroy it, to convert it into something. The 
conversion of nothing into something is the task of criticism. Literature is the 
storehouse of these rescued somethings. (17, emphasis added)
The “something” Riding is referring to, as we have seen, is the paraphrase, which, by being 
“ something,”  distracts our attention from the “nothing”  which is the poem. A paraphrase 
cannot stand in our way, impeding a more direct experience with the poem itself Riding’s 
radical positioning is a reaction to the blatant psychologism dominating literary discussions 
at the time, widi the interpretation of literature being carried from the viewpoint o f a 
powerfiil “Corpus” (the canon). She was critical o f the discourse on poetry that was 
legitimating a view o f poetry that only distanced us from the real experience of language. 
As readers, we subject too easily to the authority of tradition and the author. Thus, in 
order to fijUy appreciate poetry, she invited tiie reader to rely more on his own subjectivity 
than in preestablished systems of order and regulations imposed from the outside, be it 
named Religion, Politics, or History.'“
In Anarchism, as Riding later explained, she was arguing for self-reliance “as against 
reliance upon definitions of things delivered from socially constmcted or philosophical
10 The ideas advanced here preview Riding’s attitude towards history and time as exemplified in the
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systematized frames o f authority”  (“Comments on”, no page). That is why even anarchism 
was not enough; because anarchism makes itself into a system, it is already cau ^ t in the 
network of power relations. Anarchism depends on the institutions it attacks to define its 
own identity.
The authority o f the poem and the received interpretations that emerge through the 
process o f literary institutionalization had to be held in suspicion. We must avoid taking 
either the author’s “talent”  or the poem’s critical interpretation for granted. The poem 
cannot be treated as a sacred “well-wrought urn,”  or “a verbal icon.”  For Riding, the 
independence o f the poem, its existence as a “ creature” made o f language, and the vacuum 
in individual experience it creates, had to be taken into account.
From Image to Language
In A  Survey of Modernist Poetiy, Riding and Graves attacked a notion which they saw 
as still dominating the discourse on poetry. Horace’s formula ut pictura poiesis—that is, 
poetry is image— i^s translated in Jmagism through die Poundian belief tliat “the natural 
object is always the adequate symbol” (“Retrospect”  5). Imagism aimed at clarity of 
expression through the use o f precise visual images. Here comes the intervention o f A 
Survej. the authors criticized even the modernists as relying too much on old metaphors, 
myths, symbols, and images canonized by the male Romantic tradition, accusing them of 
having transformed poetry into a mere artificial portrait o f its times. To be sure, thus 
writes Pound in 1915: “To create new rhythms— a^s the expression o f new mood/’ (269, italics 
mine). Against absorption”  and figurative uses o f language— a^gainst “the use o f language 
o f common speech,”  as Pound defended— Riding and Graves were searching for a way to
poems discussed in Chapter 4.
Absorption, as the temi is used here, is connected with descriptive and realistic modes o f writing, 
those that use transparency as their major effect, as Bernstein explains in his Artifice of Absorption
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have language incorporate the movement of the mind, not only to represent or translate 
something that is “outside”  language (as if such a tiling could be possible).
The position outlined in A  Survey, I believe, not only, as we have seen, advances the 
New Criticism, but establishes a direct connection with contemporary theoreticians such 
as Viktor Shklovsky. Ten years before, in his essay “Art as Technique,” the Russian 
Formalist criticized the creed (derived from Romanticism and Symbolism) of poetry as 
essentiallymimetic, imagetic, and representational: “Many still believe, then, that thinking 
in images— t^hinking in specific scenes o f ‘roads and landscape’ and ‘furrows and 
boundaries’— i^s the chief characteristic o f poetry”  (qt. in Kolocotroni, Goldanin and 
Taxidou 217). In the same passage o f the essay, Shklovsky offered the new approach:
The purpose o f art is to impart the sensation o f things as they are perceived and not 
as they are known. The technique o f art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make 
forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because die process o f 
perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of 
experiencing the artfulness o f an object; the object is not important (Ibid. 219, 
' emphasis added).'
This is precisely the same line o f argument defended by Riding and Graves. This “ increase 
o f time-length” in the reading process could be achieved by several means in the 
modernist poetry they were arguing for: for instance, throu^ syntactical displacement and 
repetition (Stein), through the invention of new vocabularies (cummings, Hopkins), by 
means of the exploration of the white space of the page (as in cummings), as well as by 
articulating complex meanings through paradox and figures o f speech. The poetics 
outiined in A  Survey ^ 2.% less interested in the precise rearrangement of symbols in order to 
provide a pleasurable picture or a snapshot o f reality. They defended that, in order to 
“make it mean” in modernist times, the question of language had to be re-addressed.
(198T).
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Moreover, the poetic image had to be criticized, considered not as the central poetic 
element but as one o f them. This strikes a dissonant note in what became die established 
melody of the contemporary canon, a kind o f “law”  o f contemporary poetics: the imagist 
doctrine, which claims that, besides avoiding rhetoric and abstraction, the objective o f 
poetry is “To present an image. We are not a school o f painters, but we believe that poetry 
should render particulars exactiy and not deal in vague generalities, however magnificent 
and sonorous. It is for this reason that we oppose the cosmic poet, who seems to us to 
shirk the real difficulties o f his art”  (Pound, Essays 42). The imagist doctrine clearly rejected 
poetry that incorporated philosophical concerns as well as privileged the imagination, as in 
a late version of Romanticism. In a typical imagist poem, there is still the idea of poetry as 
presenting a striking scene, be it achieved either through cinematic montage (such as in 
Pounc^, or by William’s credo o f “no ideas but in things.”  The layering o f image upon 
image, through a process o f parataxis, became in feet the main technique of The Cantos and 
Paterson, for instance.
Imagism drew a restrictive line between the concrete (image) and the abstract 
(thought) which Riding and Graves were eager to question. If Pound was waming die 
reader to “go in fear o f abstractions,”  Riding and Graves were moving in the opposite 
direction, proving that this binary opposition is irrelevant, since in a poem the abstract 
element (a thou^t) can be as concrete as “ the apparitions o f diese feces in the crowd” in 
a metro. To reject “thinkingf’— t^he human capability o f articulating thou^t—^would be a 
contradiction to Riding and Graves’s epistemological project Opposing the imagist 
discourse on poetry (althou^ Riding and Graves overlooked too easily the other items of 
the manifest), they presented a modemist response to Pound’s and Eliot’s terms (with the 
idea of an arrangement of images functioning as an “objective correlative” o f an emotion). 
As we have seen, A  Survey criticized Imagism as a mannerism, as a mere updating, via 
Japanese poetry, of die old Symbolist image. The authors not only attacked the poetics o f
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Imagism but proposed an alternative approach as the ideal o f modernist poetry;
The modernist poet does not have to talk about the uses o f images ‘to render 
particulars exacdy,’ since the poem does not give a rendering o f a poetical picture or 
idea existing outside the poem, but presents the literal substance o f poetry, a newly 
created thought-activity; the poem has the character o f a creamre by itself Imagism, 
on the other hand, and all other similar dead movements, took for granted the 
principle that poetry was a translation of certain kinds of subjects into the language 
that would bring the reader emotionally closest to them. It was assumed that a 
natural separation existed between the reader and the subject, to be bridged by the 
manner in which it was presented. (118)
Against Imagism and image-based poetries (such as Georgianism and the so-called 
War poetry o f the time), focusing on words and their movements o f signification, the 
authors were building, albeit unacknowledgedly, an alternative modernist poetics. The aim 
was not only to constme an independent poetics, free from manifestos and literary parties 
as well, but to avoid poetry as a mere translation of visual images, be tiiese “dynamic”  or 
not. In this paradigmatic shift—embodied, as we shall see, in Riding’s poems—poetry is 
envisioned as a mode of investigation and a deeper linguistic process, always mediated by 
the mind’s language. A  Survej faces, in fact, the problem of poetic representation, o f 
referential language, o f mimesis. On the other hand. Riding and Graves were critical of the 
use o f images in the poetry o f their time as a contemporary substitute for the old Muses 
(others mentioned by them are History, the Symbol, Politics, Religion, and Tradition). 
They noted a curious reversal o f roles in modernism, since they saw that the figure o f “ the 
Poet”  was assuming die place earlier reserved to the classical Muse. While some aimed at a 
poetry made of “objective correlatives” (Eliot), “direct treatment of tlie thing” (Pound and 
Williams), Riding and Graves were aiming at writing a poetry based on thought.
Crossing all the modernist currents of her time, Laura Riding was obsessively
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interested in transforming her own poetry into a performance o f thought, a performance 
that she equated to nothing less than “ tmth,”  which later became her ideological 
imperative. Critical o f traditional poetical representation, with many of her poems. Riding 
causes in us a feeling o f disorientation due to the scarcity of images and references, as if we 
had been temporarily blinded. The purpose is to attain a level o f visibility called thought, 
where vision is understood as “ seeing beyond the range o f mere observation, the range o f 
close perception” (“Looking Back” 40). Riding’s poems deal with the mind as a language- 
mediated phenomenon, investigating itself while making sense o f the world (as in “The 
World and I”). As she S5Tithesizes in “By Crude Rotation” :
To my lot fell
By tmst, false signs, fresh starts,
A slow speed and a heavy reason,
A visibility o f blindness— these thoughts—
And the content, the language o f the mind 
That knows no way to stop.
{Poem 107) >
In Riding’s mindscapes, each poem becomes a place for the adventure o f thought, a 
mapping o f consciousness. The human mind, always tiiinking always made language, 
becomes the main focus of her poetic investigation. The elected “lot”  or “country” o f this 
poetics is that of the human, embodied mind, in its stru^le to make meaning. In the 
deconstmction of the image (questioned, made abstract and replaced by “ false signs,”  
“ fresh starts,”  “a slow speed,”  and “a heavy reason”) we see the emphasis on language as 
an endlessly perceptive process, with word tracking a self that, at each turn, strangely is 
and is not (“anotiier, and one more”). By a frequent use of paradoxes that undercut her 
questioning of identity, reality and language, mind and body. Riding put in practice what 
Shklovsky defined as “ strangeness”  {ostranenie): the ability o f the artistic constmct to slow
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down perception and make tiie audience see die object in question as if for the first time. 
Words should be used to point at language as a process o f human articulation, o f 
mindscape. Riding was obsessed with the idea that language creates human reality. Her 
aim, like that o f Shklovsky, was to make stran^ what seems familiar, to discuss the visible, 
to call attention to the movement o f meaning, thus de-automatizing the reader’s 
perceptions.
The “art o f the difficult” o f modemist poets is explained by Ron Silliman as “a 
defense mechanism. By difficulty, a writer makes it harder to be absorbed and 
commoditized (sic)” (“For Open”  no page). Ridingfs position has a striking resemblance 
with the one posed by Perloff in Radical Artftce (1991). In her defense of the difficulty 
poetry written by the Language poets in America in the age of media, Perloff says that 
“the current suspicion o f imagefiil language, on the part o f the more radical poetries, has a 
good deal to do with the acmal production and dissemination o f images in our culture” 
(57). That Laura Riding was already pointing out to a way out o f imagist and referent- 
centered poetries as early as 1927 puts her in a position of a visionary theorist o f 
modemist poetry. ‘
Language-Poetiy-Truth
The height o f Riding’s poetic career, signaled by the publication, in 1938, o f her 477- 
page Collected Poems— ^which gathers 181 poems from her previous 12 books— coincides 
with the moment of her most passionate and lucid defense of poetry, not only as the 
supreme linguistic reality, but as a higher level o f existence as well. She was only 37— an 
age when many poets are still maturing or finding tiieir own voice. In a review o f the 
book, the critic and translator Robert Fitzgerald advised that the value of Riding’s poetry 
would not be recognized for decades to go. He was clear about what he found in Riding’s
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poems: “The authority, the dignity o f truth telling, lost by poetry to science, may gradually
be regained. If it is, these poems should one day be a kind o f Principia. They argue that the 
art o f language is the most fitting instrument with which to press upon full reality and
make it known” (342). Poetry became die highest form o f knowledge available to the
human being, according to Riding: “I have learned from my poems,” she writes, “what,
completely and precisely, the scope of poetry is; and any reader can do the same” (Poem
409). Paradoxically, the same preface also points out her end o f her rv/e as a poet.
The introductory piece to Colkcted Poems, “To the Reader,”  is a tour-de-force, and
may be considered as the strongest advocation o f poetry that Riding had written so far, as 
well as one of the most important and polemic documents o f Angjo-American
modernism. More importantly, the book itself places Riding in the broadest context o f
other contemporaries who were deeply engaged in breaching die gap between thinking
and poiesis, such as Martin Heidegger. Before tracing some common points between
Riding’s poetics and some ideas professed by Heidegger, it is important to see what is at
stake in her ‘Treface.” '^
Once again defending her poetry from die accusation o f “difficulty,” Riding 
observes tiiat the problem o f die reception o f poetry must be seen in terms o f literary 
education (“Comparatively few people devote any time at all to die reading of poems; yet 
many would agree that die realities uncovered by poems are extremely important to 
know” (406)). Moreover, we have been used to an attitude in relation to poetry as a text 
“based on fancied experience,” diat is, approaching it only as something “non-tmthful,”  as 
“ fiction,” as something that “yields only a fanciful kind o f knowledge” (Poems 407).
12 The few occasions Riding mentions Heidegger, as far as I could identifjr in my research, besides 
a few mentionings in the later The Telling, is in a letter to the editor o f magazine Sulfur 0uly 1983): 
“ It is to no point o f comprehension o f my thought whether or not I have ever known o f 
Heidegger’s writing. His squeezing poetry into his Germanic-thoroughness efforts to isolate human 
identity, and to fomiulate a linguistic anatomy o f thought, are all an extemaiistic enterprise on the 
outside o f the reality o f sentient existence— and the reality o f thought, and o f language, and o f 
human identity” (212).
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According to Riding, this problem in literary education had the effect of cultivating in us 
the “wrong” reasons for reading poetry. Some o f these reasons, as we have seen, were 
already listed in “A Preface or a Plea” : approaching poetry in its medicinal roles, either as a 
escape, a dmg, or a relief from the weight o f broad lig^t reality. Another “wrong”  reason 
she detects is the usual reader’s unawareness o f poetry as a different kind of discourse: 
‘Toems will not serve as reading-matter when you want detective fiction, or a play, or 
anything but poems,” she argues (Ibid. 411). Poetry was to become, instead, “ writing- 
matter,”  that is, something to be worked out— rewritten, in fact— a^t every reading.
I f  one approaches poetry as a process o f discovery by closely attending to the words 
o f the poem—^without relying in paraphrase, for instance— i^f one engages, with total 
attention, in the power of poems to uncover important realities, then one resorts to poetry 
for the “right reasons,”  according to Riding. That is why she finds it unjust when genuine 
poets are accused of merely being “difficult” for difficulty’s sake, or o f making inaccessible 
exactly “what it is their function to uncover”  (Ibid. 406). Because “to go to poetry is the 
most ambitious act o f the mind,” Riding argues that both the poet and die reader have 
first “to overcome a tremendous inertia” (Ibid. 410). In the act o f writing, the poet has not 
only the role o f reproducing but producing a new linguistic reality: the poem. More than to 
offer delight and entertainment through the poem’s “ special effects,”  the poet has the 
obligation, through the poems, to teach the readers the right reasons o f poetry.
Knowing the responsibilities of the poet. Riding defends her own poems as being 
lucid and almost didactic: “Because I am fully aware of the background of miseducation 
from which most readers come to poems, I begin every poem on the most elementary 
plane of understanding and proceed to the plane of poetic discovery (or uncovering by steps 
which deflect the reader from false associations, from false reasons for reading” (Ibid. 407, 
italics mine). This suggests, in fact, that a poem is sometliing only discovered in the
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process o f writing/reading. In tlie sequence, and at the most extreme of Riding’s poetical 
idealism, poetry becomes nothing less than equal to truth:
A poem is an uncovering of tmth of so fundamental and general a kind that no 
other name besides poetry is adequate except truth. Knowledge implies specialized 
fields o f exploration and discovery; it would be inexact to call poetry a kind o f 
knowledge. It is even inexact to call it a kind o f tmth, since in tmth there are no 
kinds. Tmth is the result when reality as a whole is uncovered ly those faculties which apprehend 
in terms of entirety, rather than in terms merely ofparts. The person who writes a poem for 
the right reasons has felt the need o f exercising such faculties, has such faculties. The 
person who reads a poem for the right reasons is asking the poet to help him to 
accentuate these faculties, and to provide him with an occasion for exercising them. 
(Ibid. 407, italics mine)
Poetry is seen not only as an instmment to reveal tmth beyond the appearances o f the 
world, but also as a superior form o f knowledge, even to philosophy, history, and science. 
Although tmth is never satisfactorily defined by Riding, it stands as a neo-Platonic and 
unquestionable stance in her discourse, close to Derrida’s idea of a “transcendental 
signified.” '^  For Riding, tmth needs no explanation: it is incorporeal (it is “nothing,”  it is 
“the result o f an ability to create a vacuum in experience”). “Tmth,”  a poem she wrote in 
her twenties, already shows Riding dealing with the problem o f poetry, tmth, and the 
individual experience:
We keep looking for Tmth.
Tmth is afraid of being caught.
Books are bird-cages.
Tmth is no canary
A sign which acts as a foundation o f all our thought, language, and experience. Examples are 
God, the Idea, the Word Spirit, the Self, Matter. For Derrida, such transcendental meanings are 
fictions. In Riding’s case, “ truth” is based on a notion that the being o f any entity is always
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To nibble patiently at words 
And die when tlie/re all eaten up.
Truth would not like
To live in people’s heads or hearts or throats.
Don’t try to find it there.
[...]
Don’t worry the earth.
Truth leaves no footprints.
Don’t listen
Before silence has set with the moon.
Tmth makes no noise.
Don’t follow the light 
That follows the sun 
That follows the night.
Tmth dances beyond the ligjit 
And the sun 
And the night.
Tmth can’t be seen.
[...]
Leave tmth alone.
Tmth can’t be caught.
I think Tmth doesn’t live at all 
She’d have to be afraid of dying, dien.
{Firji Awakenings 84)
determined as “presence,”  which is also to determine the existence o f an ultimate origin.
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As we have seen, truth occurs when the poet is able to create a vacuum in experience, 
making room for the “unreal,”  that is, the self in state o f poetry, o f thought. Poetry is the 
now o f language, a condition that follows us closely while we live.
By claiming poetry’s r i^ t  to be taken as truth—and not as a mere fictionalization o f 
reality—^Riding was reintroducing in modernist times, perhaps, the oldest polemics 
surrounding philosophy and poetry since Plato. Strikin^y, among her contemporaries, her 
project o f rethinking the relationship between language, poetry and tmth has more to do 
with Martin Heidegger’s philosophy than with other contemporary poets (with the 
exception o f Wallace Stevens).
But what is truth? In the oldest o f the definitions, as Heidegger reminds us, veritas est 
adaeqmtio ret et intelkctus {Pathmarks 138). That is, truth is the adequation of the intellect to 
things, the correspondence o f the matter to knowledge. According to Heidegger, in “The 
Essence of Tmth,”  this concept implies “the Christian theological belief that, with respect 
to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (ens creatum) is only insofar as it 
corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intelkctus divinus, i.e., in the mind o f God, and 
tiius measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense is “true”’ (Ibid. 138). As Robert 
C. Solomon argues in Introducing Philosophy.
What indeed is truth? Should we say, as we have so far, that our beliefs are tme if 
and only if they ‘match up’ with reality? Or, in accordance with our present 
suspicions, should we not perhaps hold out for some different conception o f ‘truth,’ 
one that does not place such emphasis on ‘matching up’ and the separation o f reality 
on the one hand from our beliefs and experiences on the other? The proper 
philosophical name for this notion of ‘matching up’ our beliefs and experiences with 
reality is the correspondent theory of truth. (227 my emphasis)
In this sense, tmth is the correspondence, the matching up, o f a statement with realit)'. 
The correspondence theory o f poetry asserts tiiat a proposition bears truth-value when it
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reveals sometliing correct about reality or a fact. Translated to a common-sense 
experience: if I say to someone “The sky is clear today,”  this utterance is only true if it 
matches up with the fact that the sky is clear (not clouded) at the specific moment and 
place o f my utterance. If  I say, “the Earth is round,”  this proposition possesses tmth-value 
because it matches up with an observable fact. If  I am a journalist, and I am given 
confidential information about the poor health o f the President by an anonymous source, 
the proposition must be checked out. If, in fact, I find out that the President is sick, then 
my source has given me a tmth-value account of the real state o f things. What was said 
“matches up” with what is. Therefore, following tlie logic o f this theory, a statement’s 
truth-value is bipolar in namre: it depends on the relation between what is said (a 
proposition) and some aspect o f reality to which it refers. Moreover, it can never be 
ambiguous; it can never make room for other interpretations.
From the viewpoint o f “correspondent theory,”  it seems that poetry would not 
have any chance o f being considered trudi. Being by nature metaphorical—or, as I have 
said, being language in state of artifice—^poetry would develop only a discontinuous, 
nonidentical relation with the world. In a poem, words are frequently ambiguous: they 
imply more dian what is said” (thus, for instance. Riding’s proposition that “Tmth makes 
no noise”). Words defy our common sense, by comparing dissimilar things. In fact, the 
force of poetry, for poets such as cummings, rests in its power to say that two plus two 
“equals 5.” As Dennis Rasmussen discusses the question, in Poetiy and Truth:
Perhs^s the safest generalization that can be made concerning propositional tmth in 
poetry is that poetry may use propositional tmdi as material, hut it appears that we 
cannot expect that poetry will always offer, or even try to offer, true propositions. A poem may 
contain any combination of true and false propositions, depending on the poet’s 
artistic purpose (15, my emphasis).
Thus, widi Riding, diis old question at the beginning o f Western philosophy resurfaces at
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the core of modernism: Can poetry be tmth? Or, rephrasing the question: can tmth be 
poetry?
Definitely not, according to Plato, to whom nothing is farthest from tmth than 
poetry and poets. I f  tmth is understood as “tme being,” goodness, virtue, then nothing is 
more prejudicial to society than the poet, who, by means of his artifice, tums our attention 
away from reality. In The Republic, in a famous passage, Plato discusses the nature o f 
representation, and accuses poets o f deforming the audience’s minds (344). The poet, as 
“ image-maker,”  “a representer,”  “understands only appearance,”  while reality is beyond 
him. What he delivers as “facts”  are only “appearances of tmth.”
Plato, as we know, claims the existence o f two realms: the real and the ^pearance. 
The real is identified with the immutable realm of ideal Forms, o f eternal being. The world 
o f senses, however, is made o f appearances that are always changing, that delude us. When 
a poet writes a poem, or a painter depicts a landscape, he is dealing with the realm of 
appearances; he is depicting tlie sensual and not the rational world, not the “ real thing.”  
Worse, the poet presents as tmthfiil things which he does not even know how to use. “A 
representer knows nothing o f value about the thing it represents; representation is a kind 
o f game,”  says Plato (Ibid. 358). By stimulating people’s emotions and feelings, fears, and 
desires, poetry activates only the lower part o f our minds, while reason is left aside:
Now we can see how right we’d be to refiise him [the poet] admission into any 
community which is going to respect convention, because we know which part o f 
the mind he wakes up. He destroys the rational part by feeding and fattening up this 
other part. [...] At a personal level, he establishes a bad system of government in 
people’s minds by gratifying their irrational side (Ibid. 359).
Before banishing tlie poet altogether from his idealist Republic, Plato reminds us o f 
the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy and asserts that, if poets become more 
rational, if they begin to present their poems sustained by a rational argument, they can
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have the chance of being readmitted into the community. In Plato’s realm of ideas—^where 
even real objects were considered mere secondary imitations o f ideal forms—poetry was 
thus an imitation o f an imitation (die manufacturer, and images): poetry is, thus, three 
times removed from Truth. Notoriously, it was this deceitful, artificial nature o f poetry 
that justified Plato’s banishment o f the poets from his ideal republic. Poetic discourse was, 
in short, not only nontmthful but also manipulative of people’s emotions, therefore 
dangerous to the order o f the state. Poets were a threat to happiness, defined by Plato as 
freedom as well as the lack of fear and pain.
In twentieth-century philosophy, the question o f poetry and tmth resurfaces in the 
mid-1930s, but this time in a more positive way. Heidegger attempts to breach the gap 
between poetry and philosophy, which he saw as being mistakenly considered as separate 
realms, as different practices. He argues that in Herakleitos and Parmenides—whose 
“philosophy”  occurred before conceptual language and before any systematization had set 
in— there was no such distinction. For instance, when Herakleitos says ‘The beginning o f 
a circle is also its end” {Herakkitos 29) or, “One cannot step twice in the same river, for the 
water into which you first stepped has flowed on” (14), he is using language as the 
mediator of a tmth-value statement; the poet-philosopher is thinking and poetizing at the 
same time. This makes Heidegger posit that ‘Thinking is primordial poetry, but also prior 
to the poetics o f art, since art shapes its work within the realm of language. All poetizing, in 
this broader sense, and also in the narrower sense o f the poetic, is in its ground a thinking” 
(Pathmarks 139).
This led to Heide^er’s formulation o f the concept tmth in relation to art and 
poetry. In “The Origin of the Work of Art”  and in otiier essays, Heide^er developed a 
concept o f art as tmth by recalling the etymological root o f the Greek word for “tmth” : 
aletheia, or the “unconcealment of beings”  (51). Through his essay, Heidegger recovers the 
idea o f poetry as a primordial language which, in the artistic act, reveals Being, by founding
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a new reality. The idea o f the poet as a demiurge, as capable o f calling forth things by the 
power o f his language, draws back to the myth o f Orpheus. Heidegger sums up this 
position in his famous words, in “Hölderlin and the Essence o f Poetr/’:
The poet names the gods and names all things in that which they are. This naming 
does not consist in something already known being supplied with a name; it is rather 
that when the poet speaks the essential word, the being is by this naming nominated 
as what it is. So it becomes known as being. Poetry is the establishment of being by means of 
the words. {Existence 281, my emphasis)
With words, the essence o f language, the poet not only communicates a tmth which 
is already established outside (‘The sky. is blue,”  “the door is open’"); he does not only 
reproduce what he sees. By naming, he makes things visible, he produces, reveals, he 
brings things anew, into existence. By thinking through language he creates human 
meaning. Language, shared by all human beings, must not be thought of as something 
outside but “ the means by which the world is constituted,”  as Bernstein reminds us 
{Content’s 61). We speak language, but language also speaks us, since it stands as the 
occurrence’ o f meaning, which is intrinsically human. It is only through language that the 
human world is revealed and acquires meaning. That is the tmth o f language. Or, As 
Riding puts it in “Come, Words, Away:” “But never shall tmth circle so /  Till words 
prove language is /  How words come from far sound away /  Throug^i stages o f 
immensity’s small /  Centering the utter telling /  In tmth’s first soundlessness”  {The Poems 
136). Here, as in the poem ‘Tmth,”  we see tmth as something that cannot be easily heard 
or “caught.” And, more importandy. Riding was committed to poetry “as the path of 
resolution of the tmth-problem that language opened to the powers of human experience 
and understanding” (“I wrote this poem”  no page).
It is dirough this humanistic rethinking of language that Heidegger is able to call our 
attention to the tmth-value and philosophical status o f poetry. “Language is not a mere
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tool, one of the many which man possesses; on the contrary, it is only language that 
affords the very possibility o f standing in the openness o f the existence. Only where there 
is language there is a world”  {Existence 216). Heidegger argued that the differentiation 
imposed between poetry (“poetizing”) and philosophy (“thinking”) since Plato had the 
effect o f in^overishing both activities, which, for him, are simultaneous.
For Heidegger, what defines the first-rank poet is a resistance to using words as 
mere instruments to make us “go along” with the world, or to conceal or distract us from 
the world. Through the art o f language the poet wants to go beyond the established and 
conventional language in order to unconceal the world, to make it exist anew, to charge it
with meaning.. Poetry is, thus, the occurrence o f “tmth,”  o f “what it is.”  Like philosophy, 
poetry is a hermeneutic process; it discloses and exposes the hidden meanings o f human 
existence. Thus, against Plato, Heide^er asserts;
[p]oetry looks like a game and yet it is not. A game does indeed bring men together, 
but in such a way that each forgets himself in the process. In poetry, on the other 
hand, man is re-united on the foundation o f his existence. There he comes to rest; 
' not indeed to the seeming rest o f inactivity and emptiness o f thought, but to that 
infinite state of rest in which all powers and relations are active. {Existence 286)
Or, as Riding will say, in the 1938 preface to her collected poems, “to go to poetry is the 
most ambitious act o f mind” {Poems 410).
As we have seen, the idea of poetry as the unconcealment or uncovering o f truth—  
understood here as a step by step process o f linguistic discovery—developed by Riding in 
the 1930s has many points of contact with Heidegger’s existentialist philosophy. Riding is 
also engaged in breaching the gap between “ thinking” and “poeticizing.” ''* That is why, in 
almost all o f Riding’s poems, we have the impression that we are listening to language
Thus Richard Aldington, the imagist poet, remarks o f Laura Riding; “Miss Riding gives me the 
feeling o f someone thinking aloud and very intensely. The simplicity and directness is very 
pleasing”  (qtd in Cunard 108).
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speaking itself; ‘T o  my lot fell /  By trust, false signs, fresh starts, /  A slow speed and a 
heavy reason, /  A visibility o f blindedness—these thoughts—  /  And then content, the 
language of the mind /  That knows no way to stop” (The Poem 107), Language is an 
unstoppable process, since it is present even when sleeping. It is in this process o f pressing 
language kito reality that the poet “ founds”  and gives meaning to the world. The task 
becomes not only to recognize a previous reality, but also to find and found a new one.
In ‘Toetry and the Literary Universe” (1928), Riding sums up her existential and 
humanistic approach to poetry:
There is a sense of life so real that it becomes the sense o f something more real than 
life. Spatial and temporal sequences can only partially express it. It introduces a 
principle o f selection into the undifferentiated quantitative appetite and thus changes 
accidental emotional forms into deliberate intellectual forms; animal experiences 
related by time and space into human experiences related in infinite degrees o f kind. 
It is the meaning at work in what has no meaning; it is, at its clearest, poetry. [...] 
Poetry forces words to the limits o f language. It is to want to make words mean 
more than they express (Contemporaries and Snobs 9).
Against Poetry
As we have seen, in 1938 Laura Riding believed in poetry as the way to achieve truth. 
Everything changes sometime in the early 1940s when she begins to write under the 
signature o f Laura (Riding) Jackson (tlie parenthesis now clearly demarcating her past 
existence as poet). Only in 1962 we have her first public statement touching on the 
reasons for her rejection o f poetry. Riding’s renouncing of poetry is contemporary to 
Theodor Adorno’s famous statement diat it had become impossible to write poetry after
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the Jewish Holocaust.*^ However, Ridings motives are not exactly political, but mainly 
linguistic, humanistic, and moral. In fact, a paradoxical situation appears: if Heidegger and 
Plato are seen as being in the extreme opposites regarding poetry and tmth, the same 
applies to the case o f Laura Riding and Laura (Riding) Jackson.
In a 1976 essay, (Riding Jackson pointed out that “Where language is converted into 
the mere instrument o f an art, it loses its virme as the expressive instrument o f humanity” 
(“Poetry as”  72). But, if language was, according to her own belief, what differentiates 
human beings from other animals, why should the possibilities o f poetry, the human 
capability to manipulate language artistically, be rejected? Her argument sometimes seems 
circular, not to say tautological: she argues, responding to Joyce Wexler, that “the art 
element in poetry [...] defeated over & over the fiJl potential o f poetr/’ (“Comments” 
no page). We might ask: if, by nature, poetry ispoiesis (to make), how can we expect poetry 
to deny its nature, as being language in state o f artifice, o f play? Riding pushed poetry to its 
limit, it is tme, but in this process she was caught in a circular argument, because the limits 
she found in poetry were the ones she herself posited, in tlie first place.
Ironically enough, one strong counter-argument to Riding’s position is exemplified 
in Sidney’s “An Apology for Poetry,”  the same text that seems to have inspired some 
thoughts presented in her first published essay on poetry. There Sidney states that poetry, 
as any other medium, can also be misused. I think that (Riding Jackson’s accusation that 
all poets lie is rebuked, for instance, by Sidney’s idea of the poet as someone who—by the 
very nature o f the medium of his work—is incapable of lying:
Now, for the poet, he nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth. For, as I take it, to 
He, is to affirm that to be tme which is false. So as the other artists, and specially the
Adorno’s phrase appears in the essay “Cultural Criticism and Society” (1949): “Cultural criticism finds 
itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic o f culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz 
is barbaric. And it corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today. 
Absolute reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to 
absorb the mind entirely” (Prism s 34).
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historian, affirming many things, can in the cloudy knowledge of mankind, hardly 
escape from many lies. But the poet (as I said before) never affirmeth. The poet 
never maketh any circles about your imagination, to conjure you to believe for true 
what he writes.[...] And therefore, though he recounts things not tme, j i /  because he 
telkth them not for true, he lieth not. (249, my emphasis)
The problem, according to Sidney, has less to do with poetry itself and more with what 
uses human beings make of it. He even argues that Plato did not so much criticize poetry 
in itself at the end of The Republic, but “Upon the abuse” ([bid. 255). It is not poetry that 
abuses us, as (Riding) Jackson came to think, but we abuse poetry. It was Riding’s project 
that rendered poetry and words as instmments to a utopian “perfect speaking, each word 
faidiful to die motivation o f trutii o f utterance, faithftilly used” (“Comments” no page).
A series o f questions can be raised at this point: Who defm'es if words are or are not 
being faithfiJly used? How can one know if language is always changing and whose tmth- 
values— i^f they exist—are unavoidably linked to cultural and historical circumstances? 
Maybe it was (Riding Jackson who abused poetry, by expecting it to be the purest 
expression o f truth, the final word. Or ‘we can use,' at this point, what Riding wrote 
previously to question (Riding) Jackson’s premises: how can the poet be a liar if he, 
ideally— n^ot wanting to write a poem merely to display his crafl: or transform liis poem in 
a commodity— h^as exactiy the mission o f  uncovering truth, o f revealing and making 
known things that, if not for the poet’s intervention, would remain unknown? Aren’t the 
limits one sees in things (such as poetic practice) those which one has imposed on them? 
The poet does not pretend to tell the tmth; therefore, he isn’t lying.
By forcing the task o f poetry to its limit—as embodying in its linguistic occurrence 
nothing less than truth—^Riding was forced to an increasingly abstract language where 
words are so literal, general, purified of artifice, reference, musicality, sensuality, and 
metaphor, that it seems that nothing much lasted, only a blank and arid landscape, in a
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sort o f Bartliesian “writing degree-zero”  (an example o f this point o f no return in her 
poetry is the extraordinary, hybrid piece ‘Toet; A Lying Word,”  as we shall see in Chapter 
4). In order to attain her goal o f achieving tmth throu^ language. Riding ended up 
rejecting one defining feature of poetry in relation to other discourses: its artftce. In the 
1970 ‘Treface”  to the first selection of her poems to be published after 1938, (Riding 
Jackson made it clear that the problem was poetry’s artifice. She tells o f her “becoming so 
much aware o f a discrepancy, deep-reaching, between what I call the creed and the crcft o f 
poetry—^which I might otherwise describe as its religious and ritualistic aspects— that I 
perceived the impossibility o f anyone's functioning with consistency in the character o f a 
poet” [Selected 'Poems 414, my emphasis).
In condemning poetry’s craft— i^ts “verbal rituals that court sensuosity as if they were 
the judge of truth” (Ibid.)— (Riding) Jackson was not only echoing Plato’s old critique, but 
also falling into the same error diagnosed by Eliot: dissociation of sensibility. By separating 
the creed from the craft o f poetry (Riding Jackson ended up stressing a dissociation 
between thou^t and feeling (manifested in the senses, perceptions, the body). She seemed 
to be imposing a binary opposition onto the realm of poetry, separating something that, 
by nature, came and existed together; mind and body, form and content, creed and craft. 
The religious and ritualistic aspects o f poetry were a sin^e one, since the beginning, as the 
ethnopoetic anthology o f Jerome Rothenberg, Technicians of the Sacred, wonderfully 
demonstrates. Moreover, there is a whole range o f poetries that simply do not 
differentiate the craft (the technique o f poetry) from its creed (its religious, 
interconnecting aspects) as presented in hymns, spells, hieroglyphs, oral narratives, dreams, 
and visual patterns disseminated around the globe. For the shaman, technique is 
fundamental for the accomplishment o f the spiritual task. In denying analogy, ambiguity, 
play, the sound of words, and all the devices accumulated through the human experience 
o f poetry, from ancient times to our days, (Riding) Jackson seems to be devaluing the
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richness and diversity diat poetic language can express.
Wliat happened was that (Riding Jackson found the dissociation operating not only 
in the poet’s minds, but in die medium of poetry itself But by accusing poetry’s sensual 
verbal rituals, she is repressing the sonorous, emotional, unconscious, and the Dyonisiac 
(in Nietzsche’s sense) aspects o f human experience, as if to grasp Truth one needed, 
forcibly, to do away with Beauty. That she was coherent enough in her project o f 
abandoning poetry for moralistic and ethical purposes is laudable, but this does not give 
her the right to exclude and forbid poetry from the life practice of poets and readers. This 
authoritarian position caused many people to move away from her poetry. If she claimed 
to have gone to the limits o f poetry (as in some way she did), it seems a distortion to 
transform that limit into a sine qua non for the reasons other people might find in reading 
and writing poetry. I f  poetry is the art o f language itself, as I believe it is, why did (Riding 
Jackson come to deny this special status, this difference o f human utterances, as expressed, 
for instance, in metaphors, puns, slangs, rhythms, rhymes? If language is not only 
something that follows but in fact constitutes the world, as Laura Riding and Heidegger 
believed, why deny other potential aspects o f thoug^it, such as manifested in dreams, in 
memory, shamanic trances, slips o f tongue? Are they not all manifestations of language, o f 
what is the most intrinsic in us? If poetry, as Riding defended, “is an attempt to make 
language do more than express”  {Contemporaries 9), why deny the power o f devices to 
defamiliarize so-called ordinary speech, to test the limits o f our words? What would be a 
“natural” use of words, as she argues in The Telling Paul Auster, among the best 
commentators o f Riding’s poetry, has an incisive insight into this topic in his book The A rt 
of Hunger “If the tmth in language she is seeking is a human tmth, it would seem to be 
contradictory to want this tmth at the expense of what is human” (68). Precisely. And we 
have to admit that—in seeking poetry as “ that perfection in speaking which is tmth” 
(“The Road to” 68)— she was courageous enough to take this risk, and then to reject and
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renounce poetry. Auster continues;
For in order to sustain the high degree of intellectual precision necessary to the 
success o f the poems, Laura Riding has been forced to engage in a kind of poetic 
brinkmanship, and she has often lost more than she has won. Bventuallj we come to 
reali^ that the reasons for her break ivith poetry are implicit in the poems themselves (The A rt 
67, italics mine).
Surprisingly enough, although (Riding) Jackson rejected poetry, she did not reject the 
poems written by Laura Riding. In her essays and statements, she makes it clear that she 
considered them as indications o f the limits o f poetry, o f how far it can take us. And she 
writes in the last paragraph of her 1970 preface: “My meanings have not changed, there, 
fundamentally, from what they were in mjpoems” {Poems 419, italics mine). Therefore, the 
challenge for the critic becomes to uncover die germ o f tiiis decision in die poems 
tiiemselves, and see how this rejection o f poetry matches the progressive process o f
“demetaphorization,”  the questioning of the referent, and “de-poetizing” present in 
Riding’s poetry up to tiiat breatii taking piece named ‘Toet: A Lying Word.”
CHAPTER 4
MINDSCAPES: THE POETRY OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE
Thou^t is the occasion o f language.
((Riding Jackson, Rational 569)
[LJanguage is the material o f both tliinking and writing. [...] Just as language is not sometliing 
separable from the world, but rather the means by which the world is constituted, so tliinking 
cannot be said to ‘accompany’ the experiencing o f the world in that it informs tliat experience. It 
is through language that we experience the world, indeed tlirough language that meaning comes 
into the wodd and into being.
(Charles Bemstein, Content’s 62)
Geography contains many errors, but history corrects these errors—^which are, indeed, the 
substance of history— b^y passing. Lessons in geography are reaUy quite unnecessary. [...] The 
truth is a world tliat lives forever, and the strong people do certainly exist for a certain time. But 
to exist for a certain time in a world which lasts for ever can only mean to be somewhere—here 
or there or there— i^n it; only she is everywhere in it.
(Riding, “A Last Lesson in Geography” 251)
In the previous chapter I argued that the negotiation between mind' and reality, thought 
and feeling, is a mark o f  Riding’s epistemological poetry. Then I defined her poems as 
mindscapes, written spaces where thought and language aim at becoming one. In this chapter I
' Riding defined mind as “an organ of thought having the functional potency of an autonomous 
consciousness” (“Engaging” 14).
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intend to show that her poems are telling demonstrations o f  an amazing writer to whom “ the 
mind thinking becomes the active force o f  the poem,” as Bernstein aptly posits in relation to 
the writings o f autliors such as René Descartes, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Jack Kerouac, Paul 
Celajn, and Wallace Stevens {Content’s 66). Keeping this contention in mind, in the present 
chapter I concentrate my reading on five poems: “The Map o f  Places,” “Beyond,” “ Elegy in a 
Spider Web,” “The World and I,” and “Poet: A  Lying Word.” The limitation o f  my corpus
does not at all imply that relevant passages o f  other poems will be overlooked. Contrarily to 
what an orthodox close reading might claim, with its idea o f  organic unity, I will choose 
fragments o f  other poems that, by themselves, are illustrative o f  the points I believe Riding is 
making in her poetry as a whole. I have decided to work with this specific corpus because, in 
my view, it is in these poems that the idea o f  the poem as a mindscape not only is 
foregrounded but also dramatized: poems become, in fact, “performances o f  the mind,” as 
Riding herself would put it. The corpus discussed is taken from The Poems of Laura Riding— 
Neiv Edition of the 1938 Collection (New York: Persea Books, 1980).
The impulse to create the text as a field* o f  attention, where total awareness is asked o f 
the reader, goes hand in hand in the poems analyzed with the goal o f  questioning the nature o f 
reality, the concept o f  time, history, human identity, and poetry itself. This critical impulse is 
revealed by a full use o f  paradoxes, neologisms, repetition, as well as through a radical process 
o f  de-metaphorization. It is not that images^ cease to exist in her poetry; the strategy adopted 
by the poet is that what is visible must be immediately filtered and processed by the intellect. 
In this sense, as we have seen, Riding’s poems are exemplary o f  an obsessive attempt to fuse
2 The term Image, here, is used in its broadest meanings, as W. J . T. Mitchell exemplifies in the form  o f  a 
family tree, we would have the following categories: 1. Likeness, resemblance, similitude. 1.1 Graphic: 
pictures, statues, designs. 1.2. Optical: mirrors, projections. 1.3. Perceptual: sense data, “ species” , 
appearances. 1.4. Mental: dream s, memories, ideas, fantasmata. 1.5. Verbal: metaphors, descriptions 
(10).
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thought and feeling. Time, places and natural images, when they appear in Riding’s 
mindscapes, are never merely descriptive o f  an outer world o f  things, pure and simply, or even 
a Wordsworthian “ spontaneous overflow o f  powerful feelings.” On the contrary: they are 
always being questioned, made paradoxical, manipulated and, ultimately, surpassed by 
thought’s presence in the process o f  trying to make meaning o f  the world, in the process o f  
measuring it. In Riding’s increasingly stripping out o f  concrete references, natural objects and 
phenomena become wholly abstract, almost concepts.
In “ Sea, False Philosophy,” for instance, “Sea /  Is the spumed dust. /  Sifted into a 
metaphor /  A  slow dilution” {Poems 106). This is what happens also in the long meditative 
poem “The Why o f  the Wind” : “When the wind runs we run with it. /  We cannot understand 
because we are not /  When the wind takes our minds / [ • • • ] /  We must leam better /  What we 
are and are not. /  We are not the wind. /  We are not every vagrant mood that tempts /  Our 
minds to giddy homelessness” (Ibid. 293-94).^ Like the wind, things exist outside us, but we 
cannot measure our beings by merely comparing ourselves with nature, as the Romantics, 
Impressionists, and Imagists believed. On the contrary, things can only acquire meaning. 
Riding, when incorporated in the fabric o f thought. It is only by virtue o f  human language that 
things can participate in the performance o f  thought enacted by the poem that Riding decided 
to write. Thus, in the logic o f Riding’s mindscapes, it is self-knowledge, and not merely sensory 
perception and thinking in images, the best way to understand reality. Therefore, vision is 
defined by Riding as the achievement when one goes beyond the seen, when one transforms
5 A s Riding writes in The Te/Iing, die difference between the outer and physical world and the inner and 
human consciousness m ust be emphasized: the human being is marked by a continual experience that is 
tlie experience o f  being alive, o f  having a thinking mind. However, (Riding) Jackson  explains, “ tlie 
nature o f  our being is not to be known as we know the weather, which is by the sense o f  the 
momentary. Weather is all change, while our being, in its human nature, is all constancy”  (63). R iding’s 
view has points o f  contact widi Parmenides’s philosophy that assum es that reality is eternal and 
changeless.
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the seen into a “performance o f the mind” (“Looking Back” 41). Thus, the poem invites us to 
trust more our minds than our eyes: “The succession o f  fair things,” she writes in “There is 
Much at Work,” “Delights, does not enlighten. /  We still know nothing, nothing. /  Beauty will 
be truth but once” (Poems 79). Thus, in Riding’s poems, as Benjamin Friedlander has well 
observed, “ [t]he visible world is a synecdoche for thought— i^t’s as if things were actual pieces
o f  the intellect” (“Laura Riding” 37).
/■
In the mindscapes o f  Riding’s poems, differently from the surrealist irrational 
dreamscape or the imagist image-centered poem, the here and now o f language are posited as 
her humanistic and poetic goal: Riding manipulated time and space in order to question the 
relativity o f  historical time, space, and subjectivity, constructing poems that can be read as 
“scenes o f  thought.” As we shall see at the end o f  this chapter, in the masterpiece “Poet; A 
Lying Word,” the text becomes, “ literally,” a wall o f  words to be either faced or rejected by the 
reader. As a clear extension o f  her poetics, here the reader is challenged to take a more active 
role in the reading act, or, as the text invites, to “ speak as you see,” and to be aware o f  the 
representations that surround us. In my view, “Poet: A  Lying Word” is indisputably Riding’s 
last attempt to prove that “ existence in poetry” could become more real than “existence in 
time” (The Poems 412). Moreover, this poem previews her future and radical critique, because it 
accuses poetry, from its title, o f  being a barrier (“ a lying wall”) between human beings and the 
reality o f  the mind. Grounding poetrj% initially, as a place where a transcendental and never 
sufficiently explained signifier (Truth) could be achieved. Riding ended up creating in “ Poet: A 
Lying Word” an impasse, which she tried to solve by renouncing poetry altogether.
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Focusing on Riding’s Mindscapes“'
Thought looking out on th o u ^ t  
M akes one an eye.
One is the mind self-blind.
The other is thought gone
T o be seen from  afar and not known.
Thus is a universe very soon.
(Poem  95)
In the course o f my investigations o f  Riding’s poetry, and influenced by Charles 
Bernstein’s essays “Thought’s Measure” and “Writing and Method,” mindscapes appeared as 
an apt concept to describe those poems that are, in my opinion, Riding’s most successful ones: 
mindscapes are maps of awakened consciousness^  I use the term to distinguish it from the more 
familiar “ landscape,” which is closer to the idea o f an outdoor scenery and to a more 
referential poetics® (a piece o f  land that can be seen in a single look).
The key concept o f  mindscape— implying that what we think is our reality—^allows also a 
connection widi the poetics o f  Gerard Manley Hopkins and his notion o f  “ inscapes.”
 ^ Consulting the M LA bibliography and the archives o f  Cornell University and Ari2ona State 
University, 1 find that the only reference to this word (besides a few studies in the area o f  psychology) is 
G eorge G . Slusser and Eric S. Rabkin’s M indscapes: The Geography o f Imagined Worlds (Carbondale; 
Southern UP, 1989). In this book, however, “ m indscape”  is discussed solely in the context o f  science- 
fiction.
5 “The term consciousness is am biguous, referring to a number o f  phenomena,”  writes D avid  
Chalmers, who continues: “ Sometimes it is used to refer to a cognitive capacity, such as the ability to 
introspect or to report one’s mental states. Sometimes it is used synonymously with ‘awakeness.’ 
Sometimes it is closely tied to our ability to focus attention, or to voluntarily control our behavior”  (The 
Conscious M ind 6).
 ^ A s H effem an explains, “ [landscape] was at first used as a technical term for a picture presenting natural 
inland scenery, then it was also used to mean a particular tract o f  land that could be seen from  one point o f view, 
as i f  it  were a  picture', and finally it came to mean tlie whole o f  natural scenery”  (3 my italics).
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Although this poet (whom Riding greatly admired) never defined it categorically, “ inscape” can 
be explained in terms o f a compositional method that is discovered only on route, in movement, 
in process^ The mindscape-poems— as the first paragraph o f  “Opening o f  Eyes” quoted in the 
epigraph demonstrates— ^attempts to follow the gradual steps o f  rational thought, capturing the 
life o f  the mind in its challenge o f  making meaning o f  what is inside and outside itself.
It is exactly this aspect o f  a poetry that aims at capturing the thinking movement that 
approaches inscape and minds cape. Moreover, the latter term translates Riding’s humanistic, 
logocentric, and spatial understanding o f  language. These three points are encapsulated in the 
following statement made by Riding in Rational Meaning. “Language may be said to be the 
mind’s comprehension o f  the universe as the humanly occupied; and the occupation by the 
mind o f  language may be said to be the occupation by it o f  the universe in active, consdous.ly 
organi^d presenci' (492, emphasis added). From this view, as I shall demonstrate. Riding’s 
poems set as a goal that o f  being new places in thought. The goal o f  her reflective poetry is 
observed more clearly, in terms o f poetic form, in the rejection o f  traditional forms and meters 
and the adoption o f measure not as a given, but as something the poet discovers in 'the process 
o f  writing the poem (see Chapter 3). The writing places activated by Riding’s poems, however, 
reflise to be landscaped for the reader, presented with picturesque vistas, or translated in terms 
o f  analogies (or even described in its minute details, as the Imagist doctrine had set). Riding, as 
we have seen, was against the common-sensical view o f language as a transparent window 
through which we can see the world. Conversely, in her mindscapes the reader is constantly
We cannot forget, also, that, in A . Surv^, R iding and Graves elected H opkins, then recently re­
discovered, as a true “ m odem ist”  poet: “ We call him a m odem ist in virtue o f  his extraordinary 
strictness in the use o f  words and tlie unconventional notation he used in setting down so  that thty had 
to be understood as he meant them to be, or understood not at a ll (this is the whole crux o f  the w'hole question o f  
the intelligibility o f ‘difficult’ poetr^^” {Survg  90 italics original).
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frustrated in his desire to have something visible to hold on to (“blindness”  and “blind” are 
recurring words in her poems),®
Speaking o f  Riding’s poems, Lisa Samuels correctly observes that “Riding’s struggle with 
language’s ability to be the best place for humans to live is played out in self-questioning 
poems and self-dismantling fictions” (Poetic 67). We will see plenty o f  examples o f  this in the 
next pages. Anastasia Anastasiadou, from a more feminist viewpoint, observes that “ space 
constitutes for [Riding] a major means o f  self definition” (133). Commenting on the several 
geographic dislocations forced on Riding by personal and historical circumstances (U.S.-Egypt- 
England-Majorca-England-France-Switzerland-U.S.), Anastasiadou says that they mark “her 
constant preoccupation with space which serves as a metaphor for her quest for the 
recuperation o f  truth” (133). This can be confirmed, I would add, by means o f  the several 
spatial modes that she uses to articulate her mindscapes (besides the mind, o f  course). Riding 
uses extended metaphors typical o f the Metaphysical poets, where a same metaphor is worked 
out and questioned along the poem: the head (in “Pride o f  Head”); a newspaper page (in the 
earlier “The Fourth Estate”); a book (in “The Troubles o f a Book”); a map (in “The Map o f  
Places”); a web (in “Elegy in a Spider Web”); an island (in “The Map o f  Places,” “Laura and 
Francisca,” “There is no Land Yet”); earth itself (in “Earth,” “World’s End”); and, finally, a 
wall (in “Poet: A  Lying Word”). It is interesting to observe that the majority o f  these models 
are somewhat connected with writing surfaces: the newspaper, the page, the book, the map, 
and the wall. This idea o f  the poem as the articulation o f  a challenging and alternative place (a 
mindscape), where an utopian condition o f existehce (truth) could be lived, is expressed in 
these lines from “Laura and Francisca” :
* N ote how the process o f  creation and de-creation (pointed out by Samuels) operates in the last lines o f  
“ Tliere is N o  Land Yet” : “ 7\nd tlie dry land not yet, /  Lonely and absolute salvation—  /  Boasting o f  
constancy /  Like an island witli no water round /  In water where no land is”  (Poems 188).
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But I think this is enough to show 
My poem is not travel whimsy,
Or that mind’s masquerade called fiction.
But a poem, that is, a fact 
Standing alone, an island,
A  little all that more grows 
According to the trouble you can take.
(Poem  348)
Each poem aims at becoming, thus, a limit-experience o f  language, which the reader can 
or cannot decide to join. The result o f  this spatial and rational understanding o f  language is a 
poetry dense and highly intellectual, procedural, and that has the tendency o f  progressively 
stripping o ff itself from external references (thus the “abstract” quality o f  Riding’s poetry). All 
the procedures undertaken by Riding’s mindscapes have the very precise goal o f  delivering a 
deeper and universal truth: that we, as human and thinking beings, are in a permanent 
condition called language. The following poems exemplify how far Laura Riding went in order 
to achieve this limit condition.
“The Map of Places” ’
Conventionally, maps are a way to organize geographic or spatial data to be used in 
human activities. A map functions as a mediator between a person and the environment, 
helping the person to manage or navigate the environment. It seems precisely the dismantling
5 For the reader’s convenience, the full text o f  the five main poem s winch constitute my corpus is 
herein enclosed as an Appendix.
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o f  this traditional and referential view o f mapping— a^nd, therefore, o f language— that is 
approached in “The Map o f  Places.” The poem is a suitable entry to Riding’s mindscapes, 
since it has taken on the task o f  discovering new human places that do not exist on any map.
The poem begins with a paradox: this map, although fixed on paper, not only physically 
moves but also “passes,” so that now even its own body is tearing apart (with the element o f  
“death,” thus, implicit in the very first Une). The reader is informed that land and water are not 
what they were “before ships happened there.” But where is this “ there” ? When did ships 
“happen” ? And what is the “all” that is found? How can the reader possibly locate him /herself 
in what is being mapped? The poem gives no clues. Moreover, in this Adamic, tautological 
place, things have intrinsic meanings: they “are” literally what they “are.” Words inhabit this
meaningless “here,” before Man has “ found” this here as a new land, and, in the process, has 
transformed the “here” into a “ there” (perhaps, a British colony?)^®. Time is uncertain: the 
shipwrecked stand “now” on “naked names,” but even the paper, we are informed, is read 
“ancientiy” (as when we find an old newspaper with “news” that became “ old”). The 
consequence for the reader is to be found in the same position o f  the shipwrecked: lost in this 
non-place (thus u-topian), standing on “naked names” (?), left with “no geographies in the 
hand” to map oneself The stanza articulates, I believe, a primordial condition o f  existence 
where meaning does not exist yet, before the actual naming by new-comers, as if it were a 
sand-beach without inscriptions. But, what is next?
Curiously, the second stanza begins with the adverb o f time (“Now”), a word that 
reappears in the last line, curiously linked with the indicative o f  place (“here”), forming
Is Riding making, on a subtle level, a critique o f  England’s colonialist project? I think so: m “ Laura 
and Francisca,”  where Riding meditates on her life in the island o f  M ajorca, we have the following lines: 
“ England is knowledge’s self-doubt: /  Whatever lies beyond makes here /  Aii island in a sea o f  there.! 
From  England sailed sly  heroes /  T o  stretch an empire o f  interrogation /  As far as maia could tliink— /  
W ithout forgetting die way back to silence”  (Poem  345 my italics).
150
“nowhere.” To complicate matters, the last word o f  the poem can be read, paradoxically, as a 
“now-here” that is, in the same breath, a “no-where.” As the OED  defines it, “nowhere” 
means “not anywhere,” “not in or at any place,” “a place that does not exist,” “ an unknown 
place,” but also “an inhabited place, many miles firom nowhere, on a dismal desert island.” 
Thus, the sense o f temporal indeterminacy and spatial displacement is again mimicked by the 
words that make this “ map o f  places.” When everything is mapped out, the poem ironically 
seems to be asserting, all tliat remains is a feeling o f being nowhere. However, this place can be 
potentially filled with human meaning, with the awareness o f  the mind at work.
Another possibility o f  a close reading o f  “The Map o f  Places” can be found in the 
strategic use o f italics. Rare in Riding’s poetry, they seem to complicate the problem o f  space 
and mapping tliat the poem articulates: tlie words berv and bere are italicized in the same line, 
right after the word reads. E . A. Levenston reminds us, in his book The Stuff of Literature-Physical 
Aspects of Texts and Their Relation To Literary Meaning that in the long story o f  its use, italic has 
maintained some basic meanings: firstly, as a typographical representation o f  handwriting; 
secondly, for presenting words in languages other than English (usually Latin); thirdly," for ' 
“occasions in plays when characters are reading messages or letters” (93); and, in recent prose 
writing, to convey thought. In short, italic is used in a text as an extra-device o f  meaning, 
calling our attention onto a particular word. That is why one can say that the italic, in “The 
Map o f  Places,” is strategically placed in die stanza in order to “ involve the reader’s visual 
encounter with the text, in the arguments which the text is making,” as McGann suggests in 
another context (Textual Condition 105). This idea o f  change o f places in language is 
demonstrated even at the level o f sound play: isolating some words, the reader can see how 
this articulation o f displacement is being dramatized in die poem:
Are where 
When here
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are
were
here
there.
everywhere.
nowhere.
This exercise in “defonnative reading” shows that, unlike “pointers” in a map, the 
demonstratives have not much use for readers looking for specific references, in the 
expectation o f  something to happen. The group o f words, detached from the rest o f  the text, 
makes clear how they are being charged to reinforce, in their own physical features, the global 
problem o f “The Map o f  Places.” Here, italics are being used to emphasize the “newness” o f 
language implicit in Riding’s jioetics. They are referring to the very words in front o f the reader 
in the moment o f  reading this specific poem, which has the paradoxical character o f  a fleeting 
map (the words o f  the poem in the white space o f  the page, the time o f  reading). The 
displacement o f  temporality in this poem— which is also a displacement in the temporality o f 
reading—^reinforces die idea o f  the poem itself not merely as a “map o f places” but as a place 
in its own right: the space o f  language, where the articulation o f  meaning takes place, but 
where each word inhabits a specific and proper site. The fixed location o f  words on the page is 
activated by the reading process, and indicates not points o f  reference but a shifting ground, 
one that is always postponed. In language, “places” can pass. In language, one can be here and 
“ out there” at the same time. Thus, tlie poem calls the reader’s attention to the paradoxical
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play o f  presence and absence made possible in the writing process. Therefore, all the graphic 
and verbal apparatus o f  meaning at work in Riding’s poems— t^he use o f italics, the play o f  
adverbs, paradoxes— i^s not only part o f  the poem’s argument and structure, but also embodies 
the relativity o f  our cognitive mappings o f  reality.
Near the end o f  the poem, we are faced with another obstacle: we are informed that now 
“ Death meets itself everywhere” and, as consequence, “Holes in maps look through to 
nowhere.” How to solve the enigmatic nature o f  this last line? What to make o f  it? I suggest 
that these “holes,” following the metalinguistic level o f  the poem that I see as being articulated, 
can be taken not only as the person’s eyes— “eyes in nights are holes,” she writes in another 
poem— but also as the words being read. As a map, diis poem stands between the 
reader/explorer and the environment, but here
H *le s  inm aps i * * k  through t *  n*w here.
My intervention is made to emphasize what Riding’s mindscape is doing here: the attempt to 
lead the reader to a place outside history and time, as if to a place “behind the page.” This 
image o f  paper as a “ flimsy wall” (presented in an early poem, “The Fourth Estate”), as well 
the “ literal” wall o f  words in “Poet: A  Lying Word,” reinforces my point. To support my 
reading o f  this last line, consulting the O ED  I have found, for instance, that look-thwugh refers 
to the texture and formation o f  a sheet o f  paper when examined by transmitted light.” 
Illustrative o f  a self-deconstructive or de-creative aspect o f  her poetics, the line seems to 
indicate that the place the reader is examining through to these “black holes,” at the end o f  the 
poem, is a place o f darkness, or death, the very absence o f  language. Or, as we find in another 
poem whose subtitle is, ironically. How the Poem Ends”— “ For death’s now like earth on 
which you stand /  And only readable by looking near” (Poems 356)—what the reader finds on
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this map are not points o f  reference but only “holes” through which one can find not reality, 
but a “nowhere.” ”
In manipulating the extended metaphor o f  maps in “The Map o f Places” and other 
mindscapes, Riding developed a radical critique o f  representation. She writes in Epilogue that 
we have failed in trying to express entirety (as in maps, .history, dictionaries) rather than 
covering them up, as “ a map is covered with places instead o f  being placer (“Politics and 
Poetry” 16, my italics). That is the advantage o f  poetry over any traditional mapping. It can be 
a place in fact, instead o f  merely a representation o f piece o f  land in its entirety. Only the poem 
can be a  place in its entirety, because it injects this previously meaningless entirety with meaning.
In this specific poem, I believe. Riding is also subtly criticizing the quest for utopias, for 
power at any cost, the blind faith in progress, and the overwhelming political and historical 
pressure o f  the Zeitgeist. As the Epilogue thesis o f  the end o f  history demonstrates. Riding 
considered that the time-element alienated people from the task o f  self-knowledge, so crucial 
for her project. She also criticized our increasing dependence on the “news,” which served as a 
kind o f  modem substitute for history. Riding aimed 'at achieving a degree o f  self that she 
describes sometimes as “ finality,” sometimes as “ truth,”  sometimes (as here in “The Map o f  
Places”) as “death.” The price o f  this radical individualism, however, is a sense o f  isolation one 
finds in her poems. The poem demonstrates, in its own procedural moves, a problem felt by 
Riding and well identified by Lisa Samuels: that “continuing in the presently configured 
historical world will lead only to ‘death,’ to a finishing o f the se lf’ (Poetic 130).
”  In a letter written in 1979, Riding makes a positive definition o f  death: “ Death is the reality o f  the 
necessity o f  an end, for that which has a limit. But the com ing to a term o f  the limited is not mere 
predestinated nullification: the m ark o f  the end is the mark o f  rightness, and so deatli has, thus, aspects 
o f  significance and character which spell the perfect and true, not mortality and loss”  (qtd. in “ Laura 
(R iding Jackson,”  by Alan J .  Clark).
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A striking statement made by Riding in Epilogue might help to clarify what I believe to be 
another key to “The Map o f  Places” : Riding writes that “ to tiy to know truth through historical 
knowledge is Uke trying to see death with living ^es’ ’{Epilogue II, 4-5 my emphasis, qt. in Poetic). Let us 
try a parallelism, using the words o f  the poem: “ Holes in maps” (“historical knowledge”) look 
(“with living eyes”) through to nowhere (to “death”). Thus, the dismantling o f  reference and 
the incisive critique on the constraints o f  the Zeitgeist observed in the poem advance a post­
modern moment o f  suspicion: the failure o f  historicity as well as o f  language to name the 
world tmthfially. Or, as Riding writes in one o f  the epigrams o f  “Echoes” : “ . . .  cheated history 
— /  Which stealing now has only then /  And stealing us has only them” {Poem  73).
Mapping other Mindscapes
Riding’s definition o f the poem as having the capability to create a vacuum in experience, 
as we have seen in Chapter 3, and poetry as a condition o f  “ finality”— 3. continuous poetic 
habitation— clearly reflects her existentialist sense o f  language as an alternative and permanent 
place, able to make room for a truer human self, less fragmented by traditional and patriarchal 
hierarchies, as well as communicational, political, and gender boundaries. In poems such as 
“World’s End,” “Laura and Francisca,” “There is N o Land Yet,” “Earth,” “Yes and N o ,” 
“Poet: A  Lying Word,” and “Nothing So Far,” Riding created new verbal geographies, 
building, in the process, a kind o f  post-modern verbal displacement avant-la-lettre.
Riding’s radical notion o f  the end o f  history and the abolition o f time— ^advanced during 
the period o f  her magazine Epilogue (1935-37)— must be taken into consideration for a better 
understanding o f  her mindscapes. Decades before the post-modern thesis o f  “ the end o f 
history,” Riding announced, in the pages o f  her magazine, nothing less than the “discovery” o f
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a post-historical worid: “We plan to give all the news, and in the tranquility o f  there is no new 
news to come, and the leisure to open the files at any day, at any subject.. ..All the historical 
events have happened” (“Preliminaries” 2).
The abolition o f  the historical time is frequently played out in her poems, indicating, at 
the same time, the discovery o f  the alternative time o f  the self and o f  consciousness, the time 
o f  individual/universal existence. In “G oat and Amalthea,” for instance, the speaker discovers 
to be living in a fifth  season: “ I have come with Amalthea in my veins /  Into a fifth season. 
Time is more than slow. /  For winter is over, yet I see no summer. /  Now it is always snow” 
if^ oems 47). Or, as a concrete poet would put it, emphasizing more clearly, through layout and 
spatialization, the materiality o f  language and its movement:
n o w
a y
w
n o w
In this deformative reading, one can literally follow the phonemes that form the words in the 
line literally “ falling” through the white page (into themselves, so to speak). In the slow 
timelessness o f  the poem, “now” “ snows.” This erasure o f  historical time and elements that 
bring temporal ideas (seasons, the weather, for instance) occurs simultaneously with a process 
o f  erasing o f concrete reference. In “The Wind, The Clock, The We,” the speaker inhabits a 
place where “ time becomes a landscape /  Painted as fast as unpainted.” This is a place where 
“ the wind has at last got into the clock—  /  Every minute for itself /  There’s no more six
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twelve, /  There’s no more twelve, /  It’s as late as it’s early” (Ibid. 181). After following the 
disappearance o f  time as well as o f  the things in this landscape— with men, sea, ships, wind, 
clock, and wind “ swallowing” one another, so to speak— (he speaker directly addresses the 
words, the only entities remaining in the vacuum created by the poem: “At last we can make 
sense, you and I, /  You lone survivors on paper” (Ibid.).
This dismantiing o f  chronological time witiiin tiie poem as well as the impulse to create, 
by means o f  the poem’s difficulty, a vacuum in experience, occurs in many other poems. In 
one o f  them, whose tide is, ironically, “Tale o f  Modernity,” die speaker finds that “Time was a 
place where earth had been” (Ibid. 139). In “Midsummer Duet,”  the poet is “cooled in a 
timeless standstill /  As ourselves from house to sea we move /  Unmoving, on dumb shores 
[ ...]” (Ibid. 141). In a poem whose paradoxical titie is “Autobiography o f tiie Present,” after 
announcing to have survived “the time extreme,” the speaker reports her next goal after the 
experience o f  “death” : “Yes, she remembers all that seemed, /  All that was like enough to 
now, /  To make a then as actual as then. /  To make a now that succeeds only /  By a more 
close resemblance to itself (Ibid. 174). In Riding’s utopia o f  language, there is the suggestion 
that historical time be replaced by the “newness” '" o f  mind at work. N ot surprisingly, as I have 
counted, tiie word “now” appears notiiing less than 230 times in tiie 181 poems o f  Colkcted 
Poems. She defined tiiis condition o f  “now” as “a vivid reality o f  thought” (“Preliminaries” 5).
In order to arrive at a better understanding o f  Riding’s mindscapes (such as “Elegy in a 
Spider Web,” “Eartii,” and “Disclaimer o f  the Person”), it is interesting to know something 
about the personal and historical context in which they were written. After her suicidal attempt 
in 1929—when she miraculously survived from a fall from the third floor o f  a building, and
Riding coins the word “ nowness”  in the beautiful autobiographical poem  “Memories o f  Mortalities,”  
where “ death”  appears as a kind o f  Bergsonian duration: “ Then comes pure death, the grace compelled.
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after spending months recovering in a hospital bed, after several surgeries— ^Riding believed 
she had actually died, and that she was experiencing what she refers to, in a poem, as a 
“ suicidal resurrection.” This tragic event led her to the decision o f  reconstructing herself: to 
build a purer and more spiritual self (Wexler xvii). With the move to the Spanish island o f 
Majorca, where she lived and worked for seven years in a small village, surrounded by 
followers and “ disciples,”  Riding’s utopian and apocalyptic^^ sense that historical time had 
ended echoes the post-modern consciousness o f  history as a barbaric and monumental 
collection o f  data. In those extremely ideological times. Riding was annoyed by the fact that 
people were either becoming increasingly “media-ized,” or subjecting too easily to ideologies 
and relying more on “images o f  experiences” than on factual experiences. As a prophet, at this 
time she believed that thought (through a world web communication), and not political action, 
is what could save the world (then on the verge o f  World War II) from the imminent chaos. 
The irony is that the Epilogue thesis—which predates the recent, post-Cold War debate—was 
dramatically interrupted by the outbreak o f  the Spanish Civil War (1936). This historical fact, 
which forced both her and Graves back to London, was followed by the outbreak o f  World 
War II, in 1939, which may have influenced her decision to return to the United Sates, in the 
same year.
Paradoxically, and especially for an intellectual who rejected the Zeitgeist so violently, the 
apocalyptic tone o f  mindscapes such as “World’s End,” “Earth,” “When Love Becomes 
Words” and “The Life o f  the Dead” ''* not only captures the sense o f  imminent catastrophe but
/  Duration cleansed of day-change. / / I n  such rhythm of neamess, nextness, nowness, /  From present 
arrestation borne a motion /  Motionless toward present progress” <J>oems 255).
'3 Apocaljpse means, etymologically, an uncovering, a revelation, or a discovery. It is also the name of 
certain Jewish or Christian prophetic writings, which, as we know, contain terrifying revelations 
conceming humanity’s destiny.
I“* This poem, placed separately in the Collected Poems in the section T-iistories,’ is a striking experiment: 
Riding asked a painter, the friend John vMdridge, to execute a series of tableaux that she had imagined.
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is also indicative o f  a more general crisis (of the human being, o f  representation) at the core o f  
modernism. “How do we know that history no longer exists? By the degree that history exists 
in thought rather than in things,” (20), she argues in “The End o f the World, and After,” 
published in Epilogue III.
The idea o f  the end o f  history, time, and the attempt to make language capture a utopian 
“now and here” appears again and again throughout the Collected Poems. In “World’s End,” the 
Biblical moment o f  Apocaljpse is presented not as the destruction o f  the world, but as the 
death o f  the individual self (body and mind):
The tympanum is worn thin.
The iris is become transparent.
The sense has overlasted. ,
Speed has caught up with speed.
Earth rounds out earth.
The mind puts the mind by.
Clear spectacle: where is the eye?
(Poems 111)
In this stark landscape, the human mind has failed to articulate the meaning o f  existence, to 
think by itself Why? By trusting more in what came from the outside than exercising its power 
to inject meaning in the world. Thus, the end o f  the world is when the organs o f  the senses are 
wasted, when one cannot locate even oneself in space (not even the I/eye). The consequences 
for this are clear, and tragic:
All is lost, no danger 
Forces the heroic hand.
Riding then wrote, in French, a poem  to each picture. Tlien, she “ translated”  her own poem s into
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No bodies in bodies stand 
Oppositely. The complete world 
Is likeness in every comer.
The names o f  contrast fall 
Into the widening centre.
A  dry sea extends the universal.
(Ibid.)
In this post-historical situation, however. Riding presents humanity as standardization and 
failure. There is no more individuality, only a sameness. Instead o f  visibility and light, we have 
blindness and darkness. Interestingly enough, Robert Graves decided to close his war 
autobiography with this poem.
In “Earth,” the theme o f  language’s timelessness and the obsession with language as a 
place o f  thought returns:
1 Have no wide fears for Earth:
2 Its universal name is ‘Nowhere’.
3 I f  it is Earth to you, that is your secret.
4 The outer records leave o ff  there,
5 And you may write it as it seems,
6 And as it seems, it is,
7 A seeming stillness
8 Amidst seeming speed.
9 Almost the place is not yet,
English.
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10 Potential here o f  everywhere-
11 Have no wide fears for it:
12 Its destiny is simple,
13 To be further what will be.
14 Earth is your heart
15 Which has become your mind
16 But still beats ignorance
17 Ofall it knows—
18 As miles deny the compact present
19 Whose self-mistrusting past they are.
20 Have no wide fears for Earth:
21 Destruction only on wide fears shall fall.
(Ibid. 150)
As a mindscape, “Earth,” in my view, not only expands die theme o f “The Map o f  Places,” but 
also highlights some self-destructive (or self-deconstructed) aspects o f  Riding’s poems. As an 
accumulation o f  historical and mnemonic data, the past miles (official history) deny the 
“compact present” that tiie speaker is building for her self (although this self is presented as 
still ignorant o f  itself). Only those who fear to face themselves, the poem seems to be claiming, 
must be afraid o f  the world’s end. In the logic constructed in Riding’s poem, self-knowledge 
appears as a cure for the self-blindness o f  the Zeitgeist.
Lines 5-8 show that, although Riding claimed to have rejected music and imagery in her 
poetry, in passages such as tiiis she was very close to the ideal set by Paul Valéry o f  poetry as 
the hesitation between sound and sense:
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And you may write it as iLieems,
And as it seems, it is,
A seeming jrillnm 
Amidj'/ iiaming jpeed.
(Ibid.)
Here we have sound not as merely ornamental, but engendering meaning, intensifying the 
poem’s content. The beautiful sequence o f  consonances and assonances, with words saturating
one another, points out to what Roman Jakobson has called the poetic function o f  language: 
when language calls attention to itself, to its own “being” and occurrence, to its own 
movement o f  meaning.
One is able to describe earth by describing it as it seems, by being truthful to what earth 
really is: movement and stillness, appearing to be in inertia and in motion simultaneously. 
Words themselves achieve this feature, for instance, in line 14; “Earth is your heart” (emphasis 
mine). After the brief interval that comes after reading “ earth” (“ is your”), comes the word 
“ heart.” By a slight shift in the position o f  a letter (/h /), earth becomes a heart. The “h” at the 
edge o f  the word “earth” disappears, so to speak, reappearing in the beginning o f  the word 
“ heart” (thus making a striking image: the heart as a rotational earth!). In this poem, language is 
not only able to imitate earth’s movements (rotation/translation), but also to absorb it, 
linguistically, as Riding does with the play o f  earth/heart'^. Moreover, the sibilant sequence 
(with its j-’s and ifs) heightens this idea o f speed. Sounds recur, but always bringing a slightly 
different meaning. As “now” and “ snow,” “word” and “world,” the words “earth” and “heart”
1 add here what Bernstein says in A  Poetics. “That’s what poem s map; how you get from  one detail to 
another— one morpheme or m om ent or element to the next. A  poem, to appropriate D ucham p’s 
phrase, is a  network o f details or stoppages. O r else m aps define and prefix— scleroticize— the dom ain o f  
poetic activity”  (168).
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contain each other in their graphic features. In the mindscapes, this is a common device to 
display the double nature o f  language, as well as to show its capability to appear to be motion 
and stillness at the same time. Words seem to be fixed on the page (“a seeming stillness”), but 
they also seem to begin to move as soon as we begin to read them (“a seeming speed”). The 
alliterative and consonantal play illustrates the paradox Riding saw present in poetic meaning: 
movement as permanence, writing as a still motion, a constant deferral (maybe willing to 
achieve what Eliot has called, in “Burnt Norton,” the “still point o f  a turning world” ?) (Tbe 
Compkte Poems 14).
In “Earth,” again, one is thrown in a paradoxical atmosphere o f  permanence and flux: 
“ in a time before Eardi was,” making “you” (die reader? Language?) move “Toward perfect 
now.” However, as with many other poems, this promise o f  language as redemptive, as a 
“perfect now,” is deconstructed in the next stanza: “Almost the place is not yet, /  Potential 
here o f  everywhere.” Traditional measuring (the “mile” o f  memory, so to speak) is insufficient 
to capture “ the compact present” desired by the powerful self, who declares that its “destiny is 
simple. /  To be fiirther what will be.” The past must be wholly rejected so that language as a 
place o f  permanence is achieved. In Riding’s utopia, truth had to come in the process o f 
language itself.
The reader may ask why I have concentrated my analysis on “The Map o f  Places” . I do 
so because this poem is a synthesis o f  the problems set by Riding in the majority o f  her poems. 
It would contribute to my discussion to add here Benjamin Friedlander’s insight on this 
specific poem. He points out that “The Map o f  Places” is a meditation on a Jewish theme, that 
o f  the exile, and observes that “ it describes a homelessness that has nothing to do with 
nationalism.” [...] Her best poems have that mix o f  anger, resignation, and common sense I 
associate with the Jews o f  the diaspora” (“ Letter” 164-5). To my knowledge, Friedlander is the
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only scholar who has placed Riding’s mindscapes in the context o f the Jewish tradition. 
Expanding Friedlander’s insight, I would apply it to all the poems mentioned and discussed so 
far. Mallorca, curiously, was the place were the early Jewish mariners established a homeland, 
and Riding knew that. It would be interesting to contextualize Riding’s strange mindscapes 
within a marvelous heritage o f  displacement and exile that marks the Jewish tradition along 
history. The Jewish element o f  Riding’s mindscapes works almost as a metaphor, related more 
to the sense o f  exile and displacement one senses in reading her poems, as well as in her 
building o f  a visionary poetics that claims a universal mind, which inserts these poems in the 
tradition studied by Jerome Rothenberg in Exiledfrom the W orli^ .
In their attempt to do away with historical, Christian time. Riding’s mindscapes ended 
up replacing the Zeitgeist o f  the modems with the Benjaminian Jeit^tzeit {nunc stans), thus 
creating a model o f  what the latter called “Messianic time.” For Riding, the “death” o f  history 
had to be simultaneous with the birth o f  an atemporal and universal mind, o f  a finality o f  
consciousness. There is no “once upon a time” in the “ time o f  the now” enacted by her 
poem^. In Order to offer altemative models o f  perception, she invites the reader to replace the 
concept o f  time and history for space and for the mapping o f  language that occurs in the 
experience o f  thought. In order to overcome the Zeitgeist and the constraints o f  space, 
nationalistic, and political borders. Riding had to found her own linguistic utopia, to find new 
geographies, “ to reach somewhere while it’s still now” {Poems 152). During the 1930s Riding 
was reaffirming the superiority o f  poetry over history as a form o f knowledge: “A  poet,” she 
states in Epilogue, “purifies his age o f  historical appearances. He translates time into a condition
1*5 Rothenberg includes in this ancient tradition elements and sources as the following: stories such as 
Lilith’s, apocalyptic visionaries, the visionary poetry of the Jewish, Christian and Gnostics, Kabbala, 
discourses and mystic hymns, the magical tradition of a poetry of naming and invocation, which 
Rothenberg identifies, in contemporary America, in poets who frequently present an experimental and
164
o f meaning, replaces ‘objective’ experiences with poems. Poems are the structural parts o f  
permanent entirety” (“Politics “ 19). Riding’s view is wholly against the stream o f  the 
hegemonic poetic discourses circulating in the 1920s and 1930s, marked by Auden’s political 
poetry, Eliot’s mythical method, as well as Pound’s investment on history.
Poetry as Thinking
“Our relation to reality,” wrote Wittgenstein, “ is accomplished in the activity o f  thinking. 
The doubling o f  I and world is mirrored in the activity o f  thinking. Accordingly language is the 
authentic medium in which world and I double one another. [...] When I think in language 
there are not ‘meanings’ going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions; the 
language itself is the vehicle o f  thought” (qtd. in Brand 329). The idea o f  thinking as action, as 
stated above—-thinking not as a previous entity whose content is separate from its form but 
tliat is achieved in the act o f  performing language— is one o f  the main investigations o f  Laura 
Riding’s rational poetry. Different from an irrational surrealist poem or the Imagist epiphany, 
to name only two poetic manifestations at Riding’s time, her poems enact a poetics o f  
awareness, o f  total attention to the words that are being uttered, as this crucial passage o f  “By 
Crude Rotation” reveals;
To my lot fell
By trust, false signs, fresh starts,
A slow speed and a heavy reason 
A visibility o f  blindedness— these thoughts—
And dien content, the language o f the mind
apparently anti-Jewish approach, such as Gertrude Stein, Louis Zukofsky, Allen Gm sberg, Jack son
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That knows no way to stop.
(Poems 107)
The language o f the mind that knows no way to stop. Could there be a better description o f  
Riding’s obsessive poetics? Does not Riding’s mindscape aim at capturing “ the feeling o f  what 
happens,” that is, the workings o f  consciousness? It is necessary to be blind to acquire 
visionary insight. Riding asserts. Thought is affirmative and active by nature, as William Blake 
remarked.
Riding was critical o f  the pictorial view o f language and, specifically, o f  the view o f 
poetry as image (accused o f  being “ false signs” , in this poem). As we recall, she and Graves 
defined the poem as something that does not render “a picture or idea existing outside the 
poem, but presents the literal substance o f  poetry, a newly created thought-activity: the poem
has the character o f  a creature o f  itself’ (Survey 118). As a creature, this organism moves by 
“ fresh starts,” although its “ crude rotation” is doted with “ slow speed” and a “heavy reason,” 
and it is unstoppable. For Riding, thus, poetry is less a painting or a photograph, less a 
description and more a process o f  discovering things in the act o f  discovering them, in tlie act 
o f  speaking and writing them out. It is something that can only become meaning when read. 
Riding is more interested in capturing the physical and mental phenomena o f  consciousness 
(“ the feeling o f  what happens,” as Antonio Damasio so aptly described it (28)).
Beyond the Web
The stuttering slow grammarian o f  se lf
(Poems 254)
M aclxiw  and, why not, Laura Riding.
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As I have been discussing so far, the unification o f  words (as linguistic actualities) and 
thought (their uses and meanings) is taken by Riding as a poetic and humanistic goal. As the 
main human communication medium, words could unify the dualities o f  mind and body in the 
experience o f  poetry. One o f  the procedures used by Riding to achieve this aim was the 
combination o f  the meditative mode, together with repetition, and syntactical displacement. In 
the mindscapes “Beyond” and “Elegy in a Spider Web,” these procedures allow the reader to 
follow a mind thinking, with its hesitations, doubts, repetition, and ideas. The result is poems 
such as “Beyond,” where words are transformed into echo chambers o f meaning, while their 
“progress” displays the simultaneous phenomena o f  linguistics and bodily experiences. In 
“Elegy in a Spider Web,” “Beyond,” and, I would add here, “Disclaimer of the Person,” words 
vibrate with the minimalism not unlike the poems o f  Gertrude Stein and the later Samuel 
Beckett. On the other hand, repetition could be used, according to Graves and Riding’s praise 
o f  the use o f it in Stein, for its effect o f  “breaking down the possible historical senses still 
inherent in words” {Survey 285). In these two poems, repetition and difference become 
simultaneously possible, part o f  the poem’s rhythmical basis, good examples o f  how Riding’s 
poetry pushes meaning to its limit.
BEY O N D
1 Pain is impossible to describe
2 Pain is the impossibility o f  describing
3 Describing what is impossible to describe
4 Which must be a thing beyond description
5 Beyond description not to be known
6 Beyond knowing but not mystery
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7 N ot mystery but pain not plain but pain
8 But pain beyond but here beyond.
{Poems 128)
The poem has the structure o f  a mantra, or a meditation. The minimal choice o f  words is 
evident from the start in its seven lines, “pain” is repeated three times, “ describe” and 
“ description,” five, and “ beyond” is repeated six times (including the title). Breaking the 
normal syntax, the permutation o f  phrases proliferates meaning while articulating what could 
be called a grammar o f  sensations. Abstract words, thus, by being used minimally, are 
presented almost as if they were concrete entities in this mindscape. Although “pain” and 
“plain” have similar sounds, it is their different meanings that is emphasized. Each line o f  this 
mindscape is repeated in the next with a slight variation, altering the precedent statement, thus 
mimicking the process o f  thought (“ knowing”) and sensation (“pain”) undergone by the 
thinking subject. I f  we read it aloud, we can also hear words “pealing” through the reiterated 
dental and labial consonants {ds and f s ,p 's  and b's), thus embodying the leitmotiv o f  the 
poem: the duration and the knowledge o f  pain. This “pealing” effect can be better described if 
we highlight the sounds through capitals and bold:
1 PAIN is IMpossible to describe
\
2 PAIN is the IMpossibility o f  describING
3 D escribIN g what is IM possible to describe
4 Which must be a thINg beyONd descriptiON
5 BeyONd descriptiON not to be knOWN
6 BeyONd knOWINg but not mystery
7 N ot mystery but PAIN not PLAIN but PAIN
8 But PAIN beyONd but here beyONd.
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At the same time, the structural technique o f  “beginning again and again” is apt to 
describe the nowness o f  language and o f  die physical experience the poem is capturing. 
Through this graphic emphasis, one can also perceive that words such as “be” and “ being” 
echo th rou ^  the poem. The physical and sonorous similarity between/»az« and plain point out, 
again, to the physicality o f  meaning: pain is produced by the body (thus a private experience), 
although it cannot be properly described (made understandable), because it is far from human 
reach. Althoug^i the words have similar sounds, the poem adverts the reader to take each as 
each, as though unambiguous, as if they had only one meaning. Each word has to preserve its 
linguistic integrity. However, we are wrong if we think that we can properly define a sensation 
such as pain only by looking inwards. In the logic o f  Riding’s mindscape, “pain,” like “ truth,” 
or “ self,” is characterized by the impossibility o f  description. These concepts are always 
paradoxically here and beyond (the poem’s original title was “Here Beyond”): it may be a 
sensation for one who expresses it (it is “ here”), but even then its “meaning” is always 
escaping from oneself (“beyond”)'^ (In Riding, explanations o f  “pain” or “ truth” are always 
postponed), as a paradigm o f conscious experience (which includes visual, auditory, emotions, 
visual experiences etc.) “Pain” cannot be explained because words are inherendy limited in 
what they can communicate. It is the most private experience that human beings can 
experience, and the most difficult to explain. “Pain” must be taken literally and not as 
something mysterious or be translated into something else. Even its individuality as a word 
must be respected: “pain” is “pain,” it is neither “plain” nor translated into a n j^ in g  else.
It must be added that “Beyond” establishes a subtle dialogue with a poem of Emily Dickinson’s: 
“Pain— has an Element of Blank— /  It cannot recollect /  When it begun—or if it were /  A time 
when it was not— /  /  It has no Future—but itself—Its infinite contain /  Its past—enlightened to 
perceive /  New Periods—of Pain” {Poems 7)24).
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“Beyond” articulates, thus, a paradox inherent in language: to describe what cannot be 
described, what is in the body (here) and in a realm beyond the body (beyond). As a creature in 
itself, this poem is able to reunify thought and feeling and to demonstrate how mind and body 
cannot be separated in the experience o f  pain. Like truth, and the mind, pain is intangible. The 
poem, instead o f being about someone in pain, not only rejects description but also prefers to 
make language incorporate in its movement the experience o f  pain itself.
In the 151 lines o f  “Elegy in a Spider Web” the poetic text is literally transformed in a 
web o f  multiple utterances that are continually rupturing one another, with syntax making 
every meaning and word alter one another:
What to say when the spider 
Say when the spider what 
When the spider the spider what 
The spider does what 
Does does dies does it not 
N ot live and then not 
Legs legs then none 
When the spider does dies 
Death spider death 
Or not the spider or 
What to say when 
To say always [...]
(Poem  91)
Again, the “elegy” (originally a death poem) gives Riding the opportunity of, textually, 
dramatizing the limits between speech -and silence, self and other, life and death. From the title.
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we are adverted that what we will read is an elegy within a spider web, and not about a spider 
web. As with the use o f  the metaphor o f  map in “The Map o f  Places,” Riding has chosen the 
web as a spatial model for her mindscape. During its reading, by means o f the poem ’s syntax 
and lack o f  punctuation, it is difficult for the reader to determine where the “lyric I” begins 
and “the other” ends. What is being said? Is the “ I” the spider? “Death” itself? The Genii? In 
the poem’s language, the subjects keep changing positions, when they are not linked by force. 
While one “voice” seems to be trying to say “What to say when the spider dies,” the flow is 
always interrupted, interrogated by other “voices” : “The spider does what?,” “The dying o f  oh 
pity /  How through dies.” The hallucinatory polyphony obtained in the text, as in minimalist 
music, is made through the adding o f  successive layers-lines, thus causing syntactical 
displacements that allow new meanings. Sentence fragments are introduced and blended with 
what was already said (“ the genii who cannot cease to know,” “ legs legs than none”), thus 
progressively enlarging and complicating the previous statements:
When I or the spider
Dead or alive the dying o f
Who cannot cease to know
Who death who I
The spider who when
What to say when
Who cannot cease
Who cannot
Cannot cease
Cease
Cannot
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Death
I
We
The Genii 
To know
What to say when the 
Who cannot 
Whea the spider what
(Ibid. 91)
Repetition, in the case o f  this poem, always brings difference. Or, as Riding speaks in 
“ Then Follows” : “There is ahvays difference somewhat /  When meanings differ .somewhat” 
(Ibid. 168). The poem clearly indicates that, for Riding, identity and subjectivity exist only in 
the movement o f  meaning, as a process. Or, as the poem interrogates itself: “Who say the I.” 
In fact, what marks the poem is the successive shift o f  subject positions: “When I or the 
spider,” “No I and I what,” “Death I says say,” “The spider' /  Death /  1 /  We /  The genii /  
To know /  What to say when the.” In “ Elegy in a Spider Web,” the text tries to bring the 
presence o f  language and the mind’s experience to the fore. Language becomes a matter o f  life 
and death. There is life only where there is language, that is, human presence. Sentence 
fragments are shuffled together, causing a discontinuity, as if the poem were a collage o f  itself. 
It becomes difficult to tell, in the traditional sense o f  the word, what the poem is about. That is 
why a paraphrase o f this poem could only be made by reading the whole poem all over again, 
as Riding instructed us to do in ^  Surv^'. She thought that one can only understand “ the 
feeling o f  what happens” in a poem (its consciousness, so to speak), by reading the poem itself.
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Rather than finished, as a “well-wrought urn,” the poem’s performance is simply left in 
suspension, open-ended.'* These are the last lines:
Before after here 
Life now my face 
The face love the 
The legs real when 
What time death always 
What time the spider
(Ibid. 91)
We are left without knowing what has happened to the spider, the I, and the other elements o f 
the poem. As the poem’s open-endedness seems to indicate, one “dies” only when language 
stops. Although the context o f  Riding’s personal life is not disclosed in an autobiographical 
way, some personal historical context might be helpfiil here. Riding wrote the poem whUe 
feggrering, in a hospital b^d, from her (dmast fatal syi^idal attempt,'’  She wa? abp yndergping 
treatment with morphine to placate the terrible pains from her fall.^“ Riding herself described 
the poem “as a one-time experiment in concentration on expressing with suitable economy 
intricate thought-experience in an occasion o f  feeling on a little (spider) subject having yet a 
tragic connection with larger subjects (“Comments” 21).
This goes against the idea of the poem as a “well-wrought um,” a dosed artifact, as promoted bv the 
New Critics.
Replying to Robert Fraser’s commentary on this poem. Riding seems to recognize that this is a more 
autobiographical piece: “Its being an elegy in a spider web is integral with the nature of die poem. Tlie 
peculiar character o f tliis verbal movement is directly related to the location of the poem-composition 
within the compass of the web, the ‘in’ accounting for die uniting of the sense of the spider as having 
died with the sense of myself die poet as a creature of a kind that can, also, die. [...] There is no 
reticence here, [...] only a fidelity to die difficulty of saying something when a spider dies” (“Reply” 89).
20 “Under the influence of morphine,” writes biographer Deborali Baker, “Laura entered diat strange 
land of being dead and not dead” (180).
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Although her poetics rejected the mythic impulse common to many modernists, “Elegy 
in a Spider Web*’ can be said to rearticulate the myth o f  Arachne, but from a revisionist 
viewpoint. Arachne was a young and ambitious weaver who defied Reason’s goddess, Athena, 
for the task o f  representing the Olympus: Arachne wins the contest but, because o f  her 
arrogance, is transformed by furious Athena into a spider in order to escape death. As a result, 
she has her mouth and eyes shut by the divinity, and is condemned to weave forever. Thus, in 
my view, and having the myth as a tool for understanding this poem. Riding’s poem deals not 
only with the relationship between life and deatii, but with creation and silence. However, 
instead o f  writing about suicide or the creative act. Riding manages to articulate these 
experiences not in a referential mode, but in the very fabric o f  her poem. The poem does not 
speak o f  “Arachne” or “Athena,” for instance, being itself a critique o f  poetic representation. 
What the poem, as a typical mindscape, reinforces, is the idea o f  language as “ the knowing o f  
always,” the conscience that to stop thinking/webbing/writing is a kind o f “death.” We are, in 
short, like Arachne, webbed in the durational experience o f  human language.
In the absence o f  punctuation, use o f  repetition and the creation o f an atmosphere o f  
“ continuous present,” as well as the reliance on a minimal use o f  words, we can detect that 
Riding was very much aware o f  Stein’s experience with the continuous present, as we have 
indicated, with her technique o f  “ beginning again and again.” Many lines are compounded o f 
sentence fragments that refuse temporality, unity or closure: temporal markers are blended in 
lines such as “Now before after always,” as it happens with the “Who say the I,” “When who 
when the spider.” More importantiy, in “Elegy In a  Spider Web,” the text becomes an 
articulation o f  its own birth process, exhibiting itself as pure poiésis— the Aristotelian idea that 
die poem is, above all, a thing which is made by the poet and die reader. This is “ the scene o f  
language,” as she defines as its ideal, with each word’s meaning coming to the fore: “ My
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particular preoccupations with words was with words as the internal content o f language. [...] I 
saw word as language’s apparatus o f  meaning,” Riding reveals in Rational Meaning (15). The 
idea o f  text proposed in “Elegy” embodies Roland Barthes’s ideal o f  the text in The Pleasure of 
the Text. “ In this tissue, the generative idea that the text is made, is worked out in a perpetual 
interweaving; lost in this tissue— t^his texture— the subject unmakes himself, like a spider 
dissolving in the constructive secretions o f  its web” (64). The subject o f  the poem, if  there is 
only one, and using what Nancy Miller says in her attempt to define a feminist theory o f  the 
text (“Arachnology” '^), “ is not fixed in time and space, but suspended in a continual moment 
o f  fabrication” {The Poetics 270).
In the “ scene o f  language” that Riding’s mindscape activates, language is affirmed as 
pure immediacy, a pure presence, “ the link o f  meaning that human life has with the fact o f  
existence” {Rational 36). In this process, the text becomes the very texture o f  our lives. Clearly, 
the metaphysics o f  presence^" underlies her poetical project. Let us repeat what Riding says in 
the same book: “Language may be said to be the mind’s comprehension o f tlie universe as the 
humanly occupied; and the occupation by the mind o f  language may be said to be the 
occupation by it o f  the universe in actiue, consciously organised presence” (492; emphasis added).
This problem is enacted more clearly in the poem “Disclaimer o f  the Person,” where the 
poet offers a version o f  Genesis from the woman’s point o f  view: the world, argues the poem, 
begins only when the awareness o f the individual, as expressed in thought, begins. When the 
“ I,” immediately present, can actually utter its being:
21 “A critical positioning which reads against the weave of indifferentiation to discover the embodiment 
in writing of a gendered subjectivity; to recover within representation the emblems of its constmction” 
(272).
22 According to Derrida, the origin and foundation of most philosopher’s theories is presence (the same 
could be said in the case of poetry). But Derrida denies the possibility of this presence and in doing so 
removes the ground from which philosophers have in general proceeded. By denying presence, Derrida 
is denying that there is a present in the sense of a sin^e definable moment which is ‘now.’
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I say.
I say myself.
What is now?
Now is myself.
Now is when I say.
What am I?
I am what I say.
Who am I?
I am who I say.
Now is where I am.
Where am I?
I am in what I say.
(Ibid. 229)
The movement o f the mind and the de/re-construction o f  the textual and actual “ se lf ’ along 
the poem is a key to understand Riding’s mindscapes. Taking what Perioff says on Beckett’s 
associative monologues, one could say that repetition is used here “to present the process o f 
‘working out an idea,’ o f  getting at a meaning” {Inie/Iect 145). Riding’s belief in the total 
presence o f  a self— i^n the here and now o f  language— i^s what deconstructionists would name a 
logocentric instance: that is, as Madan Sarup explains, “ the belief that the first and last thing is 
the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the self-presence o f fioll self-consciousness” (39). 
However, it is important to observe that in Riding’s mindscapes, as well as in her general 
thought, there is always an interest in expressing and articulating the interconnection she saw 
existing between mind and body (widi everytliing resulting from this bondage, be it pleasure or 
pain).
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In another early mindscape, “Pride o f  Head,” the focus is the physical head (and the 
brain and, by extension, the thoughts it produces). Here, the head is in its proper position, 
exact. The speaker is the embodied mind that celebrates itself as being distinctively human: it 
has “no precedence in nature /  Or the beauties o f  architecture.” From this “place o f  pride,” it 
commands naming and meaning. “My head is at the top o f  me /  Where I live mostly and most 
o f  the time, /  Where my face tums an inner look /  On what’s outside o f me /  And meets the 
challenge o f other things /  Haughtily, by being what it is” {Poem  23). The “ I” is, ironically, an 
idol o f  the “head,” “Gem o f  the larger, lazy continent just under it” (the body) which now, 
personified.
Watch and worry benignly over the rest.
Send all the streams o f  sense mnning down 
To explore the savage, half-awaked land.
Tremendous continent o f  this tiny isle,
And civilize it as well as they can.
(Ibid.)
Riding’s poetry o f  mind, self-exploratory, is almost didactic in lines such as these, which 
makes the reader consider her poetics as a radical application o f  Descartes’ rationalist“  
stance— “I think, therefore I am.” In this sense, “Pride o f  Head,” as a typical mindscape, can 
be defined as a celebration o f  the mystery o f  human consciousness, o f  “tlie feeling o f  what 
happens.” On the other hand, a deconstmctionist would agree with Riding’s assumption that 
the basic fact o f  human existence is the stoic acceptance that there is no outside language. The 
ideal poem, for her, should create a vacuum in experience, a mindscape in which even “ the 
wind’s boldness and the clock’s care /  becomes a voiceless language” {Poem 181). Rephrasing
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Descartes, we exist as humans because we think the world. In writing it, we materialize it, we 
transform it in a live “ thing,” into a “ creature” o f  words, as Riding called it. By thinking it, we 
give it consistency, life, meaning. The ideal poem, for Riding, would be marked by a utopian 
desire to capture “ the language o f  the mind /  That has no way to stop” (Ibid. 107). She saw 
subjectivity as a process, and asked the reader to attend to each word o f a poem in order to 
enable the nowness o f  language to establish itself: this moment. Riding saw poetry as 
production, and as a challenge, demanding an effort to overcome our inertia as passive 
consumers o f  images and pre-packed “ feelings,” being “ subjects” again, co-producers o f  
meaning and the process o f  “defamiliarization,” being aware o f our own perceptive 
automatism regarding images and pre-received certainties. As Paul Auster has written, in “ the 
exceptional quality o f Riding’s poems is the astounding display o f  consciousness confronting 
and examining itself’ (“The Return” 36).
In “Beyond,” “Elegy In A Spider Web,” and “Poet: A  Lying Word,” we see how Riding 
may be seen as belonging to the tradition o f  radical poetries that Marjorie Perioff discusses in 
Radical Artifice: Writing 'Poetry in the Age of Media, in which “ the Image as referring to something 
in external reality is replaced by the word as Image, but concern with morphology and the 
visualization o f  the word’s constituent parts: this is the mode o f  Concrete Poetry” (78). Before 
the advent o f  Concrete Poetry, Riding envisioned an anti-referential mode, breaking with 
normative syntax, and centered her attention on the weight and concreteness o f  each word, in 
the materiality o f  the words themselves. This was achieved, as we have seen, through 
syntactical displacement (play with the order o f  words), neologisms, and through a heightened 
metalinguistic impulse (the poem meditating on its own birth). This is paradoxical, in Riding’s 
case, because her poetry is traditionally viewed as being “abstract.” Experiences such as the
In philosophy, a system of tliought that emphasizes tlie role o f reason in obtaining knowledge, in
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ones that were articulated in these poems are symptomatic o f  Riding’s desire to push meaning 
to its limit, in order to prove that thought could be as concrete as things.
Finally, it becomes clear that self-reflection as well as instances where the nature o f  
language and reality are questioned are paramount in Riding’s mindscapes. Riding’s goal 
reaches, at this point, a dangerous limit: she wanted “poetr}'  ^ brought into view— into stark 
view— the debate o f  human consciousness with itself on what is possible and what is 
impossible” (“Engaging” 8). Instead o f  proving the authority o f  the sensorial and the 
imagination (Romanticism), or electing the Image as a new totem (Modernism), Riding’s 
programmatic mindscapes aimed at emphasizing language’s presence and its process.
Word /  World /  I
“The World and I” addresses the general problem o f  truth and poetry that is at the core 
o f  Riding’s poetics. How truthful can be the world when mediated by language, specifically by 
poetry, the art o f language? Is the relation between language and reality a harmonic or a tense 
one? Does poetry approach or distance us from the world? “The World and I” is another fine 
example o f  how Riding was able to overcome both the Romantic and the “High-Modemist 
lyric mode” o f her time, by making language the core o f  her poetic investigation. As such, hers 
is a poetics that takes the mind at work, in its struggle to make meaning, the ver)' “ stu ff’ o f  the 
poem.
In a two-stanza structure, following a rhyme scheme aabbccddeeffgg, in its apparently 
simple diction, the poem presents itself as developing a philosophical argument: tlie 
relationship between word and world, language and reality. Word ambiguity is slight: Riding
contrast to empiricism, which emphasizes the role of experience, especially sense perception.
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has chosen the most neutral and general words, as if suggesting to us to take them at face 
value, as words, and not in any metaphorical sense. As I have indicated in my subtide, the poem 
seems to argue that there are slashes separating word/world/I. The questioning o f  metaphor 
as a tool to gain knowledge, the poem’s lack o f  precise visual images, is what most strikes us in 
a first reading.
The form o f address adopted now is that o f  a soliloquy, in which we have the impression 
o f  following somebody’s thoughts, somebody silently “speaking” to oneself. Since there is no 
private language in poetry—which is always an event between two persons— t^he reader has the 
privilege o f  over-hearing what is being thought. I f  there is a figure o f  speech in the poem, such 
figure is personification. The “world” assumes the character o f  a person, as capable o f  love 
and meaning (the world and the I are “doubtful if ever/ Was a thing to love the other” , lines 
12-13). The blending o f  material and concrete qualities is present again in the overall pattern o f  
the poem: both entities, world and the word, assume each other’s condition o f  existence in line 
5: the world is humanly “awkward,” while human words are considered mere objects, even 
nuisances (“hostile implements o f  sense”) for the anonymous and majestic “ I” that governs 
the poem.
The title promises a narration o f the relationship between the speaker and “the world” “^' 
and the effect it has on our minds and bodies. Although Riding uses simple words, her highly 
abstract language, almost emptied o f  external references, forces us to focus on the possible 
meanings o f  the general words being used. Although “word” and “world” do rhyme and 
“meet” in the last too lines, the poem’s argument denies such possibility o f  an encounter.
2“' According to the Oxford 'English Dictionary, “world” refers not only to the earth, but also to human 
society. “The world” can mean both “ the earthly state of human existence,” “the pursuits and interests 
o f this present life,” and “the affairs and conditions of life.” In a Biblical sense, “the world” assumes a 
moral meaning, as referring to “those who are concemed only witli the interests and pleasures o f this
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Thus, the problematic relationship between the world, the I, and the words, is the leading 
theme o f  the poem.
Right from the beginning questions arise; How can we trust language when we are not 
sure even o f the words being uttered (line 1), when language seems to be capable only o f  
tautologies (line 2), with “This,” this very utterance, not being exactly what one means? Can or 
cannot poetic statements correspond to truth? The latter question seems to be the point 
articulated in the poem. Doubt permeates the poem, with several words expressing this 
condition; “not exactly,” “how,” “approximately,” “ awkwardness,” “perhaps” (twice), 
“ doubtful,” “nearly sure.” Changes in the speaker’s attitude must also be noted; if  in line 13 the 
speaker is doubtful o f his relationship with the world, in line 14 he/she is nearly finding out 
that such a “meeting” is an impossibility. When used affirmatiyely in the poem, the word 
“exactly” points to a failure and a difficulty; that o f  making the world, the I, and words 
coincide, “meet.” From then on, the poem describes a conflict between an internal reality (the 
I, the thinking self, language) in relation to what is assumedly outside the self. The ideal o f 
blending word/world/I in a single, unified sdf, is not pdssible, according to the poem. Words, 
the I, and the world, again, as three dramatic entities, are condemned to live separate lives. 
Other set o f  irreconcilable contradictions are presented; language/reality, proximity/distance, 
meaning/nonsense, thinking/living, hate/love, success/failure. The whole poem, then, 
dramatizes itself in terms o f  paradoxes.
All these features would make Riding’s poem a perfect case for close reading along New 
Critical lines. However, Riding’s paradoxes are not resolved in her poems, but always left
life or uith temporal and mundane things.” ITie tone of tlie poem (meditative, inquisitive) seems to 
heighten this last definition.
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suspended, open.“  The poem suggests also that maybe the awareness o f  this condition can be 
a step fijrther, as suggested in lines 7-8: “Perhaps this is as close a meaning/As perhaps becomes 
such knowing.”  The O ED  tell us that “perhaps,” indicating a slight possibility, a chancedoubt, 
non-certainty, the condition o f  not-knowing, is what describes us as human beings, always 
trying to “make meaning” o f  life and what surrounds it. Isn’t doubt a condition o f  knowledge? 
The poem acknowledges that there is a gap between the world and the words that the I can 
never manage to overcome. The desire is to make them coincide, but their mutable nature, 
their indeterminacy, cancels out each other. In the last lines, one has the impression that the 
speaker realizes that it is better to recognize the unreachable span between the world and an I. 
All one can do is to realize the limits o f  language, this “place” where the world and the I “ [f]ail 
to meet by a moment, and a word” (or, as -Wittgenstein would put it, it is better to recognize 
that “ the limits o f  one’s language are the limits o f  one’s world”). In the OED, “ to meet” has 
the meaning o f  either “ to fit tightly” or “ to encounter.” Thus, by calling our attention to words 
and their etymology, in this mindscape Riding invites us to consider how we make meaning o f  
the world, while pointing out to a crucial question in her poetics: the nature and the limits o f 
human language, and the conflicting relation between poetry, language, and truth.
In the context o f  the poetics o f  the period. Riding’s mindscapes, in their critical 
approach to the image, in their critical suspicion o f  metaphor, analogy, myth, and symbols, 
exemplify a dissident aesthetics at the core o f  modemist poetry. She is also undertaking a 
criticism, through poetry, o f  patriarchal and dominant ways o f writing, with poetry seen in 
terms o f a specific male modemist tradition in Anglo-American poetry (be it Eliot’s “objective
25 As Jeanne Heuving reminds us, while for the New Critics tlie paradoxes had the final task of 
achieving a final balance or equilibrium throu^ “the ultimately harmonious relations poems brought 
into being, [f]or Riding, paradoxes were often irresolvable contradictions, attesting to the irreducible 
disparities between diverse entities. [...] Meaning itself was highly problematical, best intimated througii 
sense eclipsed by the materiality of signification” (199).
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correlative” and mythical method, Yeats’s “ symbol,” Pound’s “doctrine o f  the image,” or 
Stevens’s “ supreme fiction”).
In “The World and I” and, I must add, “Poet: A  Lying Word,” instead o f  the poem as 
the occasion o f an aesthetic or hedonistic affirmation, or even a religious unity, a “ luminous 
detail” (Pound), we get a kind o f  philosophical negation, a nihilistic fragmentation, a void. 
One feels in this poem an unbreachable gap between the physical “ senses” (the affects) and 
“ sense” (reason). The senses (images, natural phenomena) are ornaments in Riding’s rational 
theater; they distract us from the “ truth” (that is, the perfect match between the world, the 
words, and the I). The only problem is that, as Riding herself realized in the poem “Truth” (see 
Chapter 3), “ truth cannot be seen” nor “caught.” I f  language is a condition o f thinking, the 
process o f  encountering the world should be always under control, but it is not.
“The World and I” synthesizes “the drama o f  meaning” presented in so many o f  her 
poems, and presents a limit attitude towards poetry which would make her renounce (and 
reject) poetry for good after the Collected Poems (1938). Her dilemma, encapsulated in the poem, 
is: can poetry, as the art o f  language, breach the gap between the outer “world” and the inner 
“ I” ? How to give a pemanent meaning— the seal o f Truth— t^o what it is always changing? We 
carmot, according to Riding, and we have to admit that it is maybe this very undecidability—  
this “perhapsness”—  which marks human existence. Thus, “The World and I” and many o f  
her poems open room for a discussion o f  a problem that poststructuraHsm would re-address: 
the indeterminacy o f meaning inherent in language. I f  there is a theme in “The World and I” 
such theme is later alluded to (by (Riding Jackson) in The Telling, “ the common risks o f  
language, where failure stalks in every word” (126).
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“Truth begins where poetry ends” *^^ : the Wall of Writing
Laura Riding’s attack on the Romantic, Symbolist, and even “modem” poetic discourses 
that she saw as dominant in the modernist poetry o f  her time is pursued by means o f  a 
metapoetics, exemplified in the tour-de-force “Poet: A  Lying Word.” In its twenty paragraphs, 
this prose-piece is highly relevant to my thesis because it explicitly engages in a cerebral 
criticism o f poetic discourse. Riding’s dissatisfaction with Romantic and even modem lyric 
conventions demonstrated in this piece (be it the “well-wrought” urns o f New Critical poets, 
the imaginative flight o f  the late Romantics, or in Stevens) foreviews her later decision o f  
rejecting poetry. At the same time, the poem is an eloquent demonstration o f  an original 
method aimed at the deconstmction o f  what Perioff has called “ the H gh  Lyric Mode” o f 
Anglo-American modernist poetry. The poem can also be read as well as an aggressive 
manifesto o f  poetry’s “ impossibility” : that o f  saying the tmth. In “Poet: A  Lying Word,” 
instead o f  an imaginative lyric, we have the building o f  an impermeable anti-lyric, a block o f  
text defying the reader. In my opinion, the poem is unique in the history o f  modernism for 
pointing out to a crisis o f  language and o f  “High Modemism” itself
Lyric has been traditionally defined as a literary category distinguished from narrative or 
drama. Most importantly, since its beginning the word (derived from /ira, the musical 
instmment) has been connected with singing, chanting, or with melopeia, “words set to music,” 
as Pound has defined. With Romanticism, poet^ and lyric became synonyms. The Romantics 
recharged the power o f  music present in this aspect o f  great poetry by defining it, as in 
Wordsworth’s famous words, as a “ spontaneous overflow o f powerful feelings” (“Preface”
26 In the preface of Selected Poems, Riding writes: “I know of no one besides myself and my husband 
Schuyler [...] who has put feet across the margin on the further ground—the margin being tlie 
knowledge that truth begins where poetry ends (or, as I said in introducing a BBC reading o f my
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337). Poetry had to be “emotion recollected in tranquility” (Ibid.) and to emphasize the 
musical, sonorous aspects o f  speech, coloring it with a subjective experience. As Perloff 
reminds us, even today poetry is taken as essentially lyric, that is, “ a short verse utterance (or 
sequence o f  such utterances) in which a single speaker expresses, in figurative language, his 
subjective vision o f  ‘the truth o f  moments, situations, relationships,’ a fusion culminating in a 
‘unique insight’ or epiphany that unites poet and reader” {Intellect 174, my emphasis). For a Romantic 
poet such as Wordsworth, whose key subject is nature, the poet’s traveling mind was seen as 
being naturally “ the mirror o f  the fairest and most interesting properties o f nature” (“Preface” 
341), having the function o f  constructing an accurate analogy between nature and human 
nature. Wordsworth blends m an ’s passions and feelings with “ storm and sunshine, with the 
revolutions o f  the seasons.” In his Preface to Lyrical Ballads, he utterly rejects the device o f  
personification as being “a mechanical device o f  style” (Ibid. 342). Then he defends the 
imagination, that makes man create “ the goings-on o f  the Universe” where he does not find 
them” (Ibid). And then Wordsworth asks: “Taking up the subject, then, upon general grounds, 
let me ask, what is meant by the word Poet? What is a Poet? To' whom does he address 
himself? And what language is to be expected from him?— ^He is a man speaking to men [...] 
(339 my emphasis).
The ideology exposed previously takes a critical dimension in “Poet: A  Lying Word.” 
Firstly, instead o f  a male, solitary “ I” expressing fate in the realm o f  nature, in this piece we 
have language itself addressing the reader. The poem is wholly metalinguistic and its form can 
be seen as clearly political, in the sense that “Poet: A Lying Word” deconstructs traditional 
assumptions and lyric expectations concerning the nature of representation in poetiy. In this poem, 
again, instead o f a landscape, we have a mindscape.
poems, that, for tlie practice of the style of truth to become a thing of the present, poetry must become
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Secondly, the choice o f  prose, instead o f  verse (language in lines usually justified on the 
right margin), is relevant in Riding’s work for being her only prose-poem. I think that the 
option for prose, in a moment o f  crisis, points out to Riding’s purposes aimed in the text, that 
is, the deconstruction o f  lyric: a block o f  prose would indicate that it is a wall o f 
writing/reading built in front o f  the reader, in the process o f  being erected. One could say that, 
in diis meditative mindscape, this wall is the “ consciousness” o f  the text itself, the words 
erecting themselves in the process o f  signification. This wall o f  text addresses constandy the 
reader, challenging and provoking him. The poem in prose begins with the following words:
You have now come with me, I have now come with you, to the season that 
should be winter, and is not: we have not come back.
We have not come back: we have not come round: we have not moved. I have 
taken you, you have taken me, to the next and next span, and the last— a^nd it is the last. 
Stand against me then and stare well through me then. It is a wall not to be scaled and 
left behind like the old seasons, like the poet who were the seasons.
{Poem  216)
We can see here to what extremes Riding took her ideal o f  making poetry nothing less than the 
location o f  truth. But here there is no room for “recollections in tranquility.” Instead o f 
beautiftjl vistas and fleeting landscapes, whereby the poet’s words conduct die reader to an 
imaginary place— ^injecting on him memories o f  childhood, lost love, and the transitory 
existence, for instance— t^he poem casts an “ I” that is being presented, literally, as a wall o f 
words, defying its own intelligibility and negatirig the “pleasures” that lyric poetry has 
conventionally obliged to give. The “ I,” it becomes clear now, is both the speaker and 
language, the “you” being the reader (whose “historied brain” and eyes are “rolled up in white
a thing of the past” (15).
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hypocrisy”). More than that, this poem represents, in Riding’s poetic career, a kind o f  limit in 
the experience o f  reading, a point o f  no return:
Stand against me then and stare well through me then. I am no poet as you have 
span by span leapt the high words to the next depth and season, the next season always, 
the last always, and the next. I am a true wall: you may but stare me through (Ibid.)
At this point tlie poem makes clear that it is itself a wall: the wall o f  reading/writing. This wall, 
however, is presented as being o f  two kinds: the selfish wall built by “ the Poet,” and the wall 
o f  the text that is being constructed and, simultaneously, is deconstructing itself: “ It is indeed a 
wall, crumble it shall,” the poem adverts. The sentence “ 1 am a true wall: you may but stare me 
through,” repeated nine times along die poem, functions as a refrain, as a reminder that the 
text, language, is addressing the reader. At the same time, the mindscape creates expectations 
that are always frustrated, which inserts this piece in the tradition o f  enigma-texts:
The work o f  enigma could be defined as a mechanism whose paramount function is to 
promote this expectation o f  meaning, while at the same time maintaining a steady 
embargo on the transmission o f meaning. The effect on the reader or receiver may be 
seen as a combination of, on the one hand, an intuition that sense is somehow 
imminent, and on the other, the half-certainty that sense may never materialize. (Cardinal
45)
Besides this heightened self-referentialit}'— predating the post-modern and “writerly” 
text— t^he anti-absorptive effect o f “Poet: A Lying Word” occurs in the fissure it causes in the 
so-called fourth-wall o f reading: instead o f  the presentation o f a traditional scene, with words 
fianctioning as mere vehicle pointing to a thing, the poem deconstructs the transparency o f 
language so the reader can check out its own backstage and devices, its making, the reading 
process itself. Thus, in this case, the model adopted for the construction o f  this mindscape is
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that o f  the wall, which works as an extended metaphor for the experience o f  reading and 
thinking. This mindscape also interrupts the oniric and fictitious aspects o f  lyric by constantly 
and direcdy addressing the reader: “You have now come with me.” “Why have you come here 
then?” “ I am not builded (sic) o f  you so.” A  false or lying wall o f  writing, according to the 
poem, is one in which language functions as a protective screen, with the reader transformed 
into a passive spectator/consumer o f  beautiful images and emotions. Or, better, a false wall is 
presented as a kind o f  hill that, after being climbed, allows the viewer to see the changes o f 
seasons, the transient world o f  appearance. A  “ true wall,” on the other hand, aims at being a 
place o f  permanence, a kind o f final season: it threatens the reader by presenting itself -as a 
limit. “This body-self, this wall, this poet-like address, is that last barrier long shield o f  your 
elliptic changes,” the poem declares. This is a wall to see “ into,” not “ through.” ’^  On this wall, 
time and referentiality have been abolished: “no more a poet’s tale o f  a going false-like to a 
seeing. The tale is o f  a seeing true-like to a knowing.” “Like wall o f  poet here I rise, but am no 
poet as walls have risen between next and next and made false end to leap. A last, true wall am 
I: you may but stare me through.” As with the last line o f  “The Map o f  Places,” on this wall 
“ holes” look through to nowhere. The text presents itself as a limit: after it there is only an 
abyss. In a crucial passage, the text itself warns the reader o f  the danger o f being absorbed by 
it:
It is not a wall, it is not a poet. It is not a lying wall, it is not a lying word. It is a 
written edge o f  time. Step not across, for then into my mouth, my eyes, you fall. Come 
close, stare me well through, speak as you see. But, oh infatuated drove o f  Hves, step not
According to the OED, the expression “to read the writing on the wall” means to interpret tiie signs 
o f the times, to leam from contemporaries happenings or tendencies a lesson for the future.
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across now. Into my mouth, my eyes, shall you thus fall, and be yourselves no more 
(Ibid.).
This mindscape is a fine example o f  what Bemstein has called an anti-absorptive text: “Rather 
than absorb the reader in the poem, the poem radiates out, project-like, against placid ear, 
pseudosensitive politesse— ‘contesting the social ground’ without abandoning a commitment 
to the social constitution o f  meaning“ {Artifice 25). The reader is made aware by the text itself 
that “ it” is only a text, but at the same time is more than a text: it is language itself speaking. 
The passage mocks Romantic sensibility (“oh, infatuated drove o f  lives”) and presents itself as 
“a written edge o f  time” or black hole— after which there is an abyss: death itself In order to 
avoid being “ readerly” sucked by it, die text adverts, the reader has to learn “ to speak as you 
see.” That is, to resist being absorbed by the physical lyrical properties o f the words on this 
wall: “Does it seem I ring, I sing, I rhyme, I poet-wit? Shame on me then!” “This Wall reads 
Poet: A  Lying Word” (Ibid. 218). Paradoxically, the last words o f  the poem are “ I say, I say.” 
By rejecting the transparency o f  language and pointing out to its own process o f  occurrence, 
the words themselves are presented not as mere conductors or pointers to a reality supposedly 
“outside the text.” By being self-referential, this text presents the reader with the challenge o f  
“ speak[ing] as you see.” “The page before the first page tells o f  death, haste, slowness: how 
tmth falls tme now at the tum o f the page, at time o f  telling” (Ibid.).
The aim o f poetry, according to the poetics outlined in this mindscape, is not to be 
reduced to being an art o f  landscape, that is: the skill to “recreate the life o f natural objects in 
pictures or in words” (Heffeman xvii). It is, strategically, to point out to language itself, as a 
human phenomenon, and to advert the reader as to the limiting aspects o f lyrical utterance. 
Thus, Riding’s poem is not only emblematic o f the problematics o f human meaning at the core 
o f  modernism, but advances a moment o f  suspicion more typical o f post-modernism.
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In Black Riders, Jerome McGann takes “Poet: A  Lying Word” as an example o f  the 
“visible language o f  modemism” :
Language-as-such rises up as the poem’s central subject, therefore, and it rises up as a 
wall o f  joking and lying words. These words do not lead the reader anywhere, do not 
take the reader ‘false-like to a seeing.’ The poem is not allowed to point toward any truth 
beyond its own interactive features, its own textuality. The truth o f  the poem has 
become utterly literal. But in doing so it is not also set apart from the reader in some 
aesthetic condition o f  disinterest. [...] The argument is to avoid entering a language (on 
the reader’s or writer’s side) as if it were to be a ‘mortal simulacmm’ o f  lying words 
pointing elsewhere (the deceptions o f  deep feeling, perhaps, or visionary elsewhere) 
(129).
As the poem has well demonstrated, for Riding, language was not merely a tool that 
people and poets use to describe the world. Here, the reader is asked not to approach words at 
face value, but to face the reality o f  the words themselves. Riding’s poems, in short, exemplify 
a poetry in search o f  human meaning. Or, as she wrote in “ Continued for Chelsea” ; “The most 
serious character poetry bears is that o f  being a mode o f  expressing what would be otherwise 
inexpressible” (6). I f  poetry is an attempt to push words and meaning to their limits, if poetry’s 
goal is to figure out what it means to be alive, in a human body and mind. Riding’s name must 
figure in the rank o f  poets who, in our century, have taken on such challenge.
Coda
Ah, the minutes twinkle in and out 
And in and out come and go
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One by one, none by none.
What we know, what we don’t know.
(Poem 30)
As has been shown throughout this chapter, in Riding’s mindscapes, “ the mind thinking 
becomes the active force o f  the poem” (“Thought’s” 67), to use Bernstein’s formulation. 
Riding herself allowed us to analyze her poems in such terms, referring to them as 
“performances o f  the mind” (“Looking Forward” 41), as “expressive articulation o f  the mind’s 
experience” (“Comments” 25). However, Riding knew that, without the body, mental 
experience (and self-knowledge itself) would be physically impossible. Let us consider this 
example: in the reading act, one is not only mentally but also bodily present (as much as the 
words printed on the page are to their meaning). Instead o f  positing a dissociation between 
thought and feeling the poem was seen by Riding as a creature in itself, a creature o f language, 
represented by the body o f  the words (signifiers) and their mental existence (signifieds) in the 
process o f  making meaning.
> I make this remark in order to correct Joyce Wexler’s thesis that Riding’s poetry rejected 
sensory perception, and that there is no emotion in her work. Agreeing with Jerome McGann 
and Lisa Samuels, I believe Riding had an integrative view o f the mind/body problem. Riding 
herself has stated, in response to Wexler, that “ [m]ind is not something to ‘separate o f f ’ It is 
the deliberative element in being, and what one does to be by the actualities o f  being, to the 
possible full, involves the recognition, by body, o f  mind, by mind o f body” (Ibid.). Samuels has 
correctly observed in Riding “a unified sensibility that includes the physical world: the body o f 
the temporal world contained within tlie languaging human mind” {Poetic 120). In this sense. 
Riding’s view o f mind is akin to recent studies that have demonstrated that any understanding
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o f reason and consciousness -that..detaches mind from the body is wholly inadequate.^* A
mindscape is a place where tlie unity o f mind and body— the awareness o f  being__is
incessantly lived. A  mindscape, thus, is a poem that aims at capturing, along its articulation, 
“the feeling o f what happens,” affirming language as a place o f  stru^le, the place o f  our
human condition. By emphasizing the here and now o f language— a^s a distinct and human 
phenomenon— ^Riding focused on the fact that the human being is constituted as a peculiar 
union, a constant exchange, between mind and body. A poem o f hers is not to be passively 
watched, but to be actively thought out. Moreover, her mindscapes indicate a pervasive 
question that will continue to face us: how to explain the mystery o f  consciousness. As the 
speaker o f  the long meditative poem “Disclaimer o f  the Person” realizes at the end:
I f  I my words am.
I f  the footed head which frowns them 
And the handed heart which smiles them 
Are the very writing, table, chair.
The paper, pen, self, taut community 
Wherein enigma’s orb is word constrained.
Does myself upon the page meet.
Does the thronging firm a name 
To nod my own, witnessing 
I write or am this, it is written?
What thinks the world?
Has here the time-eclipsed occasion
28 I would include here studies such as Mark Johnson’s The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: U o f Chicago P, 1987, David J. Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind: In Search 
of a Fundamental Theoty (New York: Oxford UP, 1996).
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Grown language-present?
Or does the world demand,
And what think I?
The world in me which fleet to disavow 
Ordains perpetual reiteration?
And these the words ensuing.
(Poem  236)
CONCLUSION
N o canon is immutable or innocent. More than the result o f  a “natural” selection, the 
process o f  canon formation is always a complex and ideological one. Since the height o f  New 
Criticism, what is understood as the canon o f  American poetry has undergone due expansion 
and revision. Interventions such as Jerome Rothenberg’s anthologies, or the remapping o f  the 
canon undertaken by feminist literary critics, among many others, have helped to alter our 
understanding o f  the striking range o f  poetic experiences in the United States, as well as to 
expose the problems with the selective and institutionalised versions o f  modernism. Until 
recently, when the topic was the poetic production o f the first half o f the twentieth century, 
the names mentioned, discussed, eulogized, taught, and published in Anglo-American 
anthologies, were those o f  Yeats, Eliot, Pound, Frost, Stevens, Williams, and Auden. Even 
nowadays some critics seem still worried about deciding if our era belongs to Pound, Stevens, 
or Eliot. Furthermore, due to the institutional influence o f  canonical critics such as Helen 
Vendler and Harold Bloom, it is safe to say that the “ official verse culture” is still feeling the 
effects o f the New Critical construction o f  a modernist Anglo-American canon within the 
academy.
As argued in the Introduction, Michel Foucault’s concept o f  discourses—  ideological 
and institutional practices that attain hegemonic power during a specific historical period— can 
be instrumental in understanding the formation o f  the modernist canon. In order to 
comprehend Laura Riding’s disappearance from the official history o f  Anglo-American poetry 
it is absolutely necessary to comprehend also the powerful discourses that circulated in the 
literary establishment during her career as a poet-critic (and even after it): the New Criticism 
(with its canonical “Corpus” , rules, values, and regulatory features), and the dominance o f  T.
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S. Eliot (both as a poet, critic, and canon-maker). The fact is that, as a discursive formation. 
New Criticism was responsible for tlie imposition within the academy, during and after World 
War II, o f a modemist canon formed by a restricted list o f major authors. Moreover, these 
authors were examined under the lens o f  a method o f  close reading that became a standard 
instrument in the evaluation o f  “modem poetry and the tradition” (to use Brooks’s title). Such 
a canon presented a relatively conventional and “ tamed” version o f  literary history and o f  
modemist poetry, but it was powerfiil enough to maintain its institutional power. In order to 
understand this context it is important to remark, as Alan Golding does, that in the United 
States the academy is “a central canonizing force in American poetry” {From Outlaw 70).
In his seminal study Repression and Recovery (1989), Cary Nelson has shown that modem 
poetry was hardly the monolithic program that the New Critical canon presented. From our 
present view (the tum o f the twentieth century) it is possible to observe the diversity 
(understood here as oddity, conflict, and not as mere eclecticism) o f  the poetic production o f
the time. This oddity is expressed, for instance, in the range o f  different movements 
(Objectivism, Black poetry, political poetry, as well the American assimilation o f  European 
avant-garde), and in the force o f  individual poets (Gertrude Stein, Mina Loy, Muriel Rukeyser, 
Laura Riding, Lorine Niedecker, to name a few female modernists). As I argue in Chapter 2, 
the constmction o f  modemist poetry by the hegemonic New Critics during and after World 
War II blocked access and visibility to movements and authors that represent counter-versions 
o f modemism. One such author is Laura Riding.
The reasons that may explain why Riding is not a canonical writer are many. For one 
thing, she, no doubt, would deny that she ever wanted to be so. However, no single, isolated 
reason can explain the unique circumstances in which Riding was erased from the records o f  
modern poetry and criticism. Beyond either the apparent difficulty o f  her poems or the traits
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o f her “ diffiGult” personality, a series o f facts must be accounted for to explain why her poetry 
is little known, praised, and taught today. Riding’s case is a striking one, in terms o f  literary 
history as well as illustrative, in terms o f  cultural authority: firstly, after being hailed in die 
1920s by the future New Critics— who published twenty one o f  her poems in their magazine 
and praised her work as the product o f  “ a new figure in the American poetry” for its “ variety 
o f form,” for its “play o f  imagination” and for combining “a sound intellectuality and a keen 
irony” (Tbe Fugitive III, 130), she was later wholly excluded from any appreciation or even 
literary mentioning in canonical studies and anthologies. And then, even graver and more 
ironic: Riding was marginalized— ^both as poet and critic— by the same poet-critics who most 
benefited from the method o f  close textual analysis she had helped to foster (as was later 
acknowledged by William Em pson and Cleanth Brooks). As I have shown, the erasure o f 
Riding’s name from Em pson’s acknowledgements in Seven Types of Ambiguity is evidence o f  one 
insistent attempt to minimize the range o f  Riding’s contribution. Besides, her partner Robert 
Graves also began to drop Riding’s name from their collaborative works: in The Common 
Asphodel, for instance, a book o f  essays signed by him, he published parts o f  A  Surv^ without 
ever mentioning Riding. Furthermore, as I have argued in the Introduction, what is surprising 
is not only her exclusion from the canon o f  American poetry as shaped by the New Critics and 
their disciples, but also from literary feminist criticism, not to mention several studies and 
anthologies that propose altemative and revisionist literary historical accounts o f  modemist 
poetry.
There is yet another reason to advance Riding’s case as unique: i f  poets canonize poets, 
as one version o f  the process o f  canon formation posits, why not consider that some poets can 
effectively “decanonize” themselves? It is possible to say that, in fact. Riding herself greatly 
contributed to her exclusion from literary history (as Jo-Ann Wallace and K. K. Ruthven have
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observed): notoriously. Riding ceased-to write poetry in 1938, suspended the republication o f 
her poems, and published almost nothing for three decades. At the same time, her books 
(poetry, stories, criticism) went progressively out o f  print: the public had to wait until 1970 to 
have a selection o f her poems, the first since Colkcted Poems had appeared in 1938! It must also 
be remembered that, as an independent editor, in the 1930s, Riding began to print and publish 
her own and others’ books. After 1938, she refused to include her poems in anthologies 
(especially those restricted to gender, as well as “ compilations governed by any other social 
ideology”), while at the same time she began to require that republication o f  her poems should 
be done only if the publishers included a statement wherein she explained the reasons for her 
decision to renounce poetry. This extremist and ethical position regarding her work 
complicated the accessibility and visibility o f  her poetry.
I believe that Riding’s polemic critique o f  “ the forced professionalization o f  poetry,” o f 
literary institutions, and o f  feminism, also contributed to academic resistance to her work. In 
fact, she antagonized even important critics and academics sympathetic to her work, while at 
the same time managing to create around her work a protective and untouchable “aura” : 
authority over Riding’s work could only be exerted by herself. She refused to let her poetry be 
interpreted and institutionalised, representing, as Wallace has well pointed out, the case o f  “a 
writer who has been effectively ^icanonized because o f  her insistence upon being the ultimate 
referent o f  her own work and because o f  her refusal to cede either interpretive or descriptive 
authority over her own work” (“Laura Riding” 111).
As presented in Chapter 3, Riding’s poetics asserts the independence o f  the poem. This 
independence is twofold: the modernist poem had to be free, firstly, from any literary tradition 
as well as from the Zeitgeist. Secondly, once written, the poem begins a life o f  itself. Being a 
fully presented process o f  thought, the poem in Riding’s poetics is considered “a new and self-
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explanatory creature” 124). Instead o f  an Eliotian “ impersonality” o f  the poet. Riding
emphasizes the personality o f the poem. Against Eliotian, Audean, and Poundian poetics, 
Riding’s view o f poetry opposed religion, mydi, politics, and history. Instead— ^not unlike 
Henri Bergson’s concept o f  duration and then recent theories o f  the mind— she proposed a 
poetry o f  conscious experience, an achievement o f  an ahistorical and timeless self. As she 
writes in Epilogue III: “ [t]he immediacy o f  poetry is dateless, self-sustaining, not dependent on 
historical interest” (“Politics” 7). I f  poetry was to be understood as an alternative language 
system, it was necessary to make o f  every poem a fresh event, an independent life, neither 
limited by the constrains o f  the Zeitgeist nor dependent on a literary tradition. As Riding writes, 
“ No one seems to realize that the destruction o f  poetry as a tradition would not destroy poetry 
itself’ (Contemporaries 142, my emphasis). It was necessary to focus on language as poetry’s 
material, and not only as a descriptive and confessional tool.
In Chapter 3 and 4, I foregrounded Riding’s emphasis on the poem itself (how language 
works) and its peculiarity: that o f  being a reality o f  words. In order to escape “ the spirit o f  the 
times,” Riding tried to transform the poem into a timeless scene o f  thought. Thus, she 
represents'a perfect paradox: her modemist poetry rejects the modem Zeitgeist, while promoting 
a “nowness” o f  language. Focusing on the conscious experience and the durational time o f 
thought, her poetry emphasizes the “nowness” o f  self-consciousness. The linguistic task o f  
poetry is, according to her, nothing less than “ the articulation o f  our humanness” (Telling 70).
Since her first published essay, “A Prophecy or a Plea” (1925), Riding defended the view 
o f poetry as a mode o f  rational investigation. Yet, her poetics is from the beginning informed 
more by a humanistic than an aesthetic impulse. In A  Surv^, she writes that the poet is inspired 
“ to discover things which are made by his discovery o f  them” (126). In this spirit. Riding 
envisioned poetry as an exploratory activity. As she retrospectively writes: “ the poem [...]
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derives its authority from its fidelity to its kind o f  experience. I'he form o f the poem is to be 
governed only by the course o f  discovery pursued. The discovery o f  new realities o f 
experiences is the true source o f  originality in poetry” ("Commentaries” 61). As I have argued, 
as regards poetic form, her poetry tends to reject traditional forms and meters and to adopt 
measure not as a given, but as something that is discovered in the process o f  writing the poem. 
This approach sets Riding on a central position in the modemist impulse as described by 
Rothenberg and Joris, with individual poets “acting o ff  a new permission to write a poetry 
freshly invented— ^reinvented— i^n each succeeding poem” (Millennium 5).
In 1938, in the preface to Collected Poems, Riding asserted that poetry was an “uncovering 
o f  tmth.” In poem after poem o f Riding’s, one sees a fundamental assertion: that if there is a 
human tmth, it resides in the fact o f  language. Riding’s project is epistemological in its impulse: 
it reflects on the nature and conditions o f  knowledge, self, and o f  existence, and takes up 
problems that have belonged more traditionally to the province o f  philosophy (from Plato to 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Wittgenstein). Her project was to deliver a universal tmth, i.e., that 
we, as human beings, are in a common and permanent condition called language: “N o poet 
other than myself has cared about poetry, language, and tmth, in one integrated caring” (“ Some 
Notes” 22).
Two other features mark Riding’s poetics: close reading and the problem o f  the reader. 
Defending the difficulty o f  modemist poetry, in 1927, Riding and Graves raised the problem o f 
the reader and called attention to the necessity o f  reading poetry aspoetiy, i.e., the reader had to 
understand that, as an altemative discourse, poetry was a radical experience o f  language (“ to go 
to poetry is the most ambitious act o f  the mind,” Riding remarked in the preface to Collected 
Poems). The difficulty o f  the modemist poem, they explained, was a measure o f  the poem’s 
resistance to be commodified, transformed into something else (thus its “unparaphrasability”).
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Moreover, one needs to dispose one’s self to face the complexities and challenges presented by 
modernist poetry. A  Survey demanded a critical attitude from the reader, who needs to abandon 
the consumerist view o f poetry and become a producer o f text (previewing, thus, Roland 
Barthes’s formulations). One o f  the principles that guide the tandem’s comprehensive criticism 
is the close examination o f  poems. Riding and Graves’s exercise o f  close analysis o f 
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 129 became famous for the direct influence it had on Em pson (who 
admitted to have derived his method from A  Surv^). Although Riding and Graves recognized 
that the experiment’s value lay in the possibility o f  transforming the reader into a poet—  
foreseeing postulates o f  New Criticism, Structuralism, Reader Response and Deconstruction—  
the authors were cautious enough to say that the transformation o f  any method into orthodoxy 
could be damaging to poetry, and they warned against the transformation o f  such close 
readings in one more commodity in the literary and academic market: “ It must be admitted that 
excessive interest in the mere technique o f  the poem can become morbid both in the poet and 
the reader, like composing and solving cross-word puzzles” {Surv^ 25).
In Chapter 3 and 4 , 1 worked with the concepts o f  “mindsight” and created the concept 
o f mindscape further to explain Riding’s poetry and poetics. For Riding, poems are acts o f 
mind: “ I dedicated myself to poetry because o f  the promise it held out o f  a larger in scope & 
yet more definitive performance o f  expressive articulation o f  the mind’s experience” 
(“Commentary” 25). As a concept that appears early on in Riding’s work (1925), “mindsight” 
places emphasis on the mind as a shaper and not only a passive receiver o f  the outside world; it 
is poetry’s power to affect the outside world rather than being merely affected by it. Language, 
in Riding’s poetics, is understood not as something that merely describes the world and the 
experiences, but as the very source o f  those experiences. I f  language is thought and thought is
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language,-j?oetry’s aim is to capture the mind’s moves, its life. In the experience o f poetry, the 
mind escapes from the world and creates another reality.
Many o f  Riding’s poems celebrate the embodied, discerning mind. Accordingly, I 
formulated in Chapter 3 the concept o f  mindscape to describe both Riding’s poetic project as a 
whole, and also her poems themselves: thus mindscapes are “performances o f  the mind” (to 
use a recurring expression in her writing, written spaces where thought and language aim at 
becoming one. The concept o f  mindscapes emphasizes a poetry interested in bringing into 
view, as Riding wrote, “ the debate o f human consciousness with itself on what is possible and 
what impossible” (“Engaging” 8).
In Chapter 4, I concentrated on Riding’s poems in which “ the mind thinking becomes 
the active force o f  the poem” (to follow Bemstein’s brilliant formulation). Next, and following 
Riding’s method, I pursued close readings o f  five poems: “The Map o f  Places,” “Beyond,” 
“Elegy in a Spider Web,” “The World and I,” and “Poet: A  Lying Word.” The introspective, 
procedural, and “abstract” quality o f  Riding’s poems is achieved through many modes: the 
mixture o f  (anti)-pastoral and prose-poem in “Poet,” the minimalism o f  “Elegy,” the 
metalinguistic soliloquy o f “The World and I,” the meditational and permutational mode o f 
“Beyond,” and the extended metaphor o f  “The Map o f Places.” Several techniques were also 
observed in the making o f  these mindscapes: paradox, repetition, verbal permutation, word- 
invention, philosophical argument, and extended metaphor.
It is interesting to note that, although Riding progressively stripped her poems o f  images, 
she could not escape metaphor altogether. As she well knew it, “all word-use employs some 
figurativeness”  (“ Commentaries” 51). In these and other mindscape-poems I began to note 
how Riding has chosen spatial models to shape these outlines o f awakened consciousness: the 
map, the web, and the wall (of writing) are some o f  them. In other poems, as I have shown, the
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“ settings” for the mindscapes are, for instance, the head, the newspaper, the-hook, the island. 
Earth, and the very piece o f  paper upon which she is writing, and we are reading. This seemed 
to confirm Anastasia Anastasiadou’s suggestion that “ space constitutes for [Riding] a major 
means o f  seif-definition” (133). As I have argued, these “scenes o f  thought” refuse 
chronological time, history. Romantic confession, and m)rth. They are new spaces that exist as 
articulations o f  conscious experience; they intend to articulate “ a vivid reality o f  thought.” The 
poems aim at achieving a perfect “now,” a word obsessively present in Riding’s poems. As a 
shifter, the word “ now” clearly indicates a textual present (not unlike Barthes’s idea o f  the 
perpetual present o f  the writerly text). This radicalization o f  a “textual condition” (to use 
McGann’s term) arrives at a limit in “Poet: A Lying Word” : there. Riding dismanties not only 
Romantic and modemist poetics, but the idea o f  language as a mere descriptive tool. She asks 
the reader to pay less attention to what is “behind the wall” o f  language, and more to the reality 
o f the words themselves (“no more a poet’s tale o f a going false-like to a seeing. The tale is o f  a 
seeing true-like to a knowing”). Thinking as material is, therefore, at the core o f  Riding’s poetry, 
the content o f  which, as she writes in “By Crude Rotation,” is “ the language o f  the mind /  
That knows no way to stop” .
In this thesis I have tried to show how in Riding’s work theories become extensions o f
her poetic praxis and vice versa. From the beginning, criticism and poetry were integrated in 
her linguistic project. Her essays, criticism, letters— a^ll informed by ethical and linguistic 
principles— ^increase our understanding o f  the peculiar problems Riding was trying to solve in 
her poetry. A  telling example o f  this reciprocity is demonstrated by the close reading she does, 
in A  Survey, o f  a poem o f her own, “The Rugged Black o f Anger.” The analysis is a clear 
demonstration o f  how she managed to integrate poetic theory and poetic performance.
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Riding’s rejection o f poetry, as I have tried to argue, was consequence o f  her extremist 
poetics. In fact, as Paul Auster and Charles Bernstein have well observed, her early work has 
plenty o f  clues indicating that such renunciation might come one day, that it was, m some way, 
unavoidable. Premonitions o f  her future rejection are detected most clearly in the masterpiece 
“Poet: A  Lying Word” (1933), a prose-poem that criticizes poetry for being a barrier between 
human beings and the reality o f  the mind. From the beginning there is a discomfort with 
poetry as an art and as a tradition, a set o f  conventions and techniques. From “A  Prophecy or 
a Plea” and on. Riding asked from poetry nothing less than the responsibility o f  delivering 
truth through language. After 1938, however, she began to assert that poetry— language in 
state o f  artifice, essentially metaphorical—was unable to deliver the truth.
As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this thesis. Riding played a fundamental part 
in the development o f  contemporary literary criticism. There are several reasons to consider 
her one o f the most important theoreticians o f  poetry o f  the twentieth century. The range and 
seriousness o f  her critical and poetic achievement should not be discarded in any serious book 
dealing with modernist poetry. Firsdy, as we have %&&n,ASurv^ r\ot only scattered the seeds o f  
what would become known as close reading but was also among the first books, in the Anglo- 
American context, to define modemism as a conflicting category, and to dare to emulate the 
experimentalism o f  modernist poetry. By doing close analysis o f  poems from different time- 
periods (from Shakespeare to c-ummings), focusing on the text itself, A  Survg also has the 
merit o f  advancing a theory o f  the “ synchronicity” o f  literary works (in terms o f  their textual 
condition, all poems are contemporary). Finally, Riding’s method o f  poem-scmtiny (published 
two years before I. A. Richards’s Practical Criticism) showed that close attention to every feature 
o f  a poem had to be at the basis o f  poetry criticism.
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Following Marjorie Perloff s discussion on recent moves o f the North American avant- 
garde {Radical ArLifice— Writing Poet^ in the Age of Media), I believe that Riding, in her attacks on 
imagist doctrine, and in a postmodern move avant-la-lettre, was among the first to deconstruct 
the equation poetry =  image, criticized in Perloff s book. Riding’s relevance to contemporary 
poetry and poetics lies in the paradigmatic shift her poetry promotes: from image-centered to 
language-centered poetry. Riding’s poetry overcomes the dualistic model o f  the modernists: 
tension between tlie image and the real, elements which become related to each other as the 
two sides o f  a sheet o f  paper, Her mindscapes go beyond the image, deeply into the reality o f 
language itself. Riding thought that language could not be reduced to a descriptive tool or a 
translation o f  an experience (be it in the form o f an “objective correlative” or an “ image”), but 
that it is rather experience itself. I find it surprising that a critic so well informed as Perloff 
does not recognize either the importance o f  Riding’s attack on imagist doctrine or her 
language-centered poetics. Moreover, the suspicion o f  metaphor and image-based poetry, and 
the deconstruction o f  Romantic lyric discourse undertaken by Riding, among other moves, are 
not unlike the suspicion that animates the project o f  the Language poets Perloff has so 
brilliantly defended. It comes as no surprise, however, that the so-called Language poets (like 
Barrett Watten or Charles Bernstein, one o f  whom wrote a thesis on Riding), or poets 
associated with the movement (John Ashbery, Michael Palmer) are so interested in Laura 
Riding.
Her work, as a whole, advances problems later addressed by New Criticism, Feminism, 
and Deconstruction. As Wallace so aptly synthesizes:
Riding’s work had what could perhaps be called points o f strategic similarity to the three 
most important critical movements o f  the last sixty years. She shared with New Criticism 
a strategy o f close textual analysis, with feminism a strategy o f  exploring female
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difference, and with deconstruction a strategy o f rigorous linguistic analysis; and yet, 
although her strategies were similar, her intention was always quite different. (“Laura 
Riding” 120)
Another key characteristic o f  Riding’s poetry, as I have argued, is that it sits firmly 
within the never-ending debate between poetry and philosophy that marks the philosophical 
tradition, from Plato to Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Like the last two. Riding has a project that 
aims at breaching the gap between “ thinking” and “poetizing.”  This is one o f  the peculiarities 
o f her poetry.
Indifferent to poetic systematizing and critical o f  literary movements, Laura Riding 
formed neither a school o f  criticism nor an aesthetic movement. But, although difficult to 
trace, the impact o f  her poetry is undeniable. Her early influence on John Crowe Ransom,
Allen Tate and other “ Fugitives” is a story that still needs to be written. Her diction is also 
evident in the poems o f  the early W. H. Auden, and the “ truth-impulse” o f  her poetry is felt in 
poets such as James Reeves and her partner Robert Graves. In the 1950s, poets such as Sylvia 
Plath, Ted Hughes, Philip Larkin, and Charles Tomlinson recognized the importance o f  
Riding’s achievement for their own poetry. In the 1970s, John Ashbery mentioned Riding 
among the three main sources o f  his early work, praising her “abstract expressionism,” her 
procedural poetry, and placing her achievement at the core o f  “an other tradition” o f  American 
poetry (Lehman 6). The impact o f  her poetry and pronouncements on one o f  the m ost radical 
poetic movements in the U. S.—  Language poetry— h^as been also evident. Her presence can 
be detected, for instance, in the work and essays o f  Bernstein and Palmer, and in the 
speculations o f Watten and Silliman. The names listed above are a clear indication o f  how 
Riding’s work has been disseminated to authors so different among themselves.
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From the moment Riding renounced the writing- of-poetry, she began to sign her name 
“Laura (Riding Jackson,” tlie parentheses indicating that her personal identity as a poet was a 
thing o f  die past (but still visibile in the present). This renunciation, however, has been more 
debated than her poems. In the 1960s, (Riding) Jackson began to formulate a radical critique o f 
poetry that is Neo-Platonic in its impulse. She considered that “poetry, by promising to present 
truth, can only be an artificial version o f  human reality” (Jelling 116), and that “ literary reality is 
reverendy shrouded as if it were the real thing” (Ibid.). The problem o f poetry, according to 
Riding, is in its craft: “The liberty o f  word that poetry confers is poetry’s technique not truths” 
(Jelling 66). The reasons presented against poetry are ethical and aesthetical ones: if until 1938 
Riding considered poetry the best vehicle to achieve, in language, the “potentialities o f  perfect 
expression in words,” after 1938 she felt that poetry, because o f  its artificial and illusory nature, 
was not able to tell the truth (that is, to match word and thought). “There can be no literary 
equivalent to truth. If, in writing, truth is the quality o f  what is said, told, this is not a literary 
achievement: it is a simple human achievement” (Jelling 116).
A possible response to Riding can be found, ironically, in one o f  the early sources o f  her 
poetic thinking. Sidney writes in his “An Apology for Poetry” (1580?) that poets do not lie, 
because they never affirm anything as fact, which history, for instance, does. On the other 
hand, one might say that the writing o f  truth is not the province o f  poetry. Is poetry, the art o f  
language, obliged to deliver such truths?
For (Riding) Jackson, the problem o f poetry lies exactly in its textual, artificial condition: 
she criticizes poets for being overly interested in perfecting their styles, and poetry as a stock 
o f  “ styles” and “ special effects” available to tradition. However, how can we imagine poetry—  
where what is said is always connected with how is said— a^s an art that does not employ all the 
available linguistic resources (metaphor, imagery, rhyme, sound etc)? Wasn’t it Riding herself
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who asserted that in a close reading all the features o f  a poem are important?-Isn’t poetry 
language that calls attention to itself? Didn’t she speak, in The Telling, o f “ the common risks o f 
language, where failure stalks in every word” ? (66). Isn’t this risk implicit in the writing o f 
poetry? Didn’t she say that poetry is to make words do more than express, that it is a pushing 
at the limit o f  language? In this respect, it is interesting to hear Paul Auster’s position:
Laura Riding is clearly interested in problems that extend beyond the scope o f  poetry, 
and by dwelling on these problems as if they were poetry’s exclusive concerns, she only 
confiises the issue. She did not have to renounce poetry because o f  any objective 
inadequacy in poetry itself—for it is no more or less adequate than any other activity—  
but because poetry as she conceived o f  it was no longer capable o f  saying what she 
wanted to say. She now feels that she had ‘reached poetry’s limits.’ But what really 
happened, it would seem, is that she had reached her own limit in poetry. (The Art 69) 
There are several aspects o f  Laura Riding’s work that were not covered by this study. In 
order to show the fiiU importance o f  Riding’s work to contemporary poetry, fiction, and 
criticism, other studies on Laura (Riding Jackson are necessary. Susan Sontag, Helen Vendler,
and Harry Mathews were some o f  the critics able to recognize Riding’s achievement as a writer 
o f  fiction. However, there are few studies on this aspect o f Riding’s work. A study on the 
collection o f  short stories Progress of Stories (1935) as well as Anarchism is N ot Enough (1925) 
would increase the range o f  appreciation o f  the peculiarities o f  Riding’s essays and narrative 
methods. Another turning point o f  Riding’s career as a writer is the prose work The Tellings 
which she calls “a personal evangel” and where she undertakes her linguistic project o f  the 
language o f  the mind, aiming at a “ zero-degree o f  writing,” or a styleless style, so to speak. Her 
subject in this book, as she says, “ is all ourselves, the human reality” (49).
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In the area o f gender studies, an interesting research might focus the complex 
relationship between her work and feminisms, as well as her position on the topic o f gender, as 
expressed in the historical novel A  Trojan Ending (1937), in the study Uves of Wives (1939), and 
in The Word Woman and Other Related Writings (1993), wherein she criticizes the cultural 
construction o f gender. Because modernism is too often thought o f  as a male movement, the 
fact that women were not mere co-participants in the modemist adventure but were often 
enough main players (be it as poets, critics, editors etc.) has been occluded. A study on the 
tradition o f  subversion in American poetry, experimental at its core, might begin with Emily 
Dickinson, encompass Gertrude Stein, Muriel Rukeyser, Laura Riding, Lorine Niedecker, and 
reach contemporary poets such as Norma Cole, Susan Howe, Lyn Hejinian, and Juliana Spahr, 
clearly demonstrating altemative versions o f  modemism and postmodemism.
For my part, my forthcoming book Mindscapes: Poemas de Laura Riding, to be released by 
Editora Iluminuras in the beginning o f 2001, containing thirty eight translations o f  Riding’s 
poems into Portuguese, will be a direct contribution to the field. In the year o f  her centenary, 
the book will be the first collection o f her poems to be published in book-form outside the U. 
S. and Great Britain. The book, bilingual, has the following stmcture: 1) An introductory essay, 
based on my findings in the present thesis; 2) Thirty eight poems, collected from First 
Awakenings, Colkcted Poems, and from the broadside “How a Poem Comes to Be” (1980); 3) 
Gallery: a section o f  photographs; 4) Bibliographical references; and 5) an Appendix o f  short 
critical texts on Riding’s poetry by invited authors (Elizabeth Friedmann, Charles Bemstein, 
Mark Jacobs, John Nolan, Michael Palmer, Ben Friedlander, Jerome Rothenberg, Pierre Joris, 
and Lisa Samuels). I hope this thesis and the forthcoming book can contribute to making 
Laura Riding’s work more visible and known.
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APPENDIX'
THE MAP OF PLACES
The map o f places passes.
The reality o f paper tears.
Land and water where they are 
Are only where they were 
When words read hen and here 
Before ships happened there.
Now on naked names feet stand.
No geographies in the hand.
And paper reads anciendy.
And ships at sea 
Turn round and round.
All is known, all is found.
Death meets itself everywhere.
Holes in maps look through to nowhere.
 ^ The reproduction o f  the poems herein included is authorized by The Board o f  Literary 
Management o f the late Laura (Riding Jackson.
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BEYOND
Pain is impossible to describe 
Pain is the impossibility o f describing 
Describing what is impossible to describe 
Which must be a thing beyond description 
Beyond description not to be known 
Beyond knowing but not mystery 
Not mystery but pain not plain but pain 
But pain beyond but here beyond
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ELEGY IN A SPIDER WEB
What to say when the spider
Say when the spider what
When the spider the spider what
The spider does what
Does does dies does it not
Not live and then not
Legs legs then none
When the spider does dies
Death spider death
Or not the spider or
What to say when
To say always
Death always
The dying of always
Or alive or dead
What to say when I
When I or the spider
No I and I what
Does what does dies
No when the spider dies
Death spider death
Death always I
Death before always
Death after always
Dead or alive
Now and always
What to say always
Now and always
What to say now
Now when the spider
What does the spider
The spider what dies
Dies when then when
Then always death always
The dying of always
Always now I
What to say when I
When I what
When I say
When the spider
Wlien I always
Death always
When death what
Death I says say
Dead spider no matter
How thorough death
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Dead or alive 
No matter death 
How diorough I 
Wliat to say when 
When who when the spider 
When life when space 
The dying of oh pity 
Poor how thorough dies 
No matter reality 
Death always 
What to say 
When who 
Death always
Wlien death when the spider
When I who I
What to say when
Now before after always
When then the spider what
Say what when now
Legs legs then none
When the spider
Death spider death
The genii who cannot cease to know
What to say when the spider
When I say
When I or the spider
Dead or alive the dying of
Who cannot cease to know
Who death who I
The spider who when
What to say when
Who cannot cease
Who cannot
Cannot cease
Cease
Cannot
The spider
Death
I
We
The genii 
To know
What to say when the 
Who cannot 
When the spider what 
Does what does dies 
Death spider death 
Who cannot 
Death cease death 
To know say what 
Or not the spider
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Or if I say 
Or if 1 do not say 
Wlio cannot cease to know 
Who know the genii 
Wlio say die I 
Who they we cannot 
Death cease death 
To know say I 
Oh pity poor pretty 
How thorough life love 
No matter space spider 
How horrid reality 
What to say when 
What when 
Who cannot 
How ceas^
The knowing o f always 
Who these this space 
Before after here 
Life now my face 
The face love the 
Tlie legs real when 
What time death always 
What to say then 
What time the spider
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TI IE WORLD AND I
This is not exactly what I mean 
Any more than the sun is the sun.
But how to mean more closely 
If the sun shines but approximately? 
What a world of awkwardness!
What hostile implements of sense! 
Perhaps this as close a meaning 
As perhaps becomes such knowing. 
Else I think the world and I 
Must live together as strangers and die- 
A sour love, each doubtfiil whether 
Was ever a thing to love the other.
No, better for both to be nearly sure 
Each of each— exactly where 
Exactly I and exacdy the world 
Fail to meet by a moment, and a word.
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POET; A LYING WORD
You have now come with me, I have now come with you, to the season that 
should be winter, and is not: we have not come back
We hâve not come back; we have not come round; we have not moved. I have 
taken you, you have taken me, to the next and next span, and the last—and it is the 
last. Stand against me dien and stare well throu^ me then. It is a wall not to be 
scaled and left behind like the old seasons, like the poets who were the seasons.
Stand against me then and stare well throu^ me then. I am no poet as you have 
span by span leapt the high words to the next depth and season, the next season 
always, tlie last always, and the next. I am a true wall; you may but stare me through.
It is a f^se wall, a poet; it is a lying word. It is a wall that closes and does not.
This is no wall tliat closes and does not. It is a wall to see into, it is no other 
season’s height. Beyond it lies no depth and height of fiarther travel, no partial 
courses. Stand against me then and stare well throu^ me then. Like wall o f poet 
here I rise, but am no poet as walls have risen between next and next and made false 
end to leap. A last, true wall am I; you may but stare me through.
And the tale is no more of the going; no more a poet’s tale o f a going false-like 
to a seeing. The tale is o f a seeing true-like to a knowing ; there’s but to stare the 
wall through now, well through.
It is not a wall, it is not a poet. It is not a lying wall, it is not a lying word. It is a 
written edge of time. Step not across, for then into my mouth, my eyes, you fall. 
Come close, stare me well through, speak as you see. But, oh, infatuated drove of 
lives, step not across now. Into my mouth, my eyes, shall you thus fall, and be 
yourselves no more.
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Into my mouth, my eyes, I say, I say. 1 am no poet like transitory wall to lead you 
on into such slow terrain o f time as measured out your single span to broken turns of 
season once and once again. I lead you not. You have now come with me, I have 
now come witli you, to your last turn and season: thus could I come with you, thus 
only.
I say, I say, I am, it is, such wall, such poet, such not lying, such not leading into. 
Await the sight, and look well through, know by such standing still that next comes 
none o f you.
Comes what? Come this even I, even this not-I, this not lying season when death 
holds the year as steady count—this every-year.
Would you not see, not know, not mark the count? What would you then? Wliy 
have you come here then? To leap a wall that is no wall, and a true wall? To step 
across into my eyes and mouth not yours? To cry me down like wall or poet as often 
your way led past down-falling height that seemed?
I say, I say, I am, it is: such wall, such end of graded travel. And if you will not 
hark, come tumbling then upon me, into my eyes, my mouth, and be die backward 
utterance of yourselves expiring angrily through instant seasons that played you time- 
false.
My eyes, my mouth, my hovering hands, my intransmutable head: wherein my 
eyes, my mouth, my hands, my head, my body-self, are not such mortal simulacrum 
as everlong in boasted death-course, nevelong? I say, I say, I am not builded o f you
so.
This body-self, this wall, tliis poet-like address, is that last barrier long shied o f in 
your elliptic changes: out o f your leaping, shying, season-quibbling, have I made it, is 
it made. And if now poet-like it rings with one-more-time as if, this is the mounted 
stupor of your everlong outbiding worn prompt and lyric, poet-like— t^he forbidden 
one-more-time worn time-like.
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Does it seem I ring, 1 sing, I rhyme, I poet-wit? Shame on me than! Grin me 
your foulest humour then of poet-piety, your eyes rolled up in white hypocrisy—  
should I be one sprite more of your versed fame—or turned from me into your 
historied brain, where the lines read more actual? Shame on me then!
And haste unto us both, my shame is yours. How long I seem to beckon like 
a wall beyond which stretches longer length o f fleshsome traverse; it is your lie o f 
flesh and my flesh-seeming stand o f words. Haste then unto us both! I say, I say. 
This wall reads ‘Stop!’ This poet verses ‘Poet; a lying word!’
Shall the wall then not crumble, as to walls is given? Have I not said; ‘Stare 
me well through’? It is indeed a wall, cnomble it shall. It is a wall o f walls, stare it 
well through; the reading gendes near, the name o f death passes with the season that 
it was not.
Death is a very wall. The going over walls, against walls, is a dying and a 
learning. Death is a knowing-death. Known death is truth sighted at die halt. The 
name of death passes. The mouth that moves with deadi forgets the word.
And the first page is the last o f death. And haste unto us both, lest the wall 
seem to crumble not, to lead mock-onward. And the first page reads; ‘Haste unto us 
both!’ And the firt page reads; “Slowly, it is the first page only.’
Slowly, it is the page before the first page only, there is no haste. Tlie page 
before the first page tells o f deadi, haste, slowness; how truth fells true now at the 
turn of the page, at time of telling. Tmth one by one falls true. And the first page 
reads, the page which is the page before the first page only; ‘This once-upon-a-time 
when seasons failed, and time stared through the wall nor made to leap across, is the 
hour, the season, seasons, year and years, no wall and wall, where when and when 
the classic lie dissolves and nakedly time salted is with truth’s sweet flood nor yet to 
mix with, but be salted tidal-sweet—O sacramental ultimate by which shall time be 
old-renewed nor yet another season move.’ I say, I say.
